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NEWS Cladding and insulation issues continue to arise


ANONYMOUS REPORTS claim that the cladding system fitted to Grenfell Tower was ‘never subjected to fire safety testing’ before being installed, while one insulation system’s test results were withdrawn, and another cladding system failed a retest after previously passing. The Independent reported on


claims from sources to The Times that the cladding system fitted to Grenfell Tower ‘was never subjected to fire safety testing’, and that the Reynobond aluminium composite material (ACM) panels installed were ‘apparently not put through large- scale lab examinations to test their combustibility before being fitted’. These sources also claimed that


three separate police investigations ‘have yet to uncover any record of independent testing being carried out’ on the cladding, with one stating that ‘the question that has to be asked is how on earth did this material come to be installed on all of those buildings? Somehow or other, those materials have got on to 300 buildings without any tests being done or test results being produced’. The panels, fitted during a 2016


refurbishment, were previously revealed to have been a ‘cheaper but more flammable’ alternative, chosen ‘in order to save £293,000’ on the total £9.2m work programme. A spokesman for the Ministry of


Housing, Communities and Local Government ‘did not respond’ to the claims, but did confirm that the department ‘does not believe any wall system containing an ACM category three cladding panel, even when combined with limited combustibility insulation material at its core, would meet current building regulations guidance [...] those carrying out building work, including the fitting of cladding systems, should comply with the requirements of the building regulations’. This came after manufacturer


Celotex announced that its insulation – which was also on Grenfell Tower – ‘had been issued with a fire performance report’ by the Building Research Establishment (BRE) ‘which


6


contained errors’. The manufacturer discovered ‘differences’ between the fire test of the RS5000 foam panels at BRE’s laboratory in 2014 and the ‘crucial write-up’ of the test, or a BR135 report. The results have now been


withdrawn, and Celotex stated it did ‘not know whether the differences meant other buildings’ were safe, adding that ‘we have identified that one or more additional materials seem to have been used in the rainscreen cladding system which was tested that do not appear in the test report. Our priority is to establish whether there are any fire safety issues arising from these differences’. This error was a ‘matter of real


regret [...] we fully recognise its potential seriousness and that it will give rise to concern. We are working hard to arrange the further testing as quickly as possible and we will make a further announcement once the results of that testing are available’. BRE responded by ‘denying


responsibility’ for the error, commenting that ‘the information provided by Celotex for inclusion in the report is a question for Celotex – it was their discrepancy not BRE’s’. It then released another statement that read: ‘It is our understanding that the test system was not constructed according to Celotex’s design specification and as such, the test results have been withdrawn.’ Finally, a combination of foam insulation and ACM panels failed fire tests after previously being approved. Sky News reported on the test failure concerning ‘combustible’ Xtratherm Safe-R foam insulation


MARCH 2018 www.frmjournal.com


and ‘fire-resistant’ ACM panels that had ‘been assessed as capable of complying with building regulations’. The combination had been ‘previously approved’, but failed a retest, and ‘it is thought scores of high-rise buildings have been fitted’ with the combination. As a result, its official assessment ‘is no longer valid’, with the previous results published in 2015 and ‘relied on by architects and developers’. Xtratherm commented: ‘As a response to the tragedy in Grenfell, we as a responsible manufacturer felt it prudent to validate this assessment and commissioned a full-scale test. The build-up did not pass.’ Both tests were carried out by


Exova, which confirmed the system ‘failed to meet the criteria’ and that the previous results have been ‘withdrawn’. Xtratherm ‘did not say’ how many blocks had been fitted with the system, but one industry insider told Sky News ‘there could be more than 50 high-rise buildings at risk’. Sky News also noted that both


residents and landlords of affected buildings ‘may not be aware their cladding could be unsafe because nothing has been said publicly about the test failure by the government, the certification bodies involved or by Xtratherm’. Peabody housing association had removed combustible panels and fitted the Xtratherm system at a cost of £500,000 on Lucent Point in Lewisham. At this point, ‘it is unclear who


will pay if those panels now have to be removed and replaced’, with the majority ‘in the process of being fitted over’ the insulation. Exova responded that it conducts its assessments based on the regulations, adding: ‘We carefully review and analyse all relevant new evidence and guidance when it, and subsequent test evidence, is made available to us. Once we have completed a review and better understand this new evidence, we will consider it in relation to assessments we have undertaken in the past and take appropriate action, including their withdrawal if required.’


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