Editor’s comment. Whilst IIMS takes a politically neutral stance always and does not necessarily agree with the author’s opinions expressed in this article, it is an explosive and emotive piece of writing that will cause distress for some and provoke anger in others. It makes accusations as to where the fault lies, but those accused have not had the opportunity to respond to the allegations or defend their positions. The article raises more questions than answers. IIMS has no desire to pick a fight with IMO. I thought hard whether to publish the article or not, but on balance felt it important to share it with readers of The Report Magazine as it poses wider questions for the maritime world to ponder. And clearly there are issues for IMO to address and lessons to be learned. Ed.
The Wakashio is not the only wreck in Mauritius. Saying this has not been the finest hour for the global shipping regulator, the UN’s International Maritime Organization (IMO) would be a significant understatement. Following the incident when the Panama-flagged, Japanese-owned vessel ploughed straight into Mauritius’ largest and oldest coral reef system, questions are being asked about the role and effectiveness of IMO.
The IMO was supposed to be the best face of the maritime industry - representing a cleaner, greener, more transparent, responsive and gender- balanced future of global shipping.
In the year that six major UN agreements were to be signed to give greater protection to life in the ocean, one would have thought that a major oil spill amid the fragile coral reefs of a global biodiversity hotspot and high profile tourist destination, would have attracted some of the UN’s best scientists who recognized how important these unique species and ecosystems are, and would have worked night and day along with the Mauritian volunteers who were solely focused on protecting their island’s unique heritage.
Instead, Mauritius received representatives from the oil industry who acted on behalf of a UN agency - the IMO - shutting out local talent, and have been behind a series of increasingly catastrophic interventions that has now led to the loss of four local crew in Mauritius (three confirmed deaths and the captain still missing), the carcasses of almost 50 whales washing up on the Mauritian shoreline, 30km of heavily impacted oil-drenched beaches, a 300m iron ore carrier being deliberately sunk in an unknown location off the coast of Mauritius, and the 75m high stern of the vessel protruding like a giant tombstone on the once pristine coral reefs of Mauritius with no clear plan of how and when this will be removed, as the corals below are ground away each day with the strong currents and the supporting chains from the salvage operation.
Where did it all go wrong?
Here are four factors that could have contributed...
1. IMO Mission Creep
24 August 2020: a date that will go down in infamy in Mauritius’ history books for the deliberate scuttling of the Japanese iron-ore carrier, the Wakashio, in clear weather and calm waters. What was the IMO’s role? The IMO had a very clear mandate when it first landed in Mauritius. Focus only on the oil spill. The salvage operation was out of scope. This was agreed with the Government of Mauritius under the framework of the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation 1990 (OPRC 90).
Salvage was the responsibility of the Japanese P&I Club and the two salvage organizations they had engaged - SMIT Salvage and Nippon Salvage.
As the Wakashio split in two on 15 August, mysterious sediments and liquids mixed with the normally turquoise blue of Mauritius’ coral lagoons in the Indian Ocean. This was 9 days after oil started gushing out from the stricken vessel.
The separation of responsibility for those handling the oil pollution from those handling the salvage operation is a critical distinction for maritime insurance and liability reasons. Getting this wrong would be a very expensive mistake, especially in a place like Mauritius, where it is now believed that the ongoing salvage operation itself (46 days later) could have been just as damaging as the pollution from the oil spill.
On 21 August, as the Wakashio was being controversially towed toward a mysterious location, a spokesperson from IMO Headquarters in London was very clear on the terms under which the IMO was operating in Mauritius, specifying, “The IMO expert’s role is to provide advice specifically on oil pollution response matters.”
The Headquarters spokesperson went on to clarify to Forbes that, “the IMO advice is limited to advising on oil spill response and mitigation
The Report • December 2020 • Issue 94 | 75
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