Waymon L. Boyd (2020)
On August 21, 2020, the dredging vessel Waymon L. Boyd caught fire and exploded in the Port of Corpus Christi, Texas, after striking a submerged pipeline. The incident claimed five lives and caused several injuries, along with significant environmental damage due to the release of oil and other pollutants.
Coast Guard crews respond to a dredge on fire in the Port of Corpus Christi Ship Channel, August, 2020. Photo Credit: US Coast Guard
Uncovering a persistent, profits-first culture
The NTSB identified that the primary cause of the accident was shortcomings in Orion Marine Group’s planning and risk assessment procedures. These lapses led them to overlook how close their dredging activities were to the hazardous liquids pipeline, resulting in the dredge’s rotating cutterhead hitting it. Compounding the problem, Schneider Engineering and Consulting provided flawed dredging plans. These inaccuracies further caused Orion to convey incomplete details to pipeline owner Enterprise Products during the coordination.
Disasters like the Piper Alpha, Deepwater Horizon, El Faro, and Waymon L. Boyd reveal a disturbing and persistent theme: a profits-first culture in the maritime industry.
Each event, though unique, was marred by significant decision-making blunders, ranging from reliance on outdated weather forecasts to perilously close dredging operations. When combined with recurring equipment failures and communication breakdowns, the severity of these oversights becomes evident.
Why did the El Faro steam into the eyewall of a hurricane? Why did the Deepwater Horizon’s blowout preventer malfunction? Why did each of these events, plus countless others, happen in the first place?
Beyond the individual mistakes lies a deeper, systemic issue. Time and again, maritime companies have shown their inclination to prioritize production, efficiency, and cost over safety.
Had BP, Transocean, and Halliburton put safety first, they would not have made the decisions that ultimately led to the Deepwater Horizon explosion. Instead, they would have safeguarded against it.
Had TOTE Maritime taken the time to train its crew and implement proper safety measures, not to mention maintain a seaworthy vessel, the El Faro would not have steamed into Hurricane Joaquin and sunk.
Investigations into every major maritime disaster have revealed critical decisions, acts, or failures that display an insufficient emphasis on safety. The rapid pace of operations, overlooked safety checks, and risky decisions underscore an entrenched culture that too often values expediency over human lives.
Hurricanes will come. Equipment will wear out. Ships will age. None of this is new. It’s time for the maritime industry to step up, learn from its past, and prioritize the safety of its workers.
Arnold & Itkin is the US leader in maritime law. The firm has helped after every major US maritime disaster in the past 20 years, representing individuals and families whose lives have been upended by the negligence and wrongdoing of large corporations. From representing the widows of three El Faro crew members to representing over one-third of the Deepwater Horizon crew, Arnold & Itkin has sought answers and accountability for those who have experienced the worst losses. The firm has won more than $15 billion for the injured.
This article was first published on the gCaptain website and is reproduced here with our thanks.
Lessons Not Learned 153 IIMS 2023 Safety & Loss Prevention Briefings Compendium
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