Containers loaded in compliance with the CSM
It is accepted practice that container loading plans are prepared by shore planners using the computerised loading programs and CSMs, provided by shipowners. This arrangement has been adopted by shipowners because, apparently, neither the master nor the chief officer, has the time or the capability to prepare such plans. Shipowners know that loading plans often do not comply with the CSM resulting in containers being loaded onto vessels in breach of the CSM. Shipowners also know that stevedores disregard loading plans, such as when a container next in the loading sequence, cannot be located. To avoid a possible delay to the sailing schedule, stevedores will load the next available container, regardless of consequences. The GARD Guidance on Freight Containers 2016/Jeroen de Haas explains how shore planners and stevedores, without knowledge of vessel stability, breach the CSM:
As previously indicated, the CSM is valid only for certain GM values, which is problematic if the ship operates at a higher GM value. The following are typical examples which describe the problems and explain the need for lashing software
The same CSM shows that in a certain bay on deck the containers can be stacked six tiers high, and that the tier weight from the base to the top is: 30 t, 20 t, 20 t, 15 t, 10 t, 7 t. The maximum stack weight is then 102 tonnes. However, containers are never loaded exactly as prescribed by the CSM. If, for example, the container in the bottom tier weighs 21 tonnes instead of 30 tonnes, the first instinctive reaction may be that the forces will be less than the example given in the CSM, and the stowage would therefore be safe. However, the opposite is the case as less weight in the bottom tier will create higher forces as the centre of gravity of the stack moves upwards.
CSM breaches are not restricted to ‘shore’ planners: Annabella MAIB Report No 21/2007:
[1.4.1] The stowage plan for the cargo to be loaded onto Annabella was
planned by the charterer, Unifeeder, at its offices in Aarhus, Denmark. The company had 41 vessels on charter at the time of the accident and employed 4 full-time and 1 part-time planners in its operations department who prepared the cargo stowage plans for all of these vessels. The planners were aware of Annabella’s stowage capabilities and also held some details of her stability. However, they ultimately relied on the vessel’s staff to alert them to any errors in the stowage plan and expected the chief officer to critically check every aspect of the stowage plan before the vessel began loading.
[1.4.2] After the accident, a simulation of the collapsed stack load was carried out and it was found that the planning software had not been programmed to recognise 30 foot containers. It transpired that when this size was entered into the programme, it was automatically changed to 40 foot without any alert being given to the operator.
Shipowners know that Ch VI of the SOLAS Convention places ultimate responsibility on masters, for the safe loading and securing of cargo/ containers; and that loading plans are provided to masters perhaps a day, but sometimes hours, before loading commences. This prevents masters, already overwhelmed by officialese, from checking loading plans’ compliance with CSMs; and only a brave master would demand more than a few amendments to a non- complying plan due to commercial pressure, self-preservation and delays to schedules. Commercial pressure is described in the Ever Smart MAIB Report No 14/2020, para 2.6:
Regardless of the logistical and commercial challenges faced by the container shipping industry, the guidance provided in a ship’s CSM and the warnings given by its loading computer should not be ignored. Ships’ masters and C/Os might be able to identify and rectify isolated cargo stowage plan issues, but it is impractical to expect them to address large scale problems such as those identified in this report due to the potential commercial impact such interventions would have. The onus should be on the shore planners to deliver compliant and safe stowage plans.
The extract’s last sentence about the onus for compliant and safe stowage
plans to be placed on the shore planners, is contrary to masters’ obligations under SOLAS.
To ensure that shore planners and stevedores comply with the CSM, the computerised loading programs, as earlier noted, should be designed with fail-safe mechanisms that, inter alia, reject a container allocated to a slot contrary to the CSM. A fail- safe mechanism is a basic feature of computer programs, achievable without sophisticated computer skills. Such a mechanism would ensure that every loading plan, and every container loaded onto a vessel, complied with the CSM, thereby ensuring masters’ and shipowners’ compliance with their obligations under SOLAS and the Hague/Hague- Visby rules, respectively.
The computerised loading programs of container cranes should have similar fail-safe mechanisms to ensure every container lifted for loading onto a vessel, complied with the loading plan. The fail-safe mechanism would work as follows: the crane would lift a container identified by the computerised loading program as being 10 tonnes, but the crane’s weight display would show its accurate weight as, let us say, 12 tonnes. This would cause the crane to cease lifting and emit an audio-visual alarm (relayed to the shipowner’s DPA for follow-up action); the crane operator would lower the container to the ground.
Container weights as declared
The declared weight of a container is a sub-set of the computerised loading program because the CSM requires accurate container weights. Receiving ports and/or stevedores could ascertain the actual weight of a container first, when it is lifted off the truck or rail wagon in the port; secondly, during the container’s transfer to the stacking area; and finally, during the container’s transfer to the crane access area. Each time the container is handled, the equipment, consistent with its design and the work, health and safety (WHS) regime, should display the container’s actual weight, enabling detection of a container with mis-declared weight. The fact
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