move was risky, Brown’s advisers thought, because Brown was running—successfully so far—against the Demo- cratic machine. Now, the Democrats were bringing in the machine’s boss. On stage with Coakley, there would be Obama flanked by the congressional delegation and Dem- ocratic leaders from Beacon Hill—all those cast as villains to Brown’s hero. Even to some Democrats, bringing in the president illus-
trated the difference between how the campaigns perceived the electorate’s mood. “In the long run, politically Obama would have been better off to have not come in,” says Mary Anne Marsh, a veteran Boston Democratic strategist. “He wouldn’t be able to rally Democrats enough, and it was go- ing to remind unenrolled voters why they were angry.” “There’s no question he would have been criticized if he
hadn’t come,” she adds, “but in terms of a political calcula- tion, it would have been better to have a few people upset at him than to anger the unenrolled voters, of which there are plenty here.” The Brown camp decided to stage their own counter-
rally if for no other reason than so the newscasts would have tape of Brown to play next to tape of Obama. In two days, the Brown campaign organized the “People’s Rally” in Worcester, and they packed it in with 3,500 people. Meanwhile, Brown’s team was spending money as quick-
ly as it could, but not fast enough. Brown’s advisers actu- ally wanted the contributions—which were coming from all corners of the country—to stop. Even with a robust Google surge strategy and buying all the airtime available on both radio and TV in three markets—Boston, Providence, R.I., and Albany, N.Y.—the campaign couldn’t get the money out the door fast enough. In the last weekend, $500,000 was put into newspaper ads, just because it was available. Brown still ended the race with $6 million in his bank account.
Does Scott Brown’s 52 percent to 47 percent victory
over Martha Coakley represent the beginning of a tectonic shift in Massachusetts politics? Maybe. Democratic Reps. John Tierney, Niki Tsongas and Jim McGovern are polling lower than 40 percent when respondents are asked whether they deserve to be reelected. When Rep. Bill Delahunt (D) announced that he is not seeking reelection, a couple Re- publicans quickly jumped in the race to succeed him. Massachusetts GOP Chair Jennifer Nassour says that
since the election 80 people have expressed interest in run- ning as Republicans for the state legislature, Congress or other positions. “Our candidates now have a message that they are comfortable with,” she says. So far, there doesn’t seem to be any buyer’s remorse
among the locals regarding Brown’s election—even if some in the Tea Party movement recoiled at the senator’s vote for a Democratic jobs bill. A Rasmussen poll released in the first week of March found that he has a 70 percent approval rating among Massachusetts voters.
June 2010 | Campaigns & Elections 41
Nationally, the consequences of Brown’s win are at best
hazy and at worst confusing. Massachusetts has long been at the forefront of trends that sweep across the nation. It was among the first states to legalize same-sex marriage. It was the first to reform healthcare. Now, 237 years after the original Tea Party, Massachusetts has become home— somewhat paradoxically—of the Tea Party movement’s first electoral success. Brown’s election, however, probably does not mean
Tea Partiers have found a recipe for success they can rep- licate in multiple elections in 2010. Over the course of the race, Brown wisely avoided fully embracing the Tea Party when asked about it. In that same Rasmussen poll of Massachusetts voters, almost seven in 10 said they don’t consider themselves part of the Tea Party movement and a plurality held an unfavorable view of it. Brown won because he and his team capitalized on lo-
cal and national currents of anti-incumbent ferocity. The 2009 gubernatorial elections in New Jersey and Virginia hinted at the same feelings, but Democrats missed the sig- nals. There could be no greater indication that voters want something different than Massachusetts handing the hal- lowed “Kennedy seat” to a Republican. Early in the race, when Brown was just beginning to make inroads, Mas- sachusetts Democrats told me—over and over again—that there is no way Massachusetts would turn over Jack and Teddy’s legacy to a Republican, especially while the Sen- ate was enmeshed in healthcare reform—something Ted Kennedy considered his life’s work. “The Democratic mythology was self-defeating,” says
Domke, the Republican strategist. “Since liberal Demo- crats here and in D.C. believed in the Kennedy monar- chy—that the family was considered political royalty by nearly all voters—they couldn’t grasp the idea that voters could actually vote for a Republican to fill ‘the Kennedy seat.’”
Jeremy P. Jacobs is the staff writer for Politics magazine. Have you tried our
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