Security is a major cost component in maintaining an airport’s commercial viability. It is estimated that such costs account for over one-quarter (Airports Council International, 2012) of an airport's operating costs. This large investment in security has its origin in security policy decisions generated after 9/11 and has rested primarily on the combined costs of technology and security manpower; both of which operate under strict rule compliance directives and protocols generated by regulatory agencies. Under the guideline of ’100% checks’, especially security checks of air passengers, airport security has made air travel, arguably, safer but at the same time, certainly, very costly. Prof. Alan (Avi) Kirschenbaum demonstrates that by better understanding passenger behaviour the industry may be able to both reduce costs and improve the quality of security service delivered.


alculating these security costs has usually been based on macro-level data that simply contrast the total number of passengers/cargo passing through the airport during a specific time period against how much it costs to maintain the security apparatus (e.g., security employees and screening technologies). Passenger cost calculations, on the other hand, are based on "throughput", how many passengers get through screening per minute/hour. Both these measures provide an overall picture of security costs but do not provide information on factors which can be utilised to reduce these costs.


C


framework requiring compliance with security rules and protocols. Until recently, the behaviour of passengers (or employees for that matter) has rarely been taken into account in the design of airport security. A partial explanation for this is that airport design is predicated on principles for mass processing where passengers are seen as passive ’agents’ entering the airport and being controlled until exiting onto an aircraft. This may also explain the emphasis on measuring security costs through classical measures that disregard variations in human behaviour. The mere fact that ’time-motion’ studies of the time it takes for passengers


“…the bottom line goal of airport managers has been to increase flow-through with an (empirically unsubstantiated) assumption that it is possible to do so through sophisticated technology that takes into account security rule compliance…”


I will argue here that one area in the security process that has been ignored but has great potential for reducing security costs is in a better understanding of passenger behaviour. Little is known about the social context and behavioural reactions of passengers to the security process; particularly how such behaviours align themselves to the imposed security


June 2013 Aviationsecurityinternational


to get through the screening process are undertaken, is a clarion call that says security is really about money. The more time it takes to get through the security process, the less time for shopping purchases (a substantial source of income) and higher likelihood of delayed flights (substantial losses) and the higher the cost to employ security personnel.


The Missing Component


If time is of essence, then too stringent security impedes flow-through while too lax security opens up the airport to unacceptable threat risks.


This


also applies for passengers. The more ’security’ items to be searched the greater the likelihood of more time expended; and especially if the passenger is uncooperative. Yet, the bottom line goal of airport managers has been to increase flow-through with an (empirically unsubstantiated) assumption that it is possible to do so through sophisticated technology that takes into account security rule compliance. Some argue that utilising this approach has the advantage of making both the airport shareholders and passengers happy in terms of client satisfaction and increased goods purchased at the airport.


But like


every simplistic solution to a complex problem, it is based on the assumption of rational behaviour on the part of security employees and passengers – which as the recent European Commission funded BEMOSA research project has shown, is extremely fragile with rule bending and breaking part of the normative security culture of airports (Kirschenbaum et al, 2012).


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