Transport & logistics
Kharkiv, Ukraine – 31 January 2022: Ukrainian tanks patrol roads in preparation for the Russian invasion.
Fail to prepare
The first error would be to underestimate the opponent. For all its perceived expertise in information warfare, the Kremlin may have fallen for its own propaganda about the illegitimacy of the Ukrainian government. To the extent that he can divine a clear strategy, Shlapak compares it with the “Rumsfeldian” one that typified the 2003 invasion of Iraq: “They didn’t see past crossing the border.
“I think they saw this as almost an administrative move versus an invitation to actual warfare. Telling soldiers they were going on an exercise may in fact reflect what many in the Russian high command thought was going to happen.”
A select few had very clear instructions – if not the tools or support to carry them out. Just hours after the first shots were fired, Russian airborne troops attempted to seize Hostomel airport to the north of Kyiv and Vasylkiv airbase to the south. From there, the plan was to launch a rapid strike on the capital that would depose the Ukrainian government before Russian logistics became too stretched. Neither attack worked. Shlapak sees clear parallels with Arnhem. Like the British paratroopers tasked with capturing the famous bridge in the Netherlands in 1944, Russian airborne forces encountered unexpectedly fierce resistance, and their promised support didn’t arrive in time to turn the tide. “I think they put these guys forward with the anticipation that the mechanised force would rapidly close to relieve them. And, of course, that utterly failed to happen.” So went plan A. Free use of airstrips around Kyiv would have enabled the Russians to put supplies, troops and equipment forward, easing their reliance on roads. Capturing and holding major Ukrainian cities is also key to Russia’s primary logistical concern: control of the railways. The two countries share the same wide-gauge rail network, and Russia – so reliant on trains to move supplies across its vast territory – has relatively few military trucks. Confined to tyres, the Russian army only has capacity to efficiently resupply units roughly 90 miles from depots, according to a War
on the Rocks article by former US Lieutenant Colonel Alex Vershinin. That’s in secured territory with a full complement of trucks. Within weeks of the invasion, Russian logisticians were already repurposing civilian vehicles to replace the hundreds destroyed by Ukrainians. As far as special military operations go, it was the worst of both worlds. Too big for its truck supply, the invasion force was too small to secure any alternative.
Traffic control
As a result, instead of pressing pincers into Kyiv from bases in Hostomel and Vasylkiv, Russia’s main assault on the city wormed ponderously from the north – a 40-mile convoy stalled and hungry on a single road. Commentators looking for a reason it failed to take Kyiv are almost spoiled for choice. Was it the poorly maintained equipment, the muddy conditions, fuel and food shortages, communication breakdowns or Ukrainian attacks that ultimately made the difference? Or was it perhaps the decision to drive right into all those issues at once?
“They seemed totally unprepared, even though they had known for months and months that they were going to be doing this.”
Lieutenant General Ben Hodges
“It’s ridiculous,” says Hodges. “This is basic stuff. Usually, just a brigade on the move requires at least two roads to sustain it. The fact that they had literally thousands of vehicles on one road that they could not get off showed a gross lack of experience.” It’s not the only thing. Russian units across Ukraine have clogged up main roads with tactics more suited to parades than invasions. “You saw these amazing videos of armoured columns moving through villages and towns, with absolutely no flank support and the infantry remaining mounted in their fighting vehicles,” says Shlapak, shocked at Russia’s inability to implement combined arms formations. “To a first year at West
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