What Scott Means For Mitt
The Scott Brown phenom- enon may have more concrete implications for national politics than a symbolic venting of anti-incumbent anger. It could have been a warm up for a 2012 presidential run by Mitt Romney. Brown’s attention grabbing win eases the Bay State burden that hampered Romney during his 2008 presidential bid—i.e. that there’s no such thing as a Massachusetts Republican—but, also, consider the development of the campaign team. In 2004, David Axelrod
and David Plouffe ran Barack Obama’s Senate campaign in Il- linois. Then, in 2006, they came to Massachusetts and test-drove what would become Obama’s presidential campaign message on another young, African-Amer- ican politician named Deval
Patrick in his gubernatorial cam- paign. (Patrick, 2006: “Together We Can.” Obama, 2008: “Yes We Can.”) The Shawmut Group—led
by Fehrnstrom, Flaherty and Myers—has now run Romney’s 2008 campaign and has, hypothetically, test-driven a message with a good-looking and disciplined candidate in Massachusetts in 2010. Does this mean that we’re
going to see Romney run in 2012 as a Tea Party populist? Prob- ably not given his Harvard edu- cation, vast wealth and work at Bain Capital. But could Romney run on a platform that empha- sizes national security? Yes, he can. In a speech that largely fo- cused on the economy at CPAC in February, Romney included these lines: “We will strengthen
our security by building missile defense, restoring our military might, and standing-by and strengthening our intelligence officers. And conservatives believe in providing constitu- tional rights to our citizens, not to enemy combatants like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.” “On our watch,” Romney
went on, “the conversation with a would-be suicide bomber will not begin with the words, ‘You have the right to remain silent!’” On the stump, one of Brown’s
most effective lines was that our tax dollars should go to buying weapons to fight terrorists, not lawyers to defend them. It’s a good campaign line—makes you wonder if he passed it on to Romney right before introducing him at CPAC.
—J.P.J.
According to people in Washington, the National Re-
publican Senatorial Committee was skeptical of Brown’s candidacy. According to people in Massachusetts, the NRSC was completely uninterested. On December 16 and 17, the NRSC stepped lightly into the contest and polled the race. The NRSC’s investment in the poll was small—just $10,000—and the survey’s sample size was only 300. Nev- ertheless, the poll showed very encouraging signs. On the initial ballot question, Brown trailed by 13 points, 50 to 37. The numbers deeper in the poll were more promising. Respondents were asked to rank their interest in the race on a scale of one to 10. Among those who answered 10, Brown only trailed by two points, 46 to 44. Among the 9s and 10s, he trailed by three. Two days before Christmas—nearly a week after the poll—the NRSC called the Brown campaign and told them about the results. It was viewed as unbelievably good news among the Brown camp. The team still hadn’t con- ducted any polling and couldn’t tell if it was getting much traction. The NRSC poll showed that not only was Brown gaining ground, but the race was almost a dead heat. Brown’s advisers wanted to do something to break the
race open or, at least, get some headlines. Every attempt so far had failed because Coakley refused to respond to every jab Brown threw, squashing pretty much any media cov- erage. On December 27, the group met to discuss other options. One option stood above the rest: Going up on TV early. For it to work, they needed an ad that would
generate controversy and get plenty of earned media. Oth- erwise, they would be wasting the media nest egg they were saving for the end of the campaign. The campaign only had one ad in the can, and it was
controversial. The spot opened with President John F. Kennedy discussing a proposal to cut taxes to spur the economy. As Kennedy speaks, his image morphs into Brown, who finishes the speech. The message of the ad was twofold. First, Brown, not Coakley, is more in line with the economic policies of JFK Democrats. Second— and more importantly—Brown, not Coakley, is the proper heir to the Kennedy legacy and Senate seat. There was concern among the team that the ad would
incite the Democratic backlash that they had been trying to avoid. There was also worry that a member of the Ken- nedy family would speak out against the ad. “There was a risk,” says Fehrnstrom. “But we felt that the biggest risk that a Republican could take running for office in Mas- sachusetts is not take any risks at all.” Taking this risk paid off. The ad got tons of coverage
both in Massachusetts and on national cable. The ad ran for five days without any response from the Coakley camp. “They never answered,” says longtime Massachusetts Re- publican strategist Ron Kaufman, who was involved in the campaign. “It was kind of stunning.” On January 5, Rasmussen released a poll that showed
Brown trailing by 9 percent. The Brown campaign couldn’t stay under the radar any- more. The race was on.
June 2010 | Campaigns & Elections 39
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