seventh to ninth passenger. It is important to point out that most prohibited items are usually identified during the profiling and pre-search preparation of passengers by warning notices and security employees reminding passengers about prohibited items. Despite these reminders, passengers do not always discard or report prohibited items. In addition, it was necessary to have every third passenger retrace their steps and go through the metal detectors at least one more time. In both these cases the search can take a relatively short time but it does not take into consideration the negotiating stage where passengers may delay the throughput even more.
How Time Becomes Money Taking advantage of the data we collected on salaries and training, we calculated the average cost of employees associated with maintaining the security requirements of the airport we observed. As the airport was relatively small and security screening was adapted to flight schedules, the costs were approximately sixty thousand Euro (€60,500) per month. It should be emphasised that this figure reflects average annual costs for manpower at the particular airport we studied.
’problematic’ passengers make up the bulk of the costs. If we take these costs against the ’ideal’ passenger flow (9.7 months of employee salary), the ideal cost should be around €590,000 annually. The difference between costs based on actual passenger behaviour is astronomically greater than the ideal, all of which strongly emphasise the role that passenger behaviour can have on security costs. Not only do we have to take into account the anomalies of passenger-security employee interactions – namely negotiating – but also the basic travelling characteristics or profiles that were noted between charter and scheduled air travellers.
Conclusion
Costing airport security is a complex undertaking but one that has rarely focused on the role and impact that passengers have on the overall cost. Until recently, passengers were viewed as passive agents that, through operational and logistic type processes, could be ’delivered’ to their flights in the most rational and efficient way. Security technology was devised to do this flawlessly and security employees trained to implement the procedures and rule compliance protocols. The aim was not
Figure 3: Security Screening Costs Good Passengers
Problematic 1 Minute
Problematic 5 Minutes
5400 hrs 22.5 months 3700 hrs 15.4 months
18,500 hrs 77.1 months
€60.5k month
€60.5k month
€60.5k month
5400/8hr shifts=675 days/30 days=22.5 months x 10k
1361 K
932 K
the cost formula. For one, our case study clearly demonstrates the active interaction of passengers during the screening process and the potential for negotiating with security employees’ decisions. As we have seen, this negotiating process can be time consuming and therefore have a direct impact on throughput. The second issue is the possibility of macro-profiling passengers by differentiating them by type of flight chosen (charter-schedule). Again, the data strongly suggest that this simple dichotomous differentiation can be a valuable guide in determining throughput times; a key component in security costs and in anticipating security needs. What can be strongly argued is that passenger behaviour is indeed complex. More importantly, passengers actively engage in the security decision making process. To assume the ’passive passenger’ syndrome during this process would be a grave error in judgment as the evidence points in the opposite direction. From the perspective of increasing throughput that relies almost entirely on technology and its interpretation by security employees, what was discovered could be helpful in being able to discern and even predict (within reason) what to expect from passengers at security check points; a valuable asset in determining manpower allocation and its cost. It also provides a basis for changing passenger behaviour to minimise or deflect negotiating, through several alternative means, including among others pre-flight information, increasing security decision flexibility and/or reducing problematic prohibited items. But, these seemingly simple solutions for the complex issue to reduce security
costs due to passenger 4464 K
Total 6,758K
* We used a standardised 1 million passengers per year. For example, the calculation of ’good passengers’ who take 20-30 seconds is 5400/8hr shifts which are equal to 675 days or 22.5 months. This is multiplied by the average monthly security cost.
Examining Figure 3 provides what can best be described as a realistic assessment of security costs when taking passenger behaviours into consideration. Even though ’good passengers’, those who pass through the security process in the minimum time, is the bulk of passenger throughput,
June 2013 Aviationsecurityinternational
only to provide a secure airport and flights but also to do this at costs that both the airport and public could live with. This ideal description of airport security
marginalises two important issues that give rise to seriously questioning the lack of taking passenger-security employee behaviour into
behaviour, masks the complexity of a multi-interactive social and security context involving passengers, security employees, technology and stakeholders within a complex airport organisation. Here, only sophisticated research that incorporates the 'human factor' can provide the springboard for not only a better understanding of passenger behaviour but its impact on the security process.
Prof. Alan (Avi) Kirschenbaum is a Senior Research Fellow at the Technion Israel Institute of Technology in Haifa and the founder of Kirschenbaum Consulting Ltd.
This article is based on material recently published in the Journal of Air Transport Management (2013). The Cost of Airport Security: The Passenger Dilemma. Vol 30:39-45.
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