the need to return to Philadelphia, the controllers asked if there was a problem. The tower was not notified at this point. While the plane was flying back
from Harrisburg to Philadelphia, a local Philadelphia radio station that was playing announced that a US Airways flight would be landing at the airport due to a bomb threat. US Airways controllers heard the broadcast and they figured out the local radio station was talking about flight US1267 and contacted their supervisors to ask what was going on with this flight. ATC allegedly could not get information from corporate security at US Airways. Once the plane landed at Philadelphia, it was directed to a remote part of the field, as in the case of AA24. The captain again asked what the problem was with the plane but no information was given. As the captain was trying to get information about the crisis, the B cabin flight attendant on the aircraft called the cockpit to inform him that "men in black suits and guns had just opened the rear door” and were coming towards the cockpit!
Philadelphia Police identified themselves as they entered the aircraft. The officers grabbed the person, alleged to be in possession of an explosive device, from the seat number relating to the passenger identified by the caller and headed out of the plane. What the officers didn’t know was that an armed federal agent in the front of the plane had drawn his weapon and was now placed in the unfair position of having to determine whether the men in black suits were friend or foe. This plain clothed federal agent made a call that potentially saved dozens on the plane. Had he not holstered his weapon, the Philadelphia Police may have mistaken him for the actual criminal actor for whom they had stormed aboard the aircraft. One must question why the information given by US Airways Corporate Security was not passed on to the commanders planning the operation. Were it not for the sound judgment of the federal agent, who holstered his weapon, a fire fight could have easily broken out onboard between him and the police officers raiding the plane. It is should be noted that the passenger who was grabbed from his seat was the victim of a personal vendetta; an individual the passenger had recently irritated had called the police and named him as a threat to the flight out of spite. FBI spokesman JJ Klaver said, “This was a joint operation between the FBI and Philadelphia Police.” While it is true the FBI took the suspect into custody, the actual raid was made by the Philadelphia Police Department.
42
Klaver added, “The operation went smoothly and successfully
without
problems.” As one airline captain with US Airways stated, “Just because someone did not die or was injured does not make the operation, and the way it was handled, successful.”
When asked if the captain was notified prior to the raid on the aircraft, Chief Inspector Joseph Sullivan from the Philadelphia police department said, “I did not have the ability to communicate with the captain of the airplane and there was a time sensitive matter that required me to get the person in question off that airplane.” One veteran of many hijacking investigations (e.g., TWA 247 in Lebanon)
“…an armed federal agent in the front of the plane had drawn his weapon and was now placed in the unfair position of having to determine whether the men in black suits were friend or foe…”
is former FBI agent Dr. Tom Strentz, who was was one of the founding agents of the first hostage negotiation team, which was established after a hijacking involving the FBI in Jacksonville, Florida in 1971. Strentz says in his new book, Psychological Aspects of Crisis Negotiation, “We must make a reasonable effort to communicate and negotiate before we initiate an assault.” The prevalent attitude I have experienced is that law enforcement believe that they are the only ones who are qualified to not only execute intervention with an airplane in a crisis, but that they alone should be privy to any relevant information about a given threat. This goes against US Federal Aviation Regulations and, in my view, it is a dangerous mindset for those charged with handling an aviation crisis.
The pilot-in-command, or captain, is legally responsible for the safety of all passengers on board from the time they board the plane until they disembark according to international convention and, in the US, federal law. Yet law enforcement organisations responsible for upholding those laws seem to pick and choose which ones they will adhere to when it comes to pilot-in-command authority. While the official position of the FBI claims no mistakes were made (therefore implying that there is nothing to be
Download your FREE ASI "iPad/iPhone APP" NOW
US Airways flight 1267, Philadelphia, 6 September 2012
learned), this is not the case with Chief Inspector Sullivan. “We have recognised that deficiency and have worked with US Airways and they have given us equipment so that we will be able to speak to the captain when the aircraft is on the ground in the future.” He added, “Now, as far as information being passed to the captain while in the air, I do not have that ability.” And he is correct. Today’s law enforcement does not have the ability to communicate directly with crew members in an emergency. The link between law enforcement and the crew is the corporate security at any given airline. While law enforcement has their challenges in safely responding to an aircraft crisis, the people in the ranks of corporate security have their own problems to work out. If the crews can’t depend on their own company to give them complete information, they are in a dangerous position. This point brings us to the role of corporate security inside US Airways. Corporate security should have notified the captain of any problem they had been aware of with the plane. It would appear that they did not inform the crew. Furthermore it seems that they also failed to notify law enforcement of the risks (i.e. the presence of a federal air marshal) that their officers faced in dealing with the aircraft once it landed.
Clear channels of communication,
where there is a healthy exchange of information, need to be opened between corporate offices and the flight decks. That said, given the abundance of bomb threats being levelled at carriers, measures need to be in place to prevent crews effecting unnecessary diverts when faced with threats deemed non specific. Mark Vorzimmer, Director of Security
for Virgin America, stated, “If we had a credible threat directed at a specific aircraft, we at Virgin Corporate Security would provide the captain with more information than a simple instruction to return to base due to a security issue”. Vorzimmer also added, there are, “a significantly large volume of events that originate aboard aircraft during the course of flying. These events necessarily put the
June 2013 Aviationsecurityinternational
Page 1 |
Page 2 |
Page 3 |
Page 4 |
Page 5 |
Page 6 |
Page 7 |
Page 8 |
Page 9 |
Page 10 |
Page 11 |
Page 12 |
Page 13 |
Page 14 |
Page 15 |
Page 16 |
Page 17 |
Page 18 |
Page 19 |
Page 20 |
Page 21 |
Page 22 |
Page 23 |
Page 24 |
Page 25 |
Page 26 |
Page 27 |
Page 28 |
Page 29 |
Page 30 |
Page 31 |
Page 32 |
Page 33 |
Page 34 |
Page 35 |
Page 36 |
Page 37 |
Page 38 |
Page 39 |
Page 40 |
Page 41 |
Page 42 |
Page 43 |
Page 44 |
Page 45 |
Page 46 |
Page 47 |
Page 48 |
Page 49 |
Page 50 |
Page 51 |
Page 52