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TOO MUCH RELIANCE ON NAVIGATIONAL AIDS LEADS TO COLLISION IS REPORT FINDING


The Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority (NSIA) has published its report about the collision between the 118-metre-long cargo ship ‘MS Edmy’ and the fishing vessel ‘MS Tornado’ in Langesundsbukta Bay. As a result of the collision, significant material damage was sustained by the fishing vessel.


The collision caused the fishing vessel to lean to the side, and her course was turned almost 180 degrees. Once clear of the


cargo ship, the fishing vessel still had propulsion, and the crew were able to turn her in the right direction. The crew were physically unharmed and proceeded to check the status of the vessel. She had sustained considerable damage to the port bow bulwark. The forward cargo hold was also checked, but no damage was observed. The skipper therefore continued the hauling process, as they had only had time to haul about 100 metres of wire and had 600 metres left.


Analysis The sequence of events that appears in the first part of this report describes a situation where active navigation was not carried out over a period of time. NSIA has chosen to focus on some of the contributing factors to the accident. This is to highlight factors that NSIA believes provide the most universal safety learnings.


The navigator of the cargo ship checked the radar for potential dangers, without identifying the fishing vessel. The NSIA believes this was because the fishing vessel was only shown on the radar as an echo, with no AIS information on the radar or ECDIS displays. Use of navigational aids such as ECDIS and AIS allows navigators to rely more on the technology and thereby engage less actively in traditional outlook-based navigation. The NSIA believes that the expectation that most vessels transmit AIS information can lead to a false sense of security, as there is a possibility that not all dangers are identified.


The bridge navigational watch alarm system is a tool that can help navigators to maintain attention over time. The system was deactivated on the cargo ship during the day, and the NSIA believes that the system would have contributed to safer navigation had it been active, because then the navigator had to acknowledge the alarm at the navigation instruments at the front of the wheelhouse.


Measures implemented The following has been implemented on board all vessels: – Watchkeeping procedure was updated by adding the requirement on the minimum setup of navigation bridge and lookout for various sailing scenarios.


– Established minimum recommended CPA/TCPA values were established and posted next to radars / ARPAs. – Bridge change-over check list was reviewed and updated with additional check points, such as status of BNWAS, ARPA’s CPA settings, listening watch on appropriate VHF channel and Ch16.


– Departure check list was reviewed and updated with additional check points, such as status of BNWAS, ARPA’s CPA settings, listening watch on appropriate VHF channel and Ch16.


– The Master’s standing orders were updated and re-issued reflecting above items as well as statement prohibiting paper work and use of IT equipment when there is no back up lookout.


All the above was communicated to all vessels with request to review watchkeeping routines onboard and propose further improvements where necessary.


Download the report at https://bit.ly/3GAde0z. Or scan the QR code.


Safety Briefings, The Report, March 2023, Edition 103


19


IIMS 2023 Safety & Loss Prevention Briefings Compendium


Safety Briefings


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