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Building up safety barriers
Rebecca Moore
The topic was one of the dominating issues at Cruise Shipping Miami (CSM) (see pages 67-69). One thing has been made very clear: the industry is acting swiftly to learn from and reduce the chance of such an incident happening again. An operational review was implemented immediately, overseen by parent company Carnival Corporation and in April – two months after the incident – Carnival Cruise Lines announced that it would implement a US$300 million programme to significantly enhance emergency power capacity, introduce new fire safety technology and improve the level of operating redundancies across its fleet (see page 11). Indeed, just how advanced cruise ship fire prevention technology and training has become can be seen in PST’s feature on the subject (pages 49-51). “By applying lessons learned through our fleet-wide operational
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review after the Carnival Triumph fire and by taking advantages of new technologies, we have identified areas of enhancement across our operations,” Carnival Cruise Lines president and chief executive officer Gerry Cahill said. This is a theme that has been reflected across the cruise
industry. His words were also mirrored by Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA) CEO Christine Duffy, who told CSM delegates “all brands are coming together to learn lessons from this and improve.” CLIA has launched its own risk assessments following the Carnival Triumph incident. It is good to know that the industry had reacted so fast to the incident and that cruise operators are putting safety at the top of their agendas.
As well as looking at operational procedures and technology, changing the way that safety is approached and viewed by an organisation is also important when it comes to tackling safety issues. An example of this is the safety concept covered by class society Det Norske Veritas (USA) global cruise centre director Trond Arne Schistad at CSM’s safety seminar. He pointed out that 60 per cent of major marine accidents are caused by navigation errors and that 40 per cent are caused by fire. This indicates, he said, that major operational accidents occur due to failure in implemented safeguards against accidents, rather than to unknown threats. “We know about the risks, we just need to find better safeguards or barriers to them. The devil is in the details,” he added. Highlighting the importance of changing the way that safety
is approached by an operator, he said: “We need to think a little different, make the realisation that it is impossible to eradicate errors.” This means that barriers set up to protect against safety risk are imperfect. Mr Schistad highlighted that this is at the crux of the concept and that passenger ship operators need to assess and manage these barriers. He highlighted an accident causation
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afety within the cruise industry recently hit the headlines after the Carnival Triumph fire.
model that could be followed in this area: The ‘Swiss Cheese Model’, which was developed by James Reason of Manchester University in the UK. “We need barriers to safeguard against hazards, but we cannot have full confidence in these barriers because they are imperfect, due to human error and technical systems failure. These holes in the barriers are like the holes in Swiss cheese.” He explained that the model visualises vulnerabilities and therefore companies need to continuously manage and assess the integrity of barriers. He highlighted the importance of having an internal audit in place to ensure integrity of barriers and the use of a class society to verify the integrity of the system. He also singled out the use of key performance indicators to measure the effectiveness of assurance and achievement of performance standards. But the most important part of the Swiss Cheese Model is to “build and maintain a safety culture where awareness of these issues can be communicated.” Mr Schistad said: “If you really want to improve, ask yourself what you need to do. Senior management need to make sure that all people in the company understand where they are coming from, they need to be aware of the decisions taken day to day ... they need to be look at the impact [on safety] when budgets are cut or decisions are made” and to “be careful of the message you send if the company cuts resources and areas important for managing risk.”
compliance officer, Norwegian Cruise Line, gave at the CSM safety seminar. He emphasised the importance of the company’s “top to bottom” safety culture programme that encompasses all aspects of shipyard operations.
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Another way that industry can boost safety is through examining the approach of other industries to this topic. For example, Norwegian Cruise Line has been learning from aviation safety procedures. To this end, the company has two bridge officers on watch at all times when the ship is underway, which emulates the co-pilot and pilot structure on aeroplanes. Aviation- like operational protocols are also used, for example closed loop communication, which encourages challenge and response. It is heartening and reassuring to see how quickly the cruise industry has responded to Carnival Triumph and how it has ensured that lessons have been learned from the incident. As well as all the technical measures needed to prevent such an event happening again, it is also crucial that passenger ship operators think outside the box: the Swiss Cheese Model is testament to this, as is Norwegian Cruise Line’s emphasis on learning from other industries. PST
Passenger Ship Technology I 2nd Quarter 2013 I 5
he importance of a safety culture was also highlighted by a presentation that Capt Minas Myrtidis, vice president of fleet regulatory compliance & corporate environmental
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