GSM-R
Network Rail told to review its GSM-R system and training
RTM’s David Stevenson looks at the recommendations of an RAIB report that tells Network Rail to review its GSM-R system and installation.
N
etwork Rail has been told to review its
directly contact all trains within, or leaving, their area of control.
The recommendation was made in a Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB) report that looked into the unauthorised entry of a train onto a single line at Greenford in March last year.
The 11.36 passenger train 2M30 from London Paddington to West Ruislip, operated by Chiltern Railways, passed two consecutive signals at danger – GE55and GE50 – near Greenford, west London.
running onto the single line beyond signal GE50 for about a mile, when a signaller from the Marylebone signal box sent an emergency radio message to the driver.
‘The potential for a serious collision’
Although no-one was hurt, the unauthorised entry of a train onto a single line created the potential for a serious collision, noted RAIB.
The investigation found that the signaller at Greenford wanted to stop the train by sending but he did not attempt to do so because the information presented by the radio equipment in the signal box suggested to him that any message he sent would not reach the train. Instead, he contacted Marylebone signal box, which was able to send a message to the train.
for voice and data communications between and drivers. It was brought into full operation
28 | rail technology magazine Dec/Jan 15
on the southern half of the national rail network, including the Greenford area, in 2013 boxes and trains.
RAIB has advised Network Rail to review its feed adjoin signal boxes that automatically areas of enhanced risk such as the entrances to single lines.
at Greenford, so that trains travelling between Greenford and Northolt Junction will appear on the train list on the terminal in Greenford signal box for the whole of the time that they are on the single line.
emergency call would, in fact, have been received by train 2M30 – despite the train not being visible on the signaller’s terminal.
this would have been the case, and there was nothing in the training that he had been given which would have suggested that such a thing was possible.
In addition to the initial recommendation, RAIB has told Network Rail to review and modify, as necessary, the training given to signallers in adequate opportunity to become familiar with the use of railway emergency calls, by practice, simulation or any other appropriate means.
Chiltern recommendations The RAIB investigation also found that the
driver of the passenger train did not react to the two signals at danger, for ‘unknown’ reasons.
The RAIB thinks he may have assumed the train had been given ‘clear’ signals through Greenford, because of his interpretation of the meaning of the signal preceding those that he passed at danger, and he had not been stopped by signals at Greenford in the past.
Also, even though the Train Protection and and to both the signals, it did not intervene to apply the brakes of the train, as it was intended to do. This was because the on-train driver prepared the train for departure from Paddington. The isolation of the equipment the driver still drove the train.
Because of this, RAIB has recommended that Chiltern Railways should conduct a review of is “comprehensive” with regards to the equipment and systems that drivers use. Also, this review needs to make sure drivers know warnings.
notice to its drivers
on ‘Checking and
behave when a driver is setting up the cab, light, and setting out the action to take if the
FOR MORE INFORMATION
W:
www.raib.gov.uk/latest_news/141222_pn_ greenford.cfm
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