measures, whether from the bunker fuel or any other potential risks of pollution from any other type of oil remaining on board, such as the lubricating oils already mentioned. Measures are in place for an immediate response, should there be further leakage from the ship.”
On whether the IMO’s representative could advise on or endorse the decision to scuttle the Wakashio at the location that was decided upon, the IMO Headquarters spokesperson was very clear that this “was not in the scope of work.”
The IMO Headquarters was very clear that its mandate did not extend to any actions related to the scuttling of the Wakashio. However, in a televised press conference to the Mauritian media while sitting next to the Mauritian Commissioner of Police on 21 August, the IMO representative to Mauritius, said the following:
“It was a planned sinking - the decision what to do with the ship. The ship broke into two pieces. One of those pieces - the bow section - was on the reef and starting to move around. If she had been left there, she would have done more damage to the reef. So, she has to be moved. Options were looked at. Take her off, and then what do you do with her? For a long-distance tow, the ship was going to need some further repair work. Maybe 10 days. Where do we do that?”
It is important to note that the Government of Mauritius statements issued soon after the vessel had split in two on 15 August said there was no longer any oil in the forward section of the Wakashio. In the press conference on 21 August, the IMO representative went on to evaluate each of the five potential sites that had been identified by the Government with the salvors to tow the vessel for repair work.
“Each one of them was somewhere round Mauritius. Each one of them meant taking that piece of the ship to somewhere else around the country that hasn’t been
affected, bringing a risk during the tow, a risk while it was there. Those options were looked at, considered and said, ‘not good.’ Options for sinking the vessel were considered.
Initially three locations
were identified where the waters were deep enough but were in the territorial waters of Mauritius. They were considered. Further advice was taken. Some of that further advice came from neighbouring countries. Reunion had some requests regarding the position. Wildlife considerations were taken into account… In the end, a fourth location was identified where the planned sinking could occur.”
On the specific location of the sinking, the IMO representative was very clear that, “The position has been chosen because it is somewhere safe to deliberately sink the vessel. So, it’s a very considered thing that’s gone on.”
Once more, he emphasized that, “Leaving her where she was, was not an option. Moving her somewhere for a number of days was not an option. The option left was the one that’s been taken. We have this thing in oil spills we talk about called the ‘Net Environmental Benefit Analysis.’ Effectively, that is what has been done. We looked at the options and said what is the impact of each one. And this one was the one that has been chosen as being the best option.”
Within 24 hours of the sinking of the Wakashio, 18 dolphins and whales washed up dead on Mauritius’ beaches. Within five days, there were almost 50 dead whales and dolphins.
Although the press conference mentioned measures that were taken to remove items from the Wakashio, there has still been no independent verification of what materials had been removed and what was left on board. The IMO rules set out very strict procedures and documentation that must be completed before anything can be dumped in the ocean. This documentation has not been disclosed.
76 | The Report • December 2020 • Issue 94
There are only two scenarios under which an IMO representative should have been talking about a decision to deliberately sink the front of a large vessel under the mandate of an OPRC.
• That oil was still on board the vessel. This would be in line with the OPRC agreement that is limited to only evaluating the risk of oil, or
• A new agreement had been signed requesting that the IMO expand its scope to now cover salvage operations (including the decision to deliberately scuttle a large vessel that had not been fully decontaminated).
Despite repeated questions to the IMO by Forbes, no such amended agreement between the IMO and Mauritius has been publicly disclosed. The IMO is supposed to be a transparent UN regulator. Such agreements should be in the public domain for the public interest.
The mission creep of the IMO from oil spill response into salvage advice would be considered a material expansion of its role. This has been - by a long margin - the most controversial environmental decision ever taken in Mauritius’ history and thousands of protestors on the island have been calling this an ecocide. This was not a small oversight for the IMO to have overstepped its mandate and ventured into the salvage and scuttling side of the Wakashio.
It would be seen as a significant conflict of interest for the IMO - who sets several important maritime pollution laws and standards on maritime pollution and laws governing whether a ship can be deliberately sunk at sea (specifically, Marpol Annex V, Ballast Water Management Convention, International Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-fouling Systems on Ships, and Hong Kong Convention on the Safe and Environmentally Sound Recycling of Ships among others) - to be
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