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locomotive engineer uncoupled his en- gine and several cars from Mr. Inge- bretsen’s train leaving the rear end of the train including his stock car and the caboose in which he and two other drovers were riding on the main line. While thus situated, this cut of cars–


awaiting the return of the locomotive– was struck “with great violence” by a following freight train approaching at high speed from the northeast. The ca- boose was completely destroyed and two of the drovers were killed instantly. Very serious injuries were inflicted on Mr. Ingebretsen–injuries which result- ed in serious permanent impairment of his ability to do the work of a farmer. Consequently, he sued the railroad for this loss of earning power.


The M&StL stipulated that the acci-


dent was caused by the negligence of its employees and that the railroad company was culpable (interestingly, no mention was made of the line-of- sight issues which plagued this part of the railroad). The bone of contention, however, was the size of the jury’s $19,000 award to Mr. Ingebretsen. Upon appeal, the award was reduced to $14,000, but this was still excessive in the eyes of the corporate attorneys. The court proceedings make very in- teresting reading–not much has changed in 100 years in this type of case–but the outcome of the Supreme Court’s ruling is never really in doubt. The railroad was ordered to pony up $14,000. They lost a lot more than this


amount in ill-will from the case.4 I am very grateful for the assistance


I received from two friends closer to the site of these mishaps. To Doug Harding and Merrill Pierce go my undying gratitude for running down postcards from private and public col- lections and poring over dusty newspa- per archives.


1 Annual Report of the Postmaster General of the


United States, Miscellaneous Reports, page 686. 2


Courtesy of the Dennis Holmes Collection. 3 Accident Bulletin No. 47, ICC, Washington, DC,


January, February and March, 1913, page 37. 4


Excerpted from Ingebretsen vs. M&StL Railroad Company, Supreme Court of Iowa, December 17, 1915, as found in The Northwestern Reporter,Vol- ume 155, 1915, pages 327-334.


hand, Train 3, equipped with a larger, more powerful locomotive, was carded to cover this same distance at an average speed of 50.5 mph–that is, in 35.3 minutes. This night, Engineer Stuart covered the distance at 85.8 m.p.h. in 20.8 minutes. This night, Robert Stuart was indeed a bold engineer! Plenty of blame was there to be parsed


and the ICC Accident Report laid it on thickly. Special blame was assigned to the flagman and conductor of Train 25. “The accident was caused by the failure of


[Train 25] Flagman Broecker to properly pro- tect his train. [Train 25] Conductor Brainard is equally responsible for not knowing that his train was properly protected. A contributory cause was the failure of Engineman Stuart to control the speed of his train.”3 But the most chilling (from the Illinois Cen-


tral’s standpoint) comment in the accident re- port was this: “There are 23 stations [including Kin-


This astounding postcard photo was taken early the same morning as the rear-end colli- sion of two Illinois Central first-class passenger trains at Kinmundy, Illinois. The railroad already has its steam-powered wrecking crane No. 52 on the scene. This scene clearly shows the almost unthinkable violence of this wreck. The nose of Illinois Central locomo- tive 1079 is shown buried 38 feet into the rear of wooden underframe Chicago, Rock Is- land & Pacific business car 1902. The photo is marked with an “X” indicating the position of the stateroom occupied by retired Illinois Central president James T. Harahan.


required fusees. At Kinmundy, the flagman disembarked


Train 25 and looking northward saw Train 3’s headlight approaching at high speed. He waved his lantern vigorously and was an- swered by Engineer Stuart’s whistle. Crewmen on Train 25 agree that it arrived


at the penstock at Kinmundy at between 12:29 and 12:31 a.m. All agree that their train was struck by Train 3 between one and two minutes after the stop. Engineman Stuart claimed he was not


flagged until after he had already seen the west marker (the other being obscured by escaping steam) of the business car. The speedometer on engine 1079 read about 50 m.p.h. when he threw Train 3 into emergency. CRIP wooden business car 1902 was 71


feet long over end sills. Engine 1079 hit this car so hard that it penetrated its length 38


RAILROAD MODEL CRAFTSMAN


feet. It’s amazing that the entire kinetic ener- gy of a 750-ton train moving at high speed could be absorbed by the wooden under- frame of the business car. Such was the case, however—but with catastrophic conse- quences to some of the occupants of the car. The old aviation chestnut that goes,


“There are bold pilots and there are old pi- lots, but there are no old, bold pilots” appears to be equally true for railway engineers. John Luther “Casey” Jones was a bold engineer. Joseph A. “Steve” Broady, the engineer of “Ol’ 97” was a bold engineer. It seems that Mr. Robert E. Stuart, the engineer of Train 3 that night was also a bold engineer. Train 25 was scheduled to cover the 29.7


miles between Effingham and Kinmundy at a speed of 47.7 m.p.h. Its actual speed was 57.7 m.p.h. as Engineer Strode tried to make up some of his train’s lost time. On the other


mundy] on this division at which train orders can be received and delivered. Of this num- ber, only two are continuously operated, five others are operated at night only [including the interlocking tower at Kinmundy] while the remaining 16 are day offices. The movement of trains is unrestricted except at open tele- graph offices. “During the year 1911, the average daily


movement of traffic was 23 trains in each di- rection–two per hour. Traffic of this density would seem to warrant the installation of an adequate block signal system.”4 When the regulatory agency which wields


the power over your business that the ICC wielded over the railroads, a comment such as this was received with the gravity it intend- ed. In short order, a block signal system was installed on this division.


1 Annual Report, Illinois Railroad and Warehouse


“Railroad Officials Killed in Illinois Central Wreck,” Railway Review,Volume 52, No. 4, January 27,


Commission, Volume 2, 1912, page 250. 2


1912, pages 81-82. 3


“Investigation of Accident on the Illinois Central Railroad at Kinmundy, Ill, January 22, 1912.” Re- port of the Chief Inspector of Safety Appliances,


March 13, 1912, page 8. 4


Ibid, pages 6-7. 79


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