Analytical Instrumentation


A study published by the Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events (CREATE) in 2005 analyzed the impact of simultaneous small-scale (5 pounds of high explosive each) RDD attacks on the twin ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach. Results of the input- output model indicated that, for the worst case scenario, damage from economic disruption could exceed $34 billion, and cost more than 212,000 jobs (measured in person-years of employment, PYE). The “local” impact of a lower end attack, i.e., job and output losses associated with the cessation of port activities for just 15 days, amounted to $138.5 million of lost output and 1,258 PYEs.12


underutilized and improvements are possible in the near future Drawbacks to accelerator tubes include a relatively short working life and lack of convenience.


As for the gamma and x-ray sources 137Cs, 192 and 241 Ir, 60 Co,


Am, all can be replaced by x-ray tubes. There are also non-radiological alternatives for density and level gauging, moisture/density gauging, and positive material identification. There are some challenges ahead: such as developing a small high voltage source and x-ray tube that can fit in a well logging tool, to replace 137


An independent follow-up study in 2007, providing further risk and economic analysis of dirty bomb attacks on these ports, determined that the economic consequences from a shutdown of the harbours due to the contamination resulted in significant losses in the tens of billions of dollars, including decontamination costs, as well as business and property losses.13


A 2005 planning estimate, prepared by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), assessed impact of the detonation of a 3,000 pound truck bomb containing 2,300 curies of 137


Cs in the downtown business


district of a moderate-to-large city on a school day. As a result of the explosions, 90% of the radioisotope was aerosolized and carried by variable winds of 3-8 mph, with radioactive particles ranging in size from 1 micron to 150 microns. Subsequent fallout contains debris that contaminates surrounding structures. Estimates are that the incident results in 180 fatalities, 270 injuries, extensive environmental contamination, evacuation of thousands of individuals, and 20,000 contaminated individuals in the downwind zone. Decontamination, destruction, disposal, and replacement of lost infrastructure were expected to cost hundreds of millions of dollars. While broader economic impacts were not projected, the entire contaminated area was expected to be economically depressed for years.14


Research published in 2009 examined the


commercial impact of a RDD attack on a medium sized U.S. city, Dayton, Ohio. In this simulation, 2,300 curies of Cs-137 was detonated downtown, at ground level, using only 100 pounds of high explosive. Through the use of an economic input-output model, the research identified that the economic consequences totaled $1.2 billion, while impacts to labour income were $529.6 million. Overall, 21,374 jobs were affected due to the economic disruptions.15


In a study published in 2010, using a large-scale computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the previously described DHS research, the short-run and long-run regional economic consequences of an attack centered on the downtown Los Angeles area were evaluated. The event-year impacts of this scenario were found to arise almost entirely from business interruption. For a 30 day shut-down of the affected area, the real gross domestic product (GDP) loss, via both direct and indirect routes, was found to be $1.9 billion. At a 5 per cent discount rate, the net present value (NPV) long- term GDP losses were calculated at $12.1 billion.16


Alternative Technologies


The only sure way to keep radioactive materials out of the hands of terrorists, and minimise liability to the industry, is to find and implement replacement technologies. There are neutron sources available that can substitute for 241


Am\Be or 252 Cf. Accelerator tubes


are already being used for well logging in a limited capacity. These tubes generally operate by accelerating deuterium gas at high-voltage toward a tritium impregnated target, producing fusion and releasing neutrons in the process. Tritium, while radioactive, is not a very dangerous isotope (useless for making an RDD). Accelerator tubes using only deuterium ,or a mixture of deuterium and tritium, are also under


development. The technology to do away with 241


Am\Be and 252 Cf source is already in place, just accelerator that could replace a 60


http://www.nrc.gov/security/byproduct/nsts.html; Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents. Washington, D.C.: Office of Radiation Programs, United States Environmental Protection Agency, 1998. Print. 3


El-Sibaie, Magdy. "IAEA CERTIFICATE OF COMPETENT AUTHORITY


Cs sources, or a field portable high energy Co radiography


camera. But these are not insurmountable problems. Given a concerted industry-wide effort, it is possible to almost entirely eliminate radioisotope sources.


Conclusions


Assessing the economic impacts of disasters is a very recent systematic field of study, using techniques that include surveys, econometric models, Box-Jenkins time series analyses, input-output models, general equilibrium models, and economic accounting models. While these methods all have predictive limitations, for most natural disasters, losses have been mostly associated with employment income and property damage. Even when other costs are included, short term disasters historically have rarely had a meaningful impact on a national economy. But for some types of disaster – specifically terrorism – an event may precipitate negative long-term effects on macroeconomic performance. For the petroleum industry, the economic shock of occasional environmental incidents, coupled to the RDD impact models reviewed here, are a reminder that cleanup and compensation claims from misuse of unsecured radioisotope sources remain a concern.17


Radiological attacks are a matter of serious concern, but not panic. Recommendations for mitigation of risk and unnecessary economic exposure within the petroleum industry generally center on reduction of radioisotope inventories, where it is practical. Sources should be retired and replaced with benign technologies. Non-radioactive technologies, like x-ray and gamma-ray tubes and neutron generators, can be substituted for radioisotopes, reducing the opportunity for loss, theft or misuse.18


*Robert Tisdale (drtisdale@gmail.com) received his Ph.D. in organometallic chemistry from the University of Nebraska – Lincoln in 1986 and M.B.A. in technology management from The University of Texas at Austin in 1988. He is one of the cofounders of Market Intelligence Group in Austin, Texas, a services firm that guides client companies in the strategic management of extreme technologies.


