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team, including Vice President JD Vance, views him as a transactional actor who can deliver results when prop- erly incentivized.


By appealing to Erdogan’s ego, praising him publicly, and granting Turkey a visible role in the Gaza talks, Trump has eff ectively turned Ankara’s desire for relevance into a tool of American diplomacy.


That approach has yielded limited but tangible results. Erdogan was instrumental in per- suading Hamas to accept the initial ceasefi re terms and has maintained relative discipline among Palestin- ian factions.


For now, that stability has served both U.S. and Israeli inter- ests by helping to get 20 living hostages returned to Israel in October while at


tob whil least


defense ties, and equated Netanyahu with Hitler — a line that still resonates among his Islamist base. He continues to shelter Hamas political leaders and allows pro-Hamas activists to operate openly in Turkey. Jerusalem’s recent message to Washington is clear:


Turkish troops in Gaza are unacceptable. Nevertheless, Trump’s peace plan assigns Turkey a seat


at the table, refl ecting the reality that no agreement in the region can hold without Ankara’s involvement. From a strategic perspective, this makes Israel’s task


twofold. It must cooperate where necessary, while quietly ensuring that any “Turkish role” remains ceremonial, lim- ited to reconstruction contracts or humanitarian logistics, not security. Erdogan, for his part, is already touting Turkish con-


tem-


porarily halting the cycle of retaliatory violence that has plagued the region.


But Trump’s challenge lies in ensuring Turkey’s participation


doesn’t


mutate into dominance. Israel has made it clear that any Turkish military presence in Gaza is a red line, and with good reason. Ankara’s history of covert aid to Hamas and its weap- onization of Islamist rheto- ric make it an unreliable “peacekeeper.”


Turkish-Israeli


Over the past decade, relations


have lurched between tac- tical cooperation and out- right hostility. Erdogan


expelled Israeli ambassador, Recep Tayyip Erdogan


Born in 1954 in Istanbul Prime minister 2003-2014, president 2014-present Erdogan has overseen historic change since he came to power after years of secular domination. He has never lost an election. Critics say he has trampled on civil liberties and behaved like an autocrat. Ruled under a state of emergency in the wake of the 2016 failed coup, with tens of thousands of political opponents arrested in an unprecedented crackdown. Supporters say he’s given a voice to Turkey’s Muslim majority and brought economic prosperity.


struction companies as ideal partners for rebuilding the Strip — a move that is both economically and politically motivated. From dispatching drones to Ukraine, blocking Sweden’s


NATO accession before extracting concessions, to mediat- ing between Azerbaijan and Armenia, Erdogan has proven adept at monetizing his geopolitical leverage. Each move underscores the notion that Ankara cannot


be ignored. Erdogan seeks to be at the center of every nego- tiation, regardless of side or principle. In practical terms, it means playing both Washington


and Moscow — buying U.S.-made F-16s while negotiating for Russian S-400 missiles, condemning Israeli strikes while coordinating with NATO intelligence. In essence, the global arsonist and the fi refi ghter. To the East, he presents Turkey as a defender of Mus-


lim causes against Western imperialism. To the West, he frames his nation as a bulwark of stability against Russia and Iranian expansionism. To both, he off ers himself as the mediator who can talk to anyone from Vladimir Putin to Hamas leaders. This dual posture infuriates some in Washington but


the cut


intrigues Trump, who sees in Erdogan a strongman he can do business with. Their rapport seems genuine. The Trump-Erdogan relationship hinges on mutual


interest rather than shared values. Erdogan seeks recogni- tion and leverage while Trump seeks results. If handled wisely, this transactional bond could yield


benefi ts for American strategic interests, helping to stabi- lize Gaza, contain Iran, and remind the rest of the region that Washington remains the indispensable arbiter of Middle Eastern peace. But let’s not be naive. Turkey’s track record suggests


that Erdogan’s ultimate loyalty is to Erdogan. Any U.S. partnership must be conditional, coupled with clear red lines against Turkish expansion and overstepping. Eco- nomic levers in trade, defense procurement, and sanctions relief remain Washington’s best tools to manage Ankara’s behavior.


DECEMBER 2025 | NEWSMAX 57


ALEX WONG/GETTY IMAGES


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