Steven Barrett, founder and CEO of Cambridge Aerospace, established the company in 2024 in response to developments in Ukraine and the growing use of Russian variants of Iran’s Shahed one-way attack drones. Cambridge Aerospace is developing SkyHammer, a low-cost interceptor built using commercial, off-the-shelf components. It also plans a Norfolk facility to manufacture solid rocket motors and their constituent chemicals, creating a more sovereign supply chain. In August 2026, Cambridge
Aerospace raised a further $300 million at a company valuation of $3.4 billion. This is very different from dealing with a small commercial drone near a prison, airport or data centre, but it demonstrates how quickly the scale of the problem can change. It also raises questions about whether the UK has enough affordable systems and domestic manufacturing capacity to protect many dispersed sites during a sustained attack.
The next threat Technology is continuing to change the balance between drone operators and those attempting to stop them. Jamming remains effective against many remotely controlled systems, but its value may decline as drones become more autonomous. Barrett, a former professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, said technologies now appearing in Ukraine could be traced back to laboratory research carried out a decade ago. “I can tell you with certainty we will
have fully autonomous drones that will be able to target and react and evade and strike things,” he said. “We really need to develop, as a nation and as allies, ways to counter those.”
“Empowering the
judiciary…would be a meaningful step”
Reports from Ukraine suggest Russia is already experimenting with artificial intelligence aboard fixed-wing Molniya drones to help them operate despite electronic warfare. Similar developments could eventually reach larger one-way attack systems. Despite these concerns, Barrett pointed to the strength of the UK’s security and intelligence services, while Venables described the counter- drone community as one of the most progressive areas of policing because the threat is constantly evolving.
Clearer lines
The UK is not starting from scratch. It has capable police and security services, an expanding counter-drone industry, new investment and a growing range of technical options. What remains less clear is how those capabilities fit together when a drone appears above a privately operated site. Several government departments and agencies referred questions about ultimate responsibility elsewhere, reinforcing the impression of a distributed system that is not always easy to explain.
That does not mean no response
exists. Security arrangements around critical infrastructure are understandably sensitive, and the lead organisation may change with the site and severity of the threat. But infrastructure operators need to
know who to contact, where their own authority ends and how quickly support can arrive.
The Home Office may hold national accountability, but the practical response is divided between site operators, police, regulators, security agencies and, in exceptional circumstances, the military. Britain has many of the technologies, institutions and legal powers needed to protect its critical infrastructure. The unresolved challenge is ensuring everybody knows who must act, and that the response has been tested before a hostile drone arrives.
40 Advance | Autumn 2026
SECURITY
Photo credit: dsheremeta/
stock.adobe.com
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