Air traffic management
It’s a sentiment Buono echoes, accepting that safety is the overriding priority for aviation and that system failover is a critical component to manage potential hazards. “More needs to be done with manufacturers on standardisation of processes and responses for the critical engineering teams to recognise when an issue has occurred more quickly, to allow them to mitigate,” he says. Noting that modern aircraft have multiple layers of system redundancy to lessen risks and allow them to continue to operate safely, he adds, “We expect nothing less from our ANSPs [air navigation service providers].”
Time to talk training Both men feel August’s events highlighted management misgivings and a failure of training in air traffic control (ATC), an area Buono believes would benefit from greater standardisation across the sector. “Every ANSP buys similar, but different, systems. Each ANSP trains their staff similarly, but differently. Standardisation is key to enabling greater resilience and interoperability,” he says. This calibration, he adds, should not be exclusive to the highly technical systems, but include the key human resources needed to run them. “Simply put, although the technical glitch triggered the chaos, the unworking management channel and insufficient training system accelerated the chaos and amplified its magnitude,” Chang notes. “My biggest fear is that the ethos of ‘good enough’ is still prevalent in the aviation industry. As long as the glitch is not salient and the machine still works, people usually ignore it.” It’s his view that in the weeks since, growing evidence implies that improved training is needed. Looking forward, he believes that if NATS’ managers have well-trained controllers, provide adequate levels of support and communication, instruct SOP guidelines explicitly and practise glitch-identification-and-repairing regularly, the risk of future air traffic chaos would be minimised. “A stitch in time saves nine,” he adds. Buono shares these views on training, saying
the IATA has long called for more flexibility and system-based training for ATC officers (ATCOs). The pandemic meant additional work and research by training organisations and regulators was needed to adapt and develop a framework fit for the “new normal”, he says, making use of technology and combining different layers of virtual in-classroom, simulator and assessment modules. Buono argues that a move towards common standards and harmonisation must be considered to include binding and guiding principles. “Although there are multiple regulations in Europe on interoperability and standardisation of systems, each ANSP creates their own bespoke system and ATCO ratings for their areas of responsibility.”
Future Airport /
www.futureairport.com Airlines left to pick up the bill
“Rubbish” and “full of excuses” were some of the choice words Ryanair CEO Michael O’Leary used to describe NATS’ preliminary report on its findings into the late-August chaos seen at the UK’s airports and across Europe. He told the BBC the disruption would cost his airline alone up to £20m to cover the costs of passengers’ hotels, food and alternative travel and called on NATS to accept responsibility “for its incompetence”. He was not alone in his anger. For Willie Walsh, general director of the IATA, it’s a source of frustration to him that ANSPs across Europe “get away with poor performance every day of the week”, going as far as to brand them “monopoly service providers”. “Economic history tells us monopolies devolve to the most minimum standard of service unless they are strictly regulated,” he says. “If ANSPs have no consequences [for] their mistakes, they will struggle to improve. As it stands, the system rewards failure.” It’s his view that costs continue to rise, environmental targets continue to be missed, and delays continue to increase, with no consequence and high financial returns for ANSPs. “What is needed is an independent regulator to ensure that those responsible for poor service have to recompense customers,” he adds, claiming, “It might create the incentive to better performance that has been blocked through lack of regulation of these monopoly businesses.” Walsh notes the cost of the failure could top £100m for airlines, which had to cover passenger costs, added expenses for crews being out of position and the cost of extra flights that had to be laid on. “Under the present system, NATS, [which was] responsible for the entire fiasco, doesn’t have to pay a penny,” he explains. “That is surely wrong.”
The management style Chang speaks of is also of concern. It can result in a lack of technical expertise among senior managers and elicit a reluctance among employees to put their neck on the line in the event of an incident. Top management may not, says Chang, even understand the technical aspects of incidents, preventing them from comprehending their implications – meanwhile, employees might avoid reporting incidents, sometimes for fear of harming their careers. “Very likely, the ‘ostrich management style’ still exists in the aviation industry, which may take some time to disappear if no intervention is exercised,” he notes.
Air to clear
There is hope, however. Chang says the August chaos has led managers to recognise the importance of communication between technicians and non-technicians. “The attitude change from the management board is meaningful and should be praised,” he says, while encouraging further efforts in this area. “The more two sides talk to each other, the less chance for technical glitches […] resulting in fewer passengers [being] ‘grounded’.” Despite its best attempts of reassurance that such an issue would not reoccur, that the skies had remained safe and the problems had been resolved swiftly, NATS remains in the firing line. “With further issues surfacing recently, such as the lack of [ATC] staff for Gatwick, the question of what other vulnerabilities might be in the system should be raised,” cautions Buono. “NATS has a significant capital investment programme funded by some of the highest air navigation charges anywhere in the world, so lack of money is not the issue. In any event, management has some serious explaining to do.” ●
2,000
The number of flights in UK airspace that were cancelled as a result of the NATS IT failure on 29 August.
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