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COLREGS IMPLEMENTATION CALLED INTO QUESTION AFTER VESSELS COLLIDE REVEALS MCIB INVESTIGATION


Ireland’s MCIB has published an investigation report on the collision between the tanker ‘Varkan Ege’ and the sailing vessel ‘Medi Mode’ in Irish waters during August 2019. The investigation attributed the incident to a mix of misunderstanding, inefficient lookout and poor knowledge of COLREGs.


There was neither injury nor pollution by this incident.


Probable causes The cause of this collision is the result of two main factors: 1) The application and implementation, in this case, of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 1972 (COLREGs).


2) Human Factors.


Conclusions The ‘Medi Mode’ believed that no risk of collision existed because the lights were green to green. However, due to yawing from a following wind they were actually showing a red, port side light to the ‘Varkan Ege’ when the lookout observed the vessel. Having taken no compass bearings and also that they had no radar, this could not be definitively determined.


Even though ‘Medi Mode’ saw the ‘Varkan Ege’ in plenty of time, it believed it was the stand on vessel and kept its course and speed in the belief that the ‘Varkan Ege’ would either alter course or would pass clear on their starboard side. This led to a close quarters situation and subsequent collision.


Meanwhile, the ‘Varkan Ege’ reported seeing the red light with a CPA of zero at 02.16 hrs and the collision occurred at 02.22 hrs. This gave it 6 minutes to take proper action to avoid collision. A lookout would have detected this at 4 minutes.


It had six minutes to make a large alteration of course to starboard, as it observed the ‘Medi Mode’ light at a range of 1.5 NM. A course alteration was made at 02.18 hrs, approximately 4 minutes before the collision.


As per COLREGs, the ‘Varkan Ege’ complied with efforts to avoid collision when it became apparent that collision was possible. It altered course to starboard, it reduced speed and requested ‘Medi Mode’ by sound signal to indicate its intentions.


The ‘Varkan Ege’ should not have attempted to communicate via VHF with the sailing vessel when it was so close. This is not recommended, and was not successful. This wasted valuable time when an immediate alteration of course to starboard may have been sufficient to avoid collision.


Recommendations MCIB recommends Ireland’s Minister for Transport, Tourism & Sport to issue a Marine Notice highlighting the requirements set out in Chapter 2 of the Code of Practice (CoP): The Safe Operation of Recreational Craft.


In particular attention should be drawn to: – Chapter 2, para 2.1 of the CoP – Training: It is recommended that persons participating in sailboat and motorboat activities undertake appropriate training. A number of training schemes and approved courses are available and information can be obtained directly from course providers. – Compliance with the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (1972).


Read the full story and download the report at https://bit.ly/3dIzBlH.


The Report • December 2020 • Issue 94 | 25


Safety Briefings


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