NEWS Grenfell safety warnings and materials discussed


A DOCUMENT from the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority (LFEPA) and a fire risk assessment (FRA) showed that there were ‘official warnings’ on fire safety before the fatal fire, while a former London Fire Brigade (LFB) chief claimed materials used would 'never have been allowed' under old fire safety and building regulations. ITV News reported on the documents, ‘the first to reveal there were official warnings about fire safety’ at Grenfell before the fatal fire in June 2017. The LFEPA fire deficiency notice was served in November 2016, while a separate independent FRA was undertaken in June 2016, both having ‘identified multiple failures’ that ‘required prompt action’ by Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO). The FRA gave deadlines for action at the time, with the assessor writing to KCTMO in October 2016 ‘asking why action still hadn’t been taken on more than 20 issues’ identified, and stating that ‘based on inspections’ after the fire by experts for the ongoing inquiry, ‘there appears to be no evidence action was taken on many of the failings’. Both audits identified issues


with ‘damaged or poorly fitted fire doors’ and others that ‘didn’t self-close’, and questions about how the refurbishment had ‘affected the operation of the building’s smoke venting system and the firefighters’ lift controls’. The documents are said to be ‘the first evidence’ that KCTMO ‘received warnings they were legally required to act on’, with the LFEPA notice deadline May 2017, and the FRA recommending action on more than 40 ‘high risk’ issues ‘within two to three weeks’. In June 2016, the warnings from the independent assessor were issued, with deadlines for action. Kensington and Chelsea Borough Council said in a statement: ‘This will be a matter for the public inquiry, and to comment further could risk prejudicing the ongoing police investigation. We do not want to do


easier and cheaper to build and reconfigure existing structures. Government and statutory bodies have caved in and we now have a situation where safety assessments are being undertaken by unqualified people.’ Changes ‘for the worst’


or say anything that could obstruct the course of justice, because justice is what our residents want the most. ‘Our first thoughts and our last thoughts will always be with those that lost their lives in the Grenfell Tragedy. We have been clear that we want the whole unvarnished truth and we will do all we can to assist, no matter what the consequences are for the council.’ New Civil Engineer reported


on the views of Stephen Lashmar, formerly LFB city father, who stated that materials including combustible cladding and UPVC window frames would ‘never have been allowed’ under previous regulations. This is because ‘for more than 20 years building regulations and fire safety protocols have been softened by consecutive governments’, who ‘wilted’ to ‘sustained pressure from industry’ to drop ‘previously stringent’ laws. Mr Lashmar added that since the mid 1990s governments have also ‘wilted’ to pressure from the EU to ‘drop’ the fire safety protocols, adding: ‘From 1979 to 1997, it was a golden time for fire safety. There were proper fire safety regulations and proper unity between the fire safety inspectors and the building control. ‘Since then various pieces of


legislation have been under a sustained attack by developers, architects and material manufacturers in order to make it


began after the Fire Precautions (Workplace) Regulations 1997 replaced the Fire Precautions Act, while the ‘gamechanger’ was when Building Regulations ‘were altered’ in 2000, and the Building (Approved Inspectors etc.) Regulations became law. Mr Lashmar believes this, plus the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 – which he claims ‘was pushed through by the EU’ – means fire services were ‘legally told’ to take a ‘hands off approach’ to fire safety. What this ‘effectively did’ was to


‘shift the responsibility’ for building safety ‘away from the external fire safety inspectors and on to private companies who owned the buildings. In my day as an inspector, I knew I was responsible for the safety of the people inside the building and for the building itself. Now you have a system whereby a “capable person” with minimal training carries out the risk assessment and the fire inspector has to take that assessment as gospel’. Commenting further, Mr Lashmar added that ‘it would be like removing the need for mechanics to carry out MOTs and giving someone who has driven a car for a long time the power to approve a car’s safety’, and the concept of a ‘capable person’ just ‘isn’t up to the job’. The latest ‘blow’ to standards was the repealing of Section 20 of the London Building Act 1939, which he claimed removed the ‘final card’ that services could use. He concluded: ‘Section 20 was


our safety blanket. Architects and builders hated Section 20 as they knew we could enforce proper fire safety checks if a building was subjected to it. However, when they [government] removed it from law, we have been left at the mercy of what the industry wants.’


www.frmjournal.com SEPTEMBER 2018 7


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