21 BILL KWOK-PING CHOU ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF MACAU
Follow the leader B
eijing’s policy toward Macau can be regarded as an extension of its policies toward the mainland’s frontier regions, which emphasises maintaining political control.
There are three main reasons for the central government’s preoccupation with ensuring control over those areas. First, frontier regions are usually areas where ethnic
minorities live. Owing to stark cultural differences between these minorities and the mainland’s Han ethnic majority, they are generally more reluctant to accept central government authority. Frontier regions are also strategically important for China’s
security because they abut neighbouring countries. There is also a concern among those in power that some of
these regions will nd it dif cult to integrate politically with the People’s Republic of China. Some frontier areas became part of the mainland only recently. In certain cases, differences in political systems persist and the sense of belonging to Greater China is weak among citizens of these regions. Economic integration with the mainland is one of the tactics
Beijing employs to maintain political control over Hong Kong, Macau and other frontier regions. The central government provides funds, technology, labour and privileged access to mainland markets, and promotes development projects. This way, frontier regions can be helped to achieve economic and social development, weakening any anti-central government sentiment.
Grumpy neighbours To maintain a high degree of autonomy for Macau, Beijing did not vigorously promote economic integration right after the handover. But it did open some doors. For instance, the central government prescribed that, with its own approval and the Macau government’s consent, mainland provincial or municipal governments could establish representative of ces in the SAR. Similarly, provincial or municipal governments and Macau could enter into cooperation agreements if these agreements were struck on Macau’s own initiative. However, right after 1999, the Macau government’s focus
was on internal affairs. Also, of cials had no experience in dealing with the mainland and this was another obstacle to economic integration. With relations between Macau and Zhuhai less than perfect,
in the early years the cross-border industrial zone was the only material product of direct cooperation between both cities. As for Hengqin, Macau initially hinted that it hoped to rent the whole island but the Guangdong provincial government and the Zhuhai municipal authorities dragged their feet and this hope, although hotly debated for years, was eventually dashed.
Unintended consequences The turning point came in 2003, when 500,000 people in Hong Kong demonstrated their opposition to a national security bill – a law required by the Hong Kong Basic Law. To weaken opposition sentiment in Hong Kong, Beijing undertook a series of economic integration measures later that year. Those measures included granting mainland Chinese individual visas to visit the city as solo travellers, rather than as members
MACAU’S ECONOMIC INTEGRATION WITH THE MAINLAND IS THE CONSEQUENCE OF BEIJING’S WILL RATHER THAN MACAU’S INCLINATION
of tour groups, pressing ahead with the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement and giving the green light to the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macau Bridge project. Eventually Macau got the same treatment, although anti-Beijing sentiment here was far less of a threat than in Hong Kong. Individual visas boosted the rapid development of Macau’s
gaming industry and, concurrently, the city’s economy. But it also aggravated problems in the mainland such as money laundering and the propensity of of cials to gamble away public funds. In 2008, in view of Macau’s increasing dependence on
the gaming industry, Beijing demanded that the SAR take steps to diversify the city’s economy. The Macau government announced that it would not accept any new casino projects – an announcement clearly prompted by the central government. Soon after, the National Development and Reform
Commission issued “The Outline of the Plan for the Reform and Development of the Pearl River Delta”, which de ned the policy framework for the integration of Macau into the Pearl River Delta region.
All aboard The document clearly shows the central government’s hope to intensify cooperation with Taiwan through the Pearl River Delta region in areas such as trade, high-technology manufacturing, tourism, education and culture. The integration of Macau into the Pearl River Delta region was one more move by Beijing in the complex chess game that its policy toward Taiwan has become. Because an acute shortage of land was hampering the
diversi cation of Macau’s economy, vice-president Xi Jinping declared in January 2009 that Macau and Guangdong would jointly develop 5 square km of land on Hengqin Island. The rst project approved was an industrial park for the Chinese traditional medicine business. Macau was also allowed to lease a plot of 1.1 square
kilometres on the island for a new campus for the University of Macau. The land will be under Macau’s jurisdiction. The lease runs until December 19, 2049, but is extendable if approved by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress. To boost relations between Macau and Zhuhai, the
number of cross-border cooperation mechanisms has been increasing. For example, a task force was set up following a joint conference between Guangdong and Macau authorities in December 2008. In April 2009, three sub-groups were established to deal with the upgrade of the cross-border industrial zone, cross-border city planning and traf c, as well as border checkpoint management. All this points one way: after a slow start, Beijing has
become the main locomotive of economic integration, following its own political agenda and with a view to reaching its own political goals. The Macau government has just been pulled along behind. The result is a peculiar state of affairs: the economic integration of Macau with the Pearl River Delta region is more of a political undertaking by Beijing in Beijing’s interests than an economic undertaking by Macau in Macau’s interests.
JANUARY 2012
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