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NTSB ACCIDENT REPORT CONCLUDES THAT INCOMPLETE SAFETY PROCEDURES LED TO BARGE EXPLOSION


The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has published Marine Accident Report 20-34 detailing the findings of its investigation involving the explosion of a barge at the Illinois Marine Towing Heritage Slip on the Chicago Ship and Sanitary Canal, Illinois on the 4 November 2019.


The barge explosion occurred when the IB1940 was being prepared for cleaning after its cargo of acetone had been unloaded. No injuries or pollution were reported in connection with the explosion. The barge, however, was declared a total constructive loss, valued at $1.75M.


In the report, NTSB says the probable cause of the explosion was incomplete procedures that did not incorporate the safety instructions


included in the Illinois Marine Towing Facility Operations Manual for electrical bonding of air movers to barges.


The NTSB’s investigation revealed that while Illinois Marine Towing had written guidance to workers for tasks related to barge cleaning operations before the explosion, the documents did not include all procedures identified in the Facility Operations Manual, specifically guidance for bonding air movers to the barge.


Following the accident, Illinois Marine Towing updated its standard operating procedure for liquid barge strip- and-blow cleanings to a 13-page document that includes instructions for stripping tanks, verifying that all residual product has been removed from tanks, inspecting air movers before leaving the shop, and ensuring the bonding strap is attached and tested for electrical continuity between the air mover horn and the bonding clamp.


Download the report at https://bit.ly/3jgomSA.


LOSS OF TOWLINE SHACKLE PIN LED TO TUGBOAT MANGILAO SINKING REVEALS NTSB ACCIDENT REPORT The loss of a towline shackle pin and deteriorated watertight fittings caused tugboat Mangilao to sink in the Pacific Ocean about 800 miles northwest of Guam, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has revealed in a Marine Accident Brief.


The 114 foot US flagged tugboat Mangilao sank on August 5, 2019 while being towed to a drydock in Subic Bay, Philippines by the 97 foot US flagged tug Chamorro. Both vessels were owned and operated by Cabras Marine Corporation. No one was aboard tugboat Mangilao and there were 10 crew members aboard the Chamorro.


No pollution nor injuries were reported in connection with the sinking. The 1982-built tugboat Mangilao, which was estimated to be worth $437,227, was not recovered.


A US Coast Guard marine inspector completed a dead ship movement inspection before the Chamorro’s departure, and according to the marine inspector, a survey was conducted of the primary and emergency towing arrangements and verification that the exterior structure of the vessel was watertight.


In its analysis, the NTSB indicated that had the chain from the Mangilao’s bow been longer and the shackle extended out beyond the bow fender, the chain, rather than the shackle, would have contacted to bow. This likely would have prevented the shackle pin securing mechanism (cotter pin) from failing, and the tow would have remained connected.


The NTSB determined the probable cause of the sinking of the Mangilao was the failure of the Chamorro’s towing arrangement due to the loss of a towline shackle pin, which left the Mangilao adrift and resulted in the ingress of water from boarding seas in a developing typhoon.


Read the full story and download the report at https://bit.ly/3lWWvZE.


The Report • December 2020 • Issue 94 | 27


Safety Briefings


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