Appellate Decisions (Continued from page 43)
tate, filed a claim with State Farm request- ing payment pursuant to the accidental death provision of the insurance policy. State Farm denied the claim because it did not believe Ms. Cole’s death was “caused by accident.” Mr. Cole then filed a com- plaint in the District Court of Maryland on 6 March 1997 alleging that Respon- dent breached the insurance contract by refusing to pay the accidental death ben- efit. The case was eventually transferred to the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. Both Parties filed motions for summary judgment. By order dated 21 May 1998, the Circuit Court denied Mr. Cole’s motion and granted summary judg- ment in favor of State Farm finding that Ms. Cole’s death was not “caused by acci- dent.” The Court of Special Appeals affirmed.
Held: Judgment of the Court of Special Appeals reversed. The focus of the in- quiry in the case was whether Ms. Cole’s death was the direct result of an “acci- dent.” In Maryland, “accident” has been defined as “a happening; an event that takes place without one’s foresight or ex- pectation; an event which proceeds from
an unknown cause, or is an unusual ef- fect from a known cause, and therefore not expected.” Little guidance was found in this definition, however, because it did not establish through whose eyes one should consider whether Ms. Cole’s death was unforeseen or unexpected. Thus, the central issue of the case was determining whether the events should be viewed through Ms. Cole’s perspective, as the in- sured victim, or Mr. Cave’s perspective, as the intentional actor. The Court ulti- mately held that, in defining the term “accident,” the insured victim’s perspec- tive should control the inquiry. In reaching its conclusion, the Court first looked to a series of Maryland cases offered by State Farm