DEFENCE
The US and Israel also conducted a
large number of strikes against launch vehicles, warehouses and other parts of Iran’s strike complex. Those attacks reduced both the size of the salvos Iran could generate and the depth of its remaining magazine, while the regional air defence effort ensured that the depletion continued for minimal returns. If Russia deployed massed drone and combined missile strikes against NATO, it would be essential for the UK and its partners to address both salvo rate and magazine depth. That can only be done through offensive systems as well as defensive ones. The Defence Investment Plan includes several measures to support this, including funding for Stratus, the MBDA-developed cruise missile designed to replace Storm Shadow, as well as investment in Lockheed Martin’s Precision Strike Missile. In July, the UK and 11 other nations announced their
intention to invest around £37.79 billion in deep precision-strike capabilities over the next four years.
This indicates that the UK will gain capabilities that can be used for this purpose. However, there are notable challenges, including the integration of SPEAR 3 onto the F-35B. Recent tests with inert missiles confirmed that they can be carried internally and allowed data to be collected. This type of capability, combined
with the F-35’s sensor suite and stealth characteristics, is designed for countering advanced air defence systems and conducting complex strike missions. Addressing this gap will be essential to rounding out the UK’s conventional capabilities and is therefore tied to readiness for the drone threat. Beyond that, the UK and broader
NATO need enough offensive munitions and missiles to conduct and sustain
“Britain’s counter-drone problem is no longer simply one of capability”
such a campaign. CSIS estimates that the US campaign under Epic Fury consumed 13,800 munitions, including 1,000 Tomahawks. If European states are serious about their defence, including against drones, they will need similarly deep stockpiles. Britain’s counter-drone problem is no longer simply one of capability. It is one of quantity. The Armed Forces can defeat drones, but a peer adversary would seek to overwhelm those defences through scale and repetition. Success would depend on deeper defensive stockpiles and the offensive reach to break the attack at its source.
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