Data Collection, Fusion
Centres and Civil Liberties: implications for civil aviation
By Robert Raffel
serious and far-reaching implications for air travel than the collection, analysis and focused dissemination of information. Also referred to as “data mining”, powerful engines can and do collect immense items of information from public and private sources.
A
This information is collected, collated and analysed in “fusion centres”. Created after the 9/11 attacks, fusion centres have been defined as “…a collaborative effort of two or more federal, state, local or tribal government agencies that combines resources, expertise, or information with the goal of maximising the ability of such agencies to detect, prevent, investigate, apprehend and respond to criminal or terrorist activity.”1
By September 2006,
there were 38 such centres; by February 2008, 58, by November 2010, 72. At the
mid the plethora of technological innovations that help define the era of globalisation, few have more
met specific criteria. It also sought to expand these databases to include extra fields, e.g., a full street address, date of birth, and a home telephone number. Data would then be cross-referenced with government records and private sector databases to ascertain the identity of the person, and other details about that person. Risk scores would then be calculated and printed (in code) on the passenger’s boarding pass. The code would dictate the level of screening given to the individual.
CAPPS II came under fire from various watchdog organisations and other federal agencies. In February 2004 The Government Accountability Office (GAO) wrote a report critical of the TSA’s implementing plan and reiterating privacy concerns first voiced by members of Congress3
. As a result, CAPPS II was
terminated shortly thereafter. It was replaced, however, by a similar programme called “Secure Flight”4
.
"
...there is so much publicly available information about every citizen that a basic determination of trustworthiness is readily achievable..."
present time, there are fusion centres in every state, and 22 more in major urban centres2
.
This article will examine some of the ways that data and the centres themselves have been utilised in the context of civil aviation security. The lure of data, to paraphrase an old song, has a very strong appeal. The computer-assisted passenger profile system (CAPPS), developed by the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration is a case in point. Underlying the programme was the assumption that people meeting certain criteria would be subject to enhanced screening. The information existed in the form of data resident in government and airline computer systems. In 2003, the Transportation Security Administration proposed an expanded version of this programme, named CAPPS II. CAPPS II would rely on airline computer databases to identify people attempting to board aircraft who
4
Despite the demise of CAPPS, the call for more data as a tool to combat terrorism continues. At their recent annual meeting, the Airline Pilots Association (ALPA) produced a White Paper,
“Meeting Today’s Aviation Security Needs, A
Call to Action for a Trust-Based Security System.” In the Paper, ALPA calls for a “… proactive and adaptive…approach in order to…maintain an advantage over terrorists in order to meet this ever-changing threat.” Rather than concentrating on the historical “…interdiction of threat objects…” ALPA calls for a paradigm shift. The proposed system would “…positively identify known, trustworthy passengers… and concentrate our finite high-technology and behavioural screening resources on the small percentage of passengers whose trustworthiness is unknown or in doubt.”5 This end is achieved by determining a passenger’s trustworthiness “…to the greatest practical extent before being given a seat on an airliner.”6
Cutting to
the chase, the Paper makes the point that “In our data-rich society, there is so much publicly available information about every citizen that a basic determination of trustworthiness is readily achievable.”7 Thus, the default to data.
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As the TSA discovered during the rush to implement CAPPS II and other agencies have found to their chagrin, data mining as a means to counter terrorist groups and operations is a slippery slope. Without examining the efficacy of data mining per se as a means to combat terrorism (a separate, albeit valid issue), advances in processing and utilisation of personal data has raised issues involving civil liberties. Reports discussing the challenges inherent in data-mining and fusion centres have been generated by organisations ranging from the American Civil Liberties Union and the Congressional Research Service (CRS)10
to the GAO11 .
In addition to concerns over civil liberties, fusion centres have been criticised for operating in an atmosphere of excessive secrecy, which only serves to heighten suspicions regarding their methods and mission. The so-called ‘no-fly list’ is a case in point. Some of the challenges inherent in the fusion of data have ramifications for air travellers. Almost two years ago, this writer chronicled the story of Mrs. Glenda Hutton, a 66-year-old retired Canadian schoolteacher who found herself on a no-fly list. Two years, two thousand dollars and a television appearance later, Mrs. Hutton was able to fly again. She was never told why, or how, her name appeared on such a list. The continued growth of fusion centres, given their lack of accountability and transparency, make this a scenario more and more likely to be repeated. The call for more data and a commensurate growth in computer engines to control the data flow is indicative of tandem trends: First, the increasing use of data, analysis and fusion to reveal trends and suspect behaviour. Second, an over-arching assumption on the part of the fusion centre user that this process will result in deliverables that a discrete beneficiary can utilise to a comprehensible advantage. Questions over underlying philosophy have been examined in reports critical of the mission of fusion centres, to include the CRS.12 The use of data mining engines and fusion centres to help identify and combat risks from terrorism, criminal activity and even natural hazards is increasing. Techniques to manage data flow, “fuse” and compare information from various
December 2011 Aviationsecurityinternational
AVSEC OPINION
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