Naval capabilities


invasion of Ukraine, where recent events have seen many long-held theories on how modern warfare should be conducted upended and shown to be woefully out of date.


“I think that if ever there was an example of preparing to fight the last war, this looks like it,” says Hine, referring to the difficulties Russian armour, in particular, has come under over the course of the invasion. “It’s made individuals on quadbikes with rocket launchers strategic assets,” he adds, while also noting that the use of Neptune missiles to sink the Moskva “would suggest that there’s a new type of activity going on – one where drones provide targeting in real time with little opportunity to know that it’s happening”.


Here, Hine cites the way in which Russian patrol boats have been targeted by Ukrainian drones, most notably on 2 May, when a Ukrainian Navy TB2 drone engaged and sunk two Russian Raptor assault boats near Snake Island. “What we’re seeing here, again, is a changing conversation on the nature of maritime conflict akin to the introduction of maritime air power in World War Two,” he says. “There remain some truths – fundamentally, you can still operate largely with impunity under the water. You can create disruption by denying people access through relatively cheap mining activity, which then consumes enormous amounts of time and effort. But what seems to be changing is that which we thought was a well-defended, high-end capital warship looks to be vulnerable against a combination of newer technologies.” However, the biggest takeaway in Hine’s opinion, is that “the utility, ubiquity, efficiency, effectiveness, at scale” of autonomous systems has been clearly demonstrated in the conflict. Some 6,000 reconnaissance drones are reportedly being deployed by the Ukrainian army, according to Wired, and Ukraine has received an unknown number of military drones in the shape of Bayraktar TB2s from Turkey and US kamikaze Switchblade drones, which it has used to great effect. Russia has suffered for underinvesting in this area, entering the war with only a small number of its Orion combat drones, many of which were shot down in the early days of the war. “Lots of the negatives that are played out about autonomous systems are being eradicated in real time, as we speak,” Hine says, noting in particular how the war has shown that drones are expendable and disposable in a way that other vehicles are not, at a fraction of the cost. At the same time, unlike crewed vehicles, factors like loss of life do not weigh down decision-making. Others are warning against drawing too many conclusions just yet, and while Hine agrees, he believes that it would be an error not to state that “the level of autonomy being employed is significantly greater and at a higher scale than we have seen elsewhere – it’s demonstrating a shift”.


While the Integrated Review did focus on increasing expenditure and development in autonomous technologies, this shift in the perception over their utility and capability has raised questions over whether the review goes far enough.


“When everything was written, there was no war in Ukraine – so perhaps the timelines need to be accelerated,” Hine says, noting that this would create a host of new challenges. “Do you take more risk on existing capability? Do you retire older capabilities more quickly? Do you take a leap in technology terms and place some bets on things that are probably less mature than we would normally procure?”


Purchase or procure? In Hine’s opinion, the most effective solution to this issue would involve changing the way in which the MOD goes about its procurement system. “The lifecycle of some of these autonomous platforms or capabilities is going to be so fast that you’re going to have to purchase, not procure, and therefore the system will have to adjust,” he says. At the moment, the cycle of procurement is too long to keep up with such changes, which is slowly being acknowledged by the MOD, industry and government. “You’re buying things that are now expendable, disposable, and if you are lucky, may not be obsolete in two years.” With this in mind, industry partnering with the MOD should be looking into solutions that look more like mobile phone provisions – iterative, adaptable and updated on a regular basis. “You never actually necessarily need to own the phone,” Hine adds, noting that the MOD needs a different kind of model if it is to truly exploit existing and future technology, and accelerate their introduction into military service. For example, rather than expensive, high-impact munitions boasted by traditional and favoured capability practitioners, he suggests that navies might be better off investing in large quantities of autonomous drones with smaller charges, to be used in much the same way as Ukrainian forces have been doing to eliminate Russian tanks.


“If you replace like for like, which is largely the [UK] Ministry of Defence’s method of procurement for things, you get something that’s a bit more sophisticated, it goes a bit further, a bit faster, gives a bit more bang – but it also costs you a lot more, and therefore you get a few less,” Hine notes. “That seems to me to be a race to the bottom in terms of the volume of your ability to deliver capability.”


Improved capability


Of course, the greater proliferation of autonomous capability in the Royal Navy will have ramifications that extend far beyond procurement. While national media attention focused on the personnel cuts in the British Army, less focus was placed on the still-considerable cuts to positions within the Royal


Defence & Security Systems International / www.defence-and-security.com


Opposite: The Russian ship Moskva, which was sunk in mid-April – a major casualty for Russian forces.


£1.7bn


The new annual investment in shipbuilding for the Royal Navy as laid out by the Integrated Review in March 2021.


UK MOD 6,000


The number of reconnaissance drones that are reportedly being deployed by the Ukrainian Army.


Wired 35


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