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THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 9, 2010 In report on gulf oil spill, BP spreads the blame
Four-month inquiry cites several ‘complex and interlinked’ failures
BY STEVENMUFSON
AND DAVID HILZENRATH BP rolled out the results
Wednesday of a four-month inter- nal investigation into the causes of the April 20 blowout of its Macondo oil well in the Gulf of Mexico, spreading blame among its contractors and giving a glimpse of the defenses it might deploy in public and in court. The much-anticipated report
asserted that a “complex and in- terlinked series” of failures — of equipment, engineering and judgment—led to the surge of oil and gas that exploded on the deck of theDeepwaterHorizon drilling rig, killing 11 people, sinking the rig and triggering the worst oil spill inU.S. history. The report was written by a
team of 50 internal and external experts ledbythecompany’shead of safety and operations, Mark Bly, and the rollout Wednesday morning at a hotel in downtown Washington was labeled a “tech- nical briefing.” But the document inevitably
carries a heavy public relations element as well as legalandfinan- cial implications for BP. It arrives as the Justice Department is weighing whether to bring charg- es of criminal negligence against BP that could sharply increase the cost of the spill for the Lon-
What BP says went wrong BP’s report outlines a chain of eight likely failures that combined to create the massive oil spill in Gulf of Mexico.
BP’s version of events (starting at the bottom of the well) and who the company seems to be blaming:
Methane cloud
Deepwater Horizon rig
8. Blowout preventer failed Riser
containing drill pipe
Aſter the explosion, the rig operator tried to disconnect the rig from the blowout preventer, but the needed electronic cables were damaged. Either of two control boxes should have automatically triggered emergency measures, but one box had a defective valve, and a battery was nearly dead in the other. Robots probably activated the BOP 33 hours later, but “blind shear rams,” which should have closed and severed the pipe, never fully closed.
BP blames: Transocean
Blowout preventer
Seafloor
About 5,000 feet below the water surface
U.S. COAST GUARD VIA ASSOCIATED PRESS
Aday after the blowout on BP’sMacondo oil well in the Gulf ofMexico, crews battled the blaze on the damaged rig. BP’s internal report on the disaster emphasizes “shared responsibility.”
don-based oil giant and provide fodder for private lawsuits. In addition, there is legislation
in Congress thatwouldeffectively strip BP of the right to drill in the Gulf of Mexico. The company is
haggling with the Obama admin- istration over what pieces of col- lateral to offer while it is financ- ing the $20 billion escrow fund that will be used to pay claims. AndBP’smainpartner in the well,
Anadarko Petroleum, has de- clared that it won’t pay its share of the cleanup costs and claims because it views BP’s well design and actions as reckless. The BP report makes the case
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for “shared responsibility,” saying that “no single factor” caused the blowout. It points to multiple failures by its contractors in maintenance, equipment and planning. The investigation found fault
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with the recipe Halliburton used in its cement, with the flaps on a Weatherford International barri- er device known as a float collar, and with the condition of hydrau- lic lines and batteries that might have sapped power from the blowout preventer made by Cam- eron International and operated by Transocean, making it impos- sible to clamp and cut through steel piping. “Transoceanwassolely respon-
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sible for operation of the drilling rig and for operations safety,” the report says in an appendix. “It was required to maintain well control equipment and use all reasonable means to control and prevent fire and blowouts.” The report also said Transoce-
an and BP rig leaders jointly “reached the incorrect view” on well tests in the crucial hours before the explosion.AndBly said BP needs to reexamine the way it oversees work by its contractors.
