sources are becoming more sophisticated. As the ALPA White Paper demonstrates, a strong bias exists among some organisations towards increasing fusion centre data applications to strengthen security processes. This is especially true in the area of civil aviation security, where such techniques have been utilised for years. CAPPS I & II, Secure Flight and other data collection efforts have been, and continue to be viewed as an effective means by which passenger data can be collected, processed and analysed. As panellists from one roundtable examining the issue of fusion centres and information control noted, “…the horse is out of the barn.”13
If this is
indeed the case, the no-fly list can only grow, along with other ‘lists’ within which suspect persons might reside. The example de jure is the TSA’s Trusted Traveller Programme. The programme is described in a CNN article:
The idea is that if the TSA can gather enough information about someone to show that he is a reduced risk to security, then they can have a reduced level of physical security at the checkpoint itself. So, if you as a traveller want to give a lot of personal information, there is now hope that you can leave your shoes on and keep your laptop in your bag.14 At this point, the programme is under construction and open to only a few;
primarily frequent fliers and people who currently utilise existing Customs and Border Protection (CBP) programmes to expedite entry into the United States. Should it succeed (and it is difficult to see how it would not – who doesn’t want faster passage through the security screening checkpoint?), it has the potential to grow to include all travellers. At that point, data matters. Despite the voluntariness of the programme in its present form, the data must undergo verification. And this presupposes a system by which one’s information is vetted through a database. CAPPS, Watch Lists, Trust-based systems, Trusted Traveller – as the national security paradigm moves continually towards data collection and analysis and as data manipulation becomes more facile, programmes such as these will proliferate. And many of them will exist within the ambit of civil aviation security. The challenge is not merely to improve the security product, but to demonstrate a commensurate concern for its use.
Robert Raffel was Senior Director of Public Safety for the Greater Orlando Aviation Authority. He spent 31 years in the U.S. military, both active and reserve, retiring as a Colonel in 2007. He now teaches in the Homeland Security Program at Embry- Riddle Aeronautical University.
References
1. Government Accountability Office (GAO), “Information Sharing”, September, 2010. GAO-10–972. 2. Source: Department of Homeland Security (DHS). GAO 04–395, Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System Faces Significant Implementation Challenges. February 2004. 4. ACLU, Feature on CAPPS II, September 5, 2003. 5. ALPA White Paper, January, 2010. 6. Ibid. 7. Ibid.
8. The federal Terrorism Information Awareness (TIA) Programme is a case in point.
In 2003, Congress
ruled that “The [TIA] should not be used to develop technologies for use in conducting intelligence activities or law enforcement activities against Unites States persons without appropriate consultation with Congress or without clear adherence to principles to protect civil liberties and privacy.” 117 Stat. at 536. 9. ACLU, What’s Wrong with Fusion Centers?, December, 2007
10. John Rollins, Cong. Research Serv., RL 34070, Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for Congress, January 2008.
11. GAO-10–972, Information Sharing, September, 2010.
12. Rollins, Fusion Centers: Issues and Options of Congress, supra, at 10. 13. Mike Field, “Who Will Watch the Watchers?” Univ. of MD. School of Law, JD, 2009, at 23. 14. “What Trusted Traveler Means to You”, Brett Snyder, September 5, 2011.
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December 2011 Aviationsecurityinternational
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