H&S: TOM ANDERSON
What is a good safety culture?
There are a number of popular ways to explain safety culture, such as ‘what happens in an organisation when no one is watching’. For example, a Lloyd’s audit on the Deepwater Horizon rig a month before the April 2010 disaster found that there was a ‘strong team culture onboard, and the levels of mutual trust evident between the crews meant that the rig safety culture was deemed to be robust...’.4
Ironically, on the evening of the Deepwater Horizon tragedy, visiting Transocean and BP VIPs held a conference with the rig’s leadership. At this meeting, the BP Vice President for Drilling and Completions stated that ‘Deepwater Horizon was the best performing rig in our fleet and in the Gulf of Mexico. And I believe one of the top performing rigs in all the BP floater fleets from the standpoint of safety and drilling performance’.5
So, maintaining a positive
safety culture is difficult to achieve; as Professor James Reason (a world leading expert on human error) said, ‘Like a state of grace, a safety culture is something that is striven for but rarely attained’.6
So, do true safety cultures exist?
Theory and experience suggests that the more complex the technology and operating environment, the greater the chances of failure – and consequences of that failure. However, there is a group of organisations that operates within extremely testing and complex operating environments, and yet stay virtually error-free over long periods. High Reliability Organisations (HROs), such as US nuclear powered aircraft carriers (supercarriers), nuclear power stations, and Air Traffic Control systems reduce the probability of serious errors, through good organisational design and management. The complex systems of HROs mean that they have a large degree of ‘redundancy’, with system back-ups, and more than one person available at any time to do a particular job. HROs have a strong focus on getting things right first time, as they work under the assumption that their first error may be their last.
‘Offshore’ HRO operators, such as nuclear powered supercarriers have the potential for multiple accident scenarios. For example, fighter jets take off and land simultaneously on a weapons-loaded, moving airfield, often without radar. Jets are launched from a 9 metre wide deck using a one million horse power catapult, and on landing at full power, are stopped using a hook and wire system. The aircraft carrier crew, more than
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HRO generative safety cultures – ‘safety is the way we do things around here’.
3000 strong, are mostly under 21 years of age – a third of whom rotate every twelve months. Despite these huge operational challenges, supercarriers manage to operate virtually error free.
HROs really do have true, generative safety cultures, which can be summed up as, ‘safety is the way we do things around here’. These outstanding safety cultures are achieved by strong military command and control systems, where command is hierarchical. While procedures are important, workers at all levels are empowered and trusted to make important safety-related decisions. For example, any crew member on a supercarrier can ‘push the button’ to abort take offs and landings if debris is found on deck. It therefore makes sense that in a generative safety culture, the processes and procedures that workers are expected to follow are realistic and meaningful to everyone.
Can offshore oil and gas platforms become HROs?
Yes they can. Supercarrier crews and workers in nuclear power plants organise themselves in a particular way to achieve high reliability – by using ‘organisational mindfulness’ to anticipate and manage unexpected events.7
References
1. Health & Safety Executive (2012) Offshore hydrocarbon release – investigation policy. SPC/Tech/ OSD/48. Available at: www.hse.
gov.uk/foi/internalops/hid_circs/ technical_osd/spc_tech_osd_48/
index.htm
2. Oil & Gas UK Health and Safety Report 2012. Available at: www.
oilandgasuk.co.uk/cmsfiles/ modules/publications/pdfs/HS074. pdf
3. Geoffrey Maitland (2011) Offshore Oil and Gas in the UK - an independent review of the regulatory regime. Available at:
www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/11/ meeting-energy-demand/oil- gas/3875-offshore-oil-gas-uk-ind- rev.pdf
4. The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (2011); Report Regarding the Causes of the April 20, 2010 Macondo Well Blowout. Available at:
www.boemre.gov/ pdfs/maps/DWHFINAL.pdf
5. The National Commission on the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling. Available at:
www.oilspillcommission.gov/final- report
Mindfulness,
in effect, offers us a template to become an HRO, and has allowed organisations as diverse as Wildland Firefighting crews, chemical plants and High Dependency medical wards to be considered High Reliability Organisations.
This mindfulness template allows workers on oil and gas platforms to see all failures as insights into the health of their operating system, and to conduct thorough analyses of any near misses. Mindfulness encourages diverse perspectives, and a deep respect for the unknown. It also means that crews will have excellent Situational Awareness i.e. be aware that sometimes they will need to make sense of conflicting information to get a ‘big picture’ understanding of unexpected events – during a hydrocarbon release, for example.
HROs are action driven. If an HCR does occur, a mindful asset has the knowledge and skills to deal with it, and be resilient enough to handle any unanticipated dangers.
6. Reason J (1997) Managing the risks of organisational accidents. Ashgate: Aldershot.
7. Weick, K. & Sutcliffe, K (2007) Managing the Unexpected. Wiley: San Francisco
To find out more about how HRO practice can help to develop safety cultures in the oil and gas industry, contact Tom Anderson at Blue Stream Consulting on:
Mob: 07880 556999 Tel: 01768 878107
www.bluestreamconsulting.co.uk Oil&GasCONNECT 47
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