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BP’s design not faulted Yet the report absolves BP’s
widely criticized well design. It says the path that oil and gas followed as they escaped from the well meant that the well’s casing and design — matters that could otherwise implicate BP — were not factors in the disaster. In- stead, it says that if any one of eight failures of equipment or decision-making had not taken place, the blowout would not have happened. The report not only offers new
details and analysis of what went wrong, it also represents a bold declaration thatBPis not going to assume more thanwhat it consid- ers its share of the blame for the accident. The report did not say how far up the BP corporate ladder the well problems went, and no employee was named or punished. In a news release, BP chief
executiveTonyHayward,whohas barely spoken publicly since his disastrous congressional testimo- ny in June, did not offer anything resembling a mea culpa. Instead, Hayward, who has
agreed to step down Oct. 1, said, “It is evident that a series of complex events, rather than a single mistake or failure, led to the tragedy.” He added, “Multiple parties, includingBP,Halliburton and Transocean, were involved.” BP’s contractors fired back at
the company, as did some mem- bers of Congress who think BP should shoulder responsibility for the accident and be harshly punished for the damage to the Gulf Coast’s environment and economy. Rep. Edward J. Markey (D-
Mass.), a senior member of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, said that“BPishappy to slice up blame, as long as they get the smallest piece.” Transocean, the world’s largest
operator of deepwater drilling rigs, issued a statement saying, “This is a self-serving report that attempts to conceal the critical factor that set the stage for the Macondo incident: BP’s fatally flawed well design.” It added: “In both its design and construction,
Total depth 18,360 feet
NOTE: Drilling
components not to scale
Casing pipe
7. Fire prevention was inadequate Te methane cloud was sucked into the heating and air-conditioning system and into the engine rooms, which forced at least one engine to work too hard. Engine sparks may have ignited the explosions. BP blames: Transocean
6. Gas was directed onto the rig Te overwhelmed separater vented a cloud of combustible methane directly onto the rig. BP blames: Transocean
5. Crew’s actions did not work In addition to trying to close the blowout preventer, the crew chose to channel the oil and gas flow to a device on the rig called a “mud gas separater” rather than divert it overboard. Te separater was not designed for huge flows. BP blames: Transocean
Oil and gas 4. Oil flowed unnoticed
As oil and gas sped toward the surface, pressure in the well rose noticeably, but no one took action for about 40 minutes.
BP blames: Transocean Casing pipe Drill pipe 3. Pressure test was misinterpreted
Although pressure within the well rose when it should have dropped, onsite leaders concluded that the well was fine.
BP blames: Transocean and BP 2. Bottom barriers leaked
Te same problematic cement, together with a two-valve device, should have kept oil out of the bottom of the casing. Te valves didn’t fully close, and the cement leaked.
BP blames: Halliburton Cement 1. Cement did not seal
Oil and gas reservoirs
Te cement mix did not form a solid barrier, letting nitrogen out and letting oil and gas in.
BP blames: Halliburton and BP
Nitrogen
SOURCE: BP BONNIE BERKOWITZ AND TODD LINDEMAN/THE WASHINGTON POST
Casing Oil
Valve
BP made a series of cost-saving decisions that increased risk—in some cases, severely.”
Halliburton fires back Halliburton also decried the
report, in which it was faulted for using too much nitrogen in a foamlike cement mixture that BP’s team said was “very likely unstable” and that one investiga- tor compared to shaving cream going flat. The report said that Halliburton had not properly tested the cement slurry and that requests for samples from Halli- burton were rebuffed. But BP asked an independent lab to cre- ate a “representative sample,” based on the known design of the cement, and found through its own testing that, as investigator Kent Corsor put it, “The slurry was too thin.” Halliburton replied in a state-
ment that “the well owner is responsible for designing the well program and any testing related to the well. Contractors do not specify well design or make deci- sions regarding testing proce- dures as that responsibility lies with the well owner.” Halliburton added that BP’s
report has “a number of substan- tial omissions and inaccuracies,” but it did not say what those are. Weatherford declined to com-
ment. BP said that even in the final
minutes before the explosion, di- saster might have been averted if the gas had been directed off the rig. Instead it was sent to a mud gas separator, which vented the gas onto the rig. One issue that BP’s critics have cited has been the company’s
Onwashingtonpost.com Watch video coverage of BP’s findings and read the company’s full report.
decision to use only six instead of 21 centralizers, devices for center- ing the drill pipe in the well. But the BP report said that
there was no evidence of “chan- neling” by gas above the main oil- and gas-bearing reservoir, and that as a result the decision to go ahead with just six centralizers “likely did not contribute to the cement’s failure to isolate the main hydrocarbon zones.” The BP investigatory group, in
an effort to avoid internal con- flicts, drew on internal drilling experts from places such as Alas- ka rather than the Gulf ofMexico. The group also brought in outside experts and hired third parties to conduct tests. They drew on in- terviewswith rigworkers, e-mails and data transmitted to shore. But they lacked evidence from
inside the blowout preventer, which was lifted from the sea floor Friday and is in government custody. Though BP officials said the
investigation team had been giv- en wide authority and indepen- dence, Bly said he briefed execu- tives and board members on sev- eral occasions. And the investiga- tion did not address issues of the company’s safety culture. Asked whether the probe over-
lapped with his area of responsi- bility, Bly said that he dealt “at a very high level.” He said, “You could say that the investigation caused me to investigate things related to me,” but “it’s a some- what distant linkage.” He saidhedoes not believe that
widely cited pressures to save time and money on the expensive rig were to blame for the disaster. “My viewis that we didn’t see any indications that support that.”
mufsons@washpost.com hilzenrath@washpost.com
Staff writer Joel Achenbach contributed to this report.
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