safety alerts
Near-miss with live electrical cable
Compiled using information provided by the Marine Safety Forum,
www.marinesafetyforum.org
SERIOUS NEAR-MISS WITH LIVE ELECTRICAL CABLE
A recent incident on a vessel highlighted the importance of a close interface between contractors working on board and crew. During the demobilisation of contractor equipment, the equipment had to be ‘Locked Out’ and ‘Tagged Out’ (LOTO) to ensure that a ‘zero energy state’ had been achieved before work commenced. The contractor visited the ECR and, with vessel crew, locked and tagged out the system and started work. The power was verified to be locked out at the equipment and isolated at the breaker in the deck distribution box. Work commenced. During work the lock-out key was passed to another member of the contractor team who proceeded to the ECR to remove the LOTO and re-energised the system. The de-energised cable from the equipment had been disconnected and placed on the chassis but when the LOTO was removed from the ECR switchboard the cable became live with 440 volts and 100 amps passing through it.
Assessing that the cable remained de-energised, another
contractor employee
had to move it to access the work. In doing so, his hand was very close to the live cable ends. The cable ends touched the chassis and arced, causing a loud bang. An immediate safety stand-down was enforced by the contractor. Fortunately, no one was injured as a result of this incident.
A number of causes were identified after the event. These included: • no vessel involvement in job content or planning and no contractor project manager designated for work • no job safety analysis developed as per bridging document requirements • a permit required but was not raised for isolation • no contractor work permit was completed for the LOTO as required by the established bridging document • a multi LOTO was not used and a single key
88 I Offshore Support Journal I June 2012
passed to the team member • a voltage discrepancy for breaker isolation resulted in the contractor’s inability to confirm zero voltage • the deck cabinet was exposed to the elements and not easily accessible. It was not fit for purpose • electrical drawing was not a controlled document. No drawn by, checked by or approved by and no class/type approval • no recognition of labelling on adjacent breakers • the superintendent did not follow up on concern with isolation of correct breaker • the superintendent had a dual role, supervising one ROV crew and overseeing all ROV personnel. As a result of the incident, 18 corrective actions have been identified and are in the process of being implemented. The incident could have resulted in a fatality. It should not have happened and could have been prevented if all of the proven processes already in place had been used.
FINGERS LACERATED BY ROTATING MACHINERY
During the forenoon watch the chief engineer noticed that one of the clamps for the cooling pipes on main start air compressor number 1 had fallen off, presumably because of vibration, and was lying underneath the air compressor. He had a conversation with the third engineer, who was asked to remove the clamp from under the compressor and fit time permitted.
it during his watch if
The task was to offer up the cooling pipe lower clamp from the underside of the compressor and to secure it in position with a single bolt/nut. A ring spanner was to be used to hold the upper bolt and a ratchet wrench to tighten the nut on the lower clamp.
The third engineer positioned himself on his
left side on the engineroom plates to conduct the task. Using his right hand he positioned the ring end of the spanner in from the right side of the cooling pipes onto the bolt head. From the underside he offered up the clamp and put the nut onto the bolt, then proceeded to tighten using the ratchet wrench.
The third engineer continued to tighten the nut with a ratchet wrench and the compressor automatically started up. This caused the fan blade to rotate at high speed, making contact
with his left hand, knocking it downward. This caused lacerations of the finger which resulted in the vessel being re-routed back to port. The incident could have resulted in the loss of fingers or a hand.
Among the critical factors that contributed to the incident were a failure to assess and control hazards, and incorrect positioning of body parts. A contributing factor was that the personnel in question were not wearing any form of hand protection (which might have reduced the extent of the injury).
The individual was fully aware that he was taking a risk, but decided to do the job, resulting in a shortcut being taken.
Isolation of the
compressor was not conducted as he deemed the task to be a ‘two-minute job.’ Instead of performing the work in accordance with company procedures he failed to carry out a risk assessment and failed to put appropriate controls in place to minimise the risk. During the investigation interview the injured party stated that the compressor had just completed a cycle and, therefore, he did not believe it would start again. He also said he had conducted “a mental risk assessment”.
GRINDER
An AB seaman on a vessel operating close to a platform suffered an injury to his right leg – just above the knee – resulting in a 5cm cut. While waiting instructions from the platform, he had been ordered to brush the upper stern part of the crash-bar (starboard side) with an electric grinding machine. Whilst doing so, on top of a ladder, he lost his balance and the tool fell to the deck, injuring him in the process. He was given medical assistance by crew members and the doctor on the platform recommended sending him to hospital ashore.
The grinder had no emergency stop system and continued rotating once dropped. The seaman should not have used a ladder to carry out the work, and the ladder was not secured. The deck was reported to be slippery at the time. The status of the crash-bar did not justify the urgent maintenance activity. There was no evidence of planning the activity/toolbox talk, or evidence of a permit to work. The two seafarers working on deck (the AB and bosun) were working independently (not as per the permit to work requirements). OSJ
www.osjonline.com
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