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“When the chips are down, chances


are their priorities are going to lie with their home nation,” says Annalisa Russell-Smith, CSO at Flyby Technology. “One way to solve this problem is for the government to build capacity in anticipation of needing it, as we did before the Second World War.” Parker believes that task may


require an industrialist with military understanding and direct authority from the prime minister, similar to Lord Beaverbrook’s wartime role in aircraft production. “What we are doing as an industry


is arguing about whatever was in the Defence Investment Plan, which is for all intents and purposes money already spent,” adds Russell-Smith. “What we actually need is a concerted effort today on what we can produce in this country and how quickly we can produce it.”


The difficult bargain Building production capacity before it is urgently needed presents an uncomfortable political and economic problem.


56 Advance | Autumn 2026


Factories may sit partially idle in peacetime. Thousands of drones held in storage may require regular updating or replacement as technology and countermeasures evolve. Maintaining that capacity would cost money without producing an immediate operational return. That may be difficult to sell to officials, politicians and voters. Yet the experience of Ukraine suggests that industrial capacity cannot be created instantly once a conflict has begun. The Civil Aviation Authority says it is enabling more beyond-visual- line-of-sight operations, while new test-site policies are intended to make the testing of larger and longer-range drones easier. Greater access to airspace will help companies develop and demonstrate their technology, but it will not solve the procurement and production problem on its own. Trials must be followed by orders large enough to sustain engineering teams, strengthen supply chains and support continued iteration.


In Old Norse, a “windracer” was a


figure of speech associated with Odin’s legendary eight-legged horse, Sleipnir, a symbol of power, speed and agility. Standing in the Windracers factory, it seemed fitting that the company was preparing to fly an ULTRA from Shetland to Norway for delivery to a customer, subject to regulatory support. It is also a sobering thought that the outcome of a future conflict may depend on whether the UK can learn the right lessons from Ukraine before it is forced to do so under fire. Those lessons are not simply about buying more drones. They are about shortening the distance between operators and engineers, allowing technology to fail and improve, building resilient domestic supply chains and placing sustained orders before an emergency begins. Ukraine has shown that drone


warfare moves at the speed of adaptation. The question for the UK is whether its institutions and industrial base can learn to move at the same pace.


Photo credit: Windracers


TECHNOLOGY


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