A force, not a fleet
Will the UK's investment in uncrewed systems be enough? Nick Watts, VP of EuroDefense UK, examines the risks behind the ambition.
U
kraine has shown how quickly drones can dominate a battlespace. Both sides now use
uncrewed systems across an expanding range of missions, while Ukraine has built a maritime capability around remotely operated vessels. NATO members, including the UK,
have been studying this evolution closely. The question is whether they have understood the full lesson. When the Ministry of Defence published its Defence Investment Plan, much of the attention focused on the £5bn allocated to advanced uncrewed systems over the remainder of this Parliament, up to 2029/30. The figure includes £1.5 billion for a Hybrid Navy and £1.6 billion for Army drones and ASGARD, its AI-enabled digital targeting system. The plan also promises additional autonomous capability for the Royal Air Force, including the development of uncrewed combat aircraft. The Armed Forces must move
towards a genuinely integrated force, while industry has four years to deliver
the autonomous systems, software and infrastructure promised by the plan. That means moving at drone speed. But speed cannot be measured simply by how quickly the money is spent or how many platforms are ordered. The more uncomfortable question is whether the UK is building a coherent and survivable uncrewed capability, or merely acquiring a larger collection of machines.
Platforms are not capability Liam Hutcheson, UK director at counter-UAS specialist MyDefence, argues that headline platform numbers are the wrong measure of progress. “The risk is that Britain measures
its uncrewed ambition by the number of platforms it buys, rather than by how many can complete a mission in a drone-saturated battlespace,” he said. Ukraine is procuring uncrewed
ground vehicles at significant scale to move supplies, support engineering work and reduce soldiers’ exposure. Yet the battlefield has also demonstrated that almost any movement can attract surveillance, followed rapidly by attack.
A ground robot carrying ammunition
remains a target. An autonomous vehicle is still vulnerable to recon-naissance drones, first-person-view attacks and electronic disruption.
“Britain could spend billions building an
uncrewed fleet only to discover it cannot operate inside the threat environment it was designed for,” Hutcheson said. “Without counter-UAS protection, these assets risk becoming expensive equipment that cannot safely leave the operating base.” Interceptor drones are only one link in
a larger chain. They depend on detection, classification, command and control, and a decision to engage. If uncrewed vehicles, counter-UAS sensors and effectors are acquired through separate programmes and integrated only later, the UK risks buying systems that were never designed to operate together. Hutcheson argues that survivability should therefore be included in every uncrewed requirement from the beginning. Each programme, he suggests, should have to answer a simple question: “How will this system continue operating when the sky above it is full of enemy drones?”
Autumn 2026 | Advance 57
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