POOR MAINTENANCE AND LACK OF REGULATORY SURVEILLANCE CONTRIBUTED TO FISHING VESSEL SINKING
The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) has published its investigation report into the August 2020 sinking of the fishing vessel Arctic Fox II near Bamfield, British Columbia. The incident resulted in the death of two crewmembers.
The TSB said the master and crew were unfamiliar with the instructions for deploying the liferaft and, in their efforts to deploy the raft, its painter line was disconnected from the vessel and went overboard. Shortly afterwards, the master and one of the crew members entered the water with their immersion suit only partially
zipped and with ankle straps unsecured. Consequently, they were exposed to the elements and eventually drowned.
The familiarisation of the life-saving equipment that the crew received was insufficient for them to successfully abandon the vessel, and the crew’s response was guided only by their limited experience. The one surviving crew member who managed to reach the liferaft was later rescued by the US Coast Guard.
The investigation found that insufficient vessel maintenance and the absence of regulatory surveillance contributed to the vessel taking on water and eventually sinking. This occurrence highlights the need for Transport Canada to provide more surveillance and monitoring to effectively ensure that vessel owners and authorised representatives take ownership of their safety responsibilities and comply with regulatory requirements.
FLEXIBLE FUEL HOSE FAILURE CAUSES FIRE ONBOARD BULKER
The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) has released its report into the engine room fire onboard the bulk carrier Tecumseh while transiting the Detroit River off Windsor, Ontario.
Probable cause The investigation determined that the fire on board the Tecumseh originated on the port main engine after a flexible fuel hose assembly supplying fuel to the main engine failed. The analysis examined engine room maintenance, the effectiveness of the vessel’s structural fire protection and emergency equipment, and the decision to re-enter the engine room after the fire had been initially suppressed by the carbon dioxide (CO2) fixed fire suppression system.
Flexible fuel hose assembly on the inboard side of the starboard main engine (Photo credit: TSB)
Causes and contributing factors: – A fuel hose assembly of unknown origin and integrity failed on the port main engine, which allowed fuel oil to spray on to local sources of ignition, leading to the fire.
– Multiple unsealed deck cable penetrations between the engine room and the engine control room (ECR) deck allowed the fire to propagate to the ECR main switchboard, leading to the complete destruction of the ECR.
– Because the maintenance opening for the emergency fire pump compartment was not secured, smoke entered the emergency fire pump compartment and prevented the crew from being able to access the fire pump to troubleshoot it. Consequently, for approximately 2 hours, the fire pump was unavailable to the crew for boundary cooling.
– Approximately 3 hours after the CO2 was released, crew re-entered the engine room from the steering gear flat with a charged fire hose. Re-entry into the engine room allowed fresh air to enter the engine room, which most likely re-ignited the fire.
– Without local shore-based firefighting resources to assist, the vessel was forced to await the arrival of additional firefighting resources, which meant that the fire burned for many hours without on-board firefighting capability.
Download the full report at
https://bit.ly/3HREGcP. Or scan the QR code.
Safety Briefings, The Report, March 2023, Edition 103
11
IIMS 2023 Safety & Loss Prevention Briefings Compendium
Safety Briefings
Photo: Tibbie Adams via TSB
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