conclusion of a trial on the merits.43 dissent remarked:
The
The only basis upon which we could have reviewed the transfer order in that case [Leung] was to treat the judgment entered in the Circuit Court for Howard County as the final judgment in the case and to regard the transfer order as an interlocutory order reviewable on appeal from the later-entered final judgment. Under what, up to now, has been our clear and routine jurisprudence, if a transfer order constitutes a final judg- ment as the Court now holds, the transfer order in Leung would have been unreviewable, for, as noted: (1) no ap- peal had been taken from that order, and (2) the only appeal that was taken was filed long after the 30 days allowed for noting an appeal. We would have lacked substantive jurisdiction to enter the mandate that we entered.44
43
The majority did not consider its decision to be inconsistent with Leung because it “ignore[d] the proposition that a party may elect to appeal within thirty days of the en- try of the order or wait until the litigation has been completed.” Brewster, at 16 n. 4. 44Dissent at 6-7.
Fourth, the dissent found the ruling in- consistent with Parrott v. State,45
in which
the Court had held that an order removing a case from one Circuit Court to another under Article IV, Section 8 of the Mary- land Constitution, was an interlocutory order and, hence, not immediately appeal- able. In Parrott, the dissent pointed out, the Court had explicitly stated that, “Be- cause the order of
removal...is not a final judgment and does not fall within the col- lateral order doctrine exception, we dismissed Parrott’s appeal.”46 Fifth, the dissent distinguished the de- cisions upon which the Court relied for the proposition that the Courts had “of- ten permitted an appeal from a judgment ultimately disposing of a case based on an issue that could have been, but was not, made the basis of an earlier appeal.”47
It
45301 Md. 411 (1984). 46
49
Dissent at 7 (quoting Parrott, 301 Md. at 425)(emphasis added)). In a footnote, the majority dismissed this criticism, noting that Parrott did not address the question whether the circuit court order was a final appealable judgment and, as such, did not constitute binding precedent. Brewster, at 15-16 n. 3. 47Dissent at 8-9.
found inapposite decisions involving ap- peals,48
after the conclusion of arbitration,
of earlier orders of the circuit court or- dering the parties to arbitrate, on two grounds: (a) in those actions, no issue had been raised regarding any waiver by the appellant of his right to raise the issue by failing to appeal within thirty days after the order to proceed to arbitration was docketed; and (b) when the circuit court acts on a petition to compel arbitration49 or petition to stay arbitration50
it neces-
sarily determines whether an agreement (Continued on page 8)
48
Dissent at 10 (discussing Testerman Co. v. Buck, 3 340 Md. 569 (1995); Horsey, supra, 329 Md. at 392; Board of Education, supra, 305 Md. 774)).
Section 3-207 of Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. (The “Courts Article”), the Uniform Arbitration Act, authorizes the filing of a pe- tition to compel arbitration when a party to an arbitration agreement refuses to arbitrate.
50
Section 3-208 of the Courts Article (the Uniform Arbitration Act) permits a person to petition to stay arbitration on the ground that the parties never agreed to arbitrate.
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