Ray Fleming received his Bachelors of Science degree from the University of Houston in 1986. He has worked in the field of health physics for 22 years and is currently the program coordinator for the industrial radioactive material licensing program for the Texas Department of State Health Services.


References 1


Adapted from Radiological Dispersal Device Human Health Fact Sheet, Argonne National Laboratory, August 2005. 5


Washington, D.C. 20590 SPECIAL FORM RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS CERTIFICATE USA/0703/S-96, REVISION 1." U.S. Department of Transportation: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (2009). Print. 4


;"FEMA: Are You Ready?" Federal Emergency Management Agency. Web.<http://www.fema.gov/areyouready/radiological_dispersion_ device.shtm>. 8


Levi, Michael A., and Henry C. Kelly. Weapons of Mass Disruption. Emmitsburg, MD: National Emergency Training Center, 2002. Print; Weapons of mass disruption. M Levi and H Kelly; Scientific American 287:55, 76-81, 11/2002. 7


"NTI: Radiological Terrorism Tutorial: Intro to Radiological Terrorism." Nuclear Threat Initiative: Home Page. Web. <http://www.nti.org/h_learnmore/radtutorial/chapter01_05.html>. 6


35


Schaefer-Jones, James. Preparing for the Worst. Praeger Publishers, 2007. 98. Print. 9


"HotSpot." National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center. Web. <https://narac.llnl.gov/HotSpot/HotSpot.htm> 10


First responders will generally need to be wearing respiratory equipment such as SCBAs in this zone. Due to ground deposition the 50 year PAG (5 REM over 50 years) extends 5 km from the blast and about 0.5 km wide. This are will need to be cleaned up before it can ever be occupied again. The area of ground deposition is high enough that food products need to be tested (we assumed 100 picocuries per square meter (pCi/m2


) extend


8 km and is 0.4 km wide. The area with greater than 1 pCi/m2 extends 320 km and is about 10 km wide. If the assumption is that our terrorist acquires 10 of these sources, the 100 pCi/m2 zone extends to 45 km, and if 100 sources to 320 km. In both of those cases, measurable amounts of radiation may extend beyond 1000 km. Of course, wind will not likely be that stable for very long so a more random distribution is expected in a more real world example. Depending on the amount of radioactive material, the bomb design and terrain, it is possible for an area covering thousands of square kilometers to be effected; "CPG Sec. 560.750 Radionuclides in Imported Foods - Levels of Concern." U S Food and Drug Administration Home Page. Web. <http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/ComplianceManuals/ComplianceP olicyGuidanceManual/UCM074576>. 11


Testimony of Dr. Henry Kelly, President, Federation of American Scientists before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, March 6, 2002. 12


A Risk and Economic Analysis of Dirty Bomb Attacks on the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach. Rosoff, H. von Winterfeldt, D. Risk Analysis 2007; 27 (3) 533-546. 14


“Scenario 11: Radiological Attack – Radiological Dispersal Devices”. National Planning Scenarios (NPS). Version 21.3. Department of Homeland Security (DHS); March 2006. Print. 15


The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission has implemented rules for increased controls and a National Source Tracking System for large sources, however most well-logging sources fall below that standard. A 16 curie 241


Am\Be source is below those standards for


example as are all but a handful of well-logging sources. To examine how big that really is we only need to look at the US Food


Am, 2 Becquerels per kilogram (54 picocuries/kilogram). A Becquerel is one disintegration per second, so that is a tiny amount. Spread evenly a 16 curie 241


and Drug Administration’s Derived Intervention Levels (DILs) for 241


Am can contaminate 325


million tons of food above the DIL.; "NRC: Security Orders." NRC: Home Page. Web. http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/ doc-collections/enforcement/security/; "NRC: National Source Tracking System." NRC: Home Page. Web.


Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Terrorist Threat. Steve Bowman. CRS Report for Congress 2002; Van, Tuyle Gregory J., Tiffany L. Strub, Harold A. O'Brien, Caroline F. V. Mason, and Steven J. Gitomer. Reducing RDD Concerns Related to Large Radiological Source Applications. [Los Alamos, N.M.]: Los Alamos National Laboratory, 2003. Print. 2


Economic Impact of a Terrorist Attack on the Twin Ports of Los Angeles-Long Beach. Gordon, P., Moore, J. II., Richardson, H., and Pan, Q. The Create Report. Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events, University of Southern California. 1 May 2005. Print. 13


LeBrun, Michael T. The Economic Impact of a Radiological Dispersal Device (RDE). Ft. Belvoir: Defense Technical Information Center, 2009. Print. 16


Assessment of the Regional Economic Impacts of Catastrophic Events: CGE analysis of resource loss and behavioral effects of a RDD attack scenario. J.A. Giesecke, W.J. Burns, A. Barrett, E. Bayrak, A. Rose, and M. Suher. General Paper No. G-194. Centre of Policy Studies (COPS): Monash University 2010. Print. 17


Clower, Terry L. "Chapter18: Economic Applications in Disaster Research, Mitigation, and Planning." Disciplines, Disasters, and Emergency Management: the Convergence and Divergence of Concepts, Issues and Trends from the Research Literature. Springfield, Ill.: Charles C Thomas, 2007. 233-48. Print. 18


Dirty Bombs: The Threat Revisited. Peter D. Zimmerman with Cheryl Loeb. Defense Horizons. 38 (2004); "Dealing with Dirty Bombs: Plain Facts, Practical Solutions | The Heritage Foundation." Conservative Policy Research and Analysis | The Heritage Foundation.


Web.<http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2004/01/Deali ng-with-Dirty-Bombs-Plain-Facts-Practical-Solutions>.


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