Deepwater Horizon (2010)
The Deepwater Horizon disaster occurred on April 20, 2010, in the Gulf of Mexico. It is one of the largest environmental disasters in history. 11 workers lost their lives when the offshore rig exploded and sank, and the subsequent spill lasted for 87 days, releasing an estimated 134 million gallons of oil into the Gulf.
The incident’s primary causes included: Well Blowout
A surge of natural gas blasted through a recently installed cement core. This gas travelled up the rig’s riser to the platform, where it ignited, causing a massive explosion.
Safety Systems Failures
The rig’s blowout preventer, a last-resort safety device, failed to seal the well.
Management Failures Decisions made by BP, Transocean, and Halliburton to cut costs and save time contributed to the disaster.
In 2011, a report from the White House oil spill commission pinpointed the root causes of the Deepwater Horizon explosion. The findings indicated the involved corporations— BP, Halliburton, and Transocean—lacked the necessary safeguards to prevent such a catastrophe. The commission highlighted a pattern where choices seemed to favour time and cost savings at the expense of increasing risks for those on board. Key oversights identified included the absence of a cement bond log to assess cement stability. This lapse led to unchecked, ultimately unstable cement. Furthermore, mud displacement in the riser pipe was overlooked, vital tests were bypassed, and lessons from past errors, which could have averted the disaster, were not adequately heeded.
El Faro (2015)
The El Faro, a US cargo ship owned by TOTE Maritime, sank on October 1, 2015, during Hurricane Joaquin near the Bahamas. All 33 crew members tragically lost their lives after the vessel steamed into the hurricane’s eyewall. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigated the incident and released a detailed report on what caused the El Faro to cross the storm’s path and ultimately sink.
The incident’s primary causes included:
Management & Oversight Failures Ineffective bridge resource management. Lack of formal crew training. Insufficient tracking of El Faro’s proximity to Hurricane Joaquin. The absence of a comprehensive safety management system left the crew ill-equipped to handle emergencies like flooding, propulsion loss, and tilting.
Vessel’s Seaworthiness & Equipment Concerns Flooding in cargo holds due to open ventilation closures and an open scuttle. Damage potentially caused by unsecured vehicles in a hold, affecting crucial systems. Use of outdated, open lifeboats.
Captain’s Decision-Making
Reliance on outdated weather information, insufficient route adjustments, and inadequate response to deck officers’ concerns.
Lessons Not Learned 152
A scaled illustration of El Faro’s main hull as it rests on the ocean bottom. Photo Credit: Public Domain
IIMS 2023 Safety & Loss Prevention Briefings Compendium
Images of Container Ship El Faro on the ocean floor. Photo Credits: NTSB Accident Report
Deepwater Horizon offshore drilling unit on fire, April, 2010 Photo Credit: Public Domain
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