TECH TALK
Aeronautics (RTCA), and the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) Aerospace Recommended Practices (ARP) in ASISP policy in order to make use of existing work (and seek to update any of these as necessary). Not only was the ASISP made
up of various types of industry participants (domestic and foreign OEMs, airlines, standards organizations, government agencies, and trade associations), but also had EASA, Transport Canada (TCCA) and the National Civil Aviation Agency of Brazil (ANAC) onboard, to provide a well-rounded group. One of they named vital tasks for this group was to consider EASA (and other certifying authorities) requirements and guidance material for regulatory harmonization, and with RMT.0270, this has been accomplished. The FAA recognizes the need
to have these new cyber-related airworthiness standards for aircraft are harmonized to the greatest extent possible since aviation is a highly- interwoven industry. To paraphrase the ASISP mission, an excerpt is provided from their assigned mission: “This new task requires the working group to provide recommendations regarding ASISP rulemaking, policies, and guidance on best practices for airplanes and rotorcraft, including both certifi cation and continued airworthiness. Without updates to regulations, policies, and guidance to address ASISP, aircraft vulnerabilities may not be identifi ed and mitigated, thus increasing exposure to security threats. Besides, a lack of ASISP- specifi c regulations, policies, and guidance could result in security- related certifi cation criteria that are not standardized and harmonized between domestic and
international regulatory authorities. Unauthorized access to aircraft systems and networks could result in the malicious use of networks and loss or corruption of data (e.g., software applications, databases, and confi guration fi les) brought about by software worms, viruses, or other malicious entities.” In late 2016, the (ARAC Report)
Aircraft System Information Security/Protection was released with 30 detailed recommendations, categorized into eight areas, to the FAA. These cut across a wide swath that addresses rulemaking, airworthiness standards, industry consensus standards, and technical standards orders. Also identifi ed was the necessity to conduct ongoing research on cybersecurity-related concerns going forward, since this is a fast-moving and ever-changing topic.
EASA MOVING FORWARD At the moment, cybersecurity is addressed as part of the certifi cation process of new large airplane type designs and STCs via special conditions to EASA CS-25. This new proposed guidance from EASA would instead insert cybersecurity provisions into the relevant certifi cation specifi cations of large and small aircraft. Since this action is based upon the previously referenced ARAC (ASISP) report, this action is expected to better harmonize with FAA regulations, providing OEMs and operators with smoother means of certifying aircraft and systems/parts internationally. According to information released
by EASA, they have identifi ed seven diff erent certifi cation specifi cations areas they will move forward on, including technical regulatory requirements for business jets, commercial airliners, and rotorcraft.
This guidance will replace the use of special conditions to mitigate cyber threats with dedicated requirements under the specifi c certifi cation specifi cations (CS) applicable to aircraft, as well as avionics. One key area worth noting is
how EASA will address product information security risk assessments for specifi c systems, in that “a change may be considered to be major if the security environment is impacted and the initial analysis shows that before the implementation of mitigation means, there is a potential for an unsafe condition… A new digital communication means, logical or physical, is established between a more closed, controlled information security domain, and a more open, less controlled security domain. For example, in the context of large aircraft, a communication means is established between the aircraft control domain (ACD) and the airline information services domain (AISD)… A new service is introduced between a system of a more closed, controlled information security domain and a system of a more open, less controlled security domain, which allows the exploitation of a vulnerability of the service that has been introduced, creating a new threat path. For example: opening and listening on a UDP port in an end system of an already certifi ed topology; activating a protocol in a point-to- point communication channel. The modifi cation of a service between a system of a more closed, controlled security domain and a system of a more open, less controlled security domain.” The fi gure shown illustrates the three major aircraft domains, and the fourth, which is passenger-owned devices domain.
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DOMmagazine.com | may 2019
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