minates the proceeding in a particular court is final and appealable.”12 Preliminarily, the Court discussed the historical development of the final judg- ment rule and rejected the proposition that an order which was not a final judg- ment under Rule 2-602 (a), or which did not dispose of the merits of a case could not be immediately appealed.13
The
Court restated the well-established propo- sition that, to have the attribute of finality, the order or judgment of the circuit court “must be so far final as to determine and conclude the rights in the action, or to deny to the party seeking redress by the appeal the means of further prosecuting or defending his rights and interests in the subject matter of the proceeding.”14 While readily acknowledging that this lan- guage was “susceptible” of meaning that an order would not be considered final if the party could pursue the subject matter before another tribunal,15
it rejected that
construction, urging: We have never explicitly stated that an inability to pursue the substance of a claim in any forum is a requirement of finality, and we reject this notion now. An order putting the appellant out of every court is simply one type of instance of a final judgment. This proposition is entirely consistent with the proposition that an order putting an appellant out of a particular court is also a final judg- ment. It follows that an order transferring a case from one circuit court to another, for proper venue or for a
12Id. (emphasis added). 13Id. at 4.
14
Id. at 6 (relying, inter alia, on Ferrell v. Benson, 352 Md. 2, 6 (1998); Rohrbeck v. Rohrbeck, 318 Md. 28, 41 (1989); Grimberg v. Marth, 338 Md. 546, 551 (1995); McCormick v. St. Francis de Sales Church, 219 Md. 422, 426-27 (1959); Jeffers v. State, 203 Md. 227, 239 (1953); In re Buckler Trusts, 144 Md. 424, 427 (1924)(emphasis added). See also Anthony v. Clark, 335 Md. 579, 587 (1994); Popham v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., 333 Md. 136, 142 (1993); Wilde v. Swanson, 314 Md. 80, 84 (1988); Highfield Water Co. v. Washington County Sanitary District, 295 Md. 410, 415 (1983). To be final and appealable, a ruling need not settle the underlying dispute be- tween the parties if its effect is to put the parties out of court. Grimberg, supra, 338 Md. at 551; Anthony, supra, 335 Md. at 587; Horsey v. Horsey, 329 Md. 392, 401-02 (1993).
15
Id. at 12 (emphasis in original)(quoting Rohrbeck, supra, 318 Md. at 41).
Fall 2000 Trial Reporter 5
more convenient forum, and thereby terminating the litigation in the trans- ferring court, is a final judgment and thus immediately appealable. At the same time, an order denying a motion to transfer is not an immediately appeal- able final judgment, because the litigation may continue in the court is- suing the order.16 In support of the more specific propo- sition that a judgment terminating litigation in a particular court is a final judgment, the Court relied upon decisions treating as final judgments orders remand- ing an action from the Circuit Courts to the District Courts;17
orders dismissing
actions against one of multiple defendants for improper venue when properly certi- fied under Rule 2-602(b);18
orders (Continued on page 6)
16Id. (emphasis in original). 17
19
Id. at 10 (relying on Ferrell v. Benson, 352 Md. 2 (1998)(an order transferring the ac- tion from the Circuit Court to District Court was final judgment); and Carroll v. Housing Opportunities Commission, 306 Md. 515 (1986)(order denying plaintiff a jury trial and remanding the case to the District Court was appealable, final judgment)).
18
Id. at 11 (citing Wilde v. Swanson, 314 Md. 80, 81 (1988)).
20
Id. (relying on Horsey v. Horsey, 329 Md. 392 (1993)).
Id. at 11-12 (relying on Eastern Stainless Steel v. Nicholson, 306 Md. 492, 501-02 (1986); Brown v. Baer, 291 Md. 377, 385-86 (1981); Department of Public Safety v. LeVan, 288 Md. 533, 543-44 (1980)).
21
Id. at 13 (citing, for example, Harris v. David S. Harris, P.A., 310 Md. 310, 314-15 (1987)).
22Id.
directing the parties to proceed to arbi- tration;19
and orders remanding an action
to an administrative agency.20 The Court emphasized that its hold- ing was consistent with the policies undergirding the final judgment rule: avoiding piecemeal appeals and unneces- sary interruptions in the trial process and thereby promoting judicial economy.21
It
reasoned that interruptions in trial court process could not occur in a case in which a motion to transfer has been granted be- cause, “[i]n the transferring court, there are no longer any proceedings to interrupt...[and in] the receiving court, the proceedings cannot be interrupted because they have not yet begun.”22 Court likened an order transferring an
The
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