DEFENCE
“Small drones used in tactical settings are here to stay”
a short-range directional jammer, alongside Cortexa Guardian, a static camera and radar system for detection. They also appeared to use the K-CEMA Neo, a man-portable jammer providing area protection. Flytrap is experimental, so this does not mean that all the systems used there are in service. However, the British Army is not yet in contract, and while it needs to adapt to the drone threat, it has time to explore what works and what does not. It can gather lessons from peers in Israel, Ukraine and elsewhere on the technologies involved and the tactics that work. Arguably, the British Army could deploy to many locations now and
its forces would be well prepared for the threat of drones. The main confounding factors are scale and reconnaissance drones. Scale means that the Army may be able to handle low-intensity drone use but could struggle if densities are very high or the force is widely dispersed. Reconnaissance drones refer to systems such as Russia’s Orlan-30, a fixed-wing design used to designate targets for tactical ballistic missiles, artillery and loitering munitions.
The Orlan-30 can fly at around 15,000 ft, putting it beyond the reach of most systems except Rapid Sentry or Stormer. Before the Defence Investment Plan, the Army had a requirement for short-range air defence, including a cannon-based system to intercept drones, which would be a welcome addition against this type of threat.
When drones become missiles The other drones causing concern are arguably closer to cruise missiles. Iran’s Shahed and Russia’s Geran systems tend to accumulate more advanced capabilities over time, eventually converging on a design that is much closer to a cruise missile than when they started. That constant evolution is also shaping industry thinking. Matt Foster, CEO of Callen-Lenz, describes it as a continuing “game of cat and mouse between drone and counter-drone technology”, with cost-per-effect remaining an important consideration on both sides. Broadly speaking, drones like the
Shahed are relatively simple threats: they are large, slow, and often fly at low altitude. In Ukraine, this has enabled mobile response forces to bring them down with 12.7 mm heavy machine guns for some time. Increased operating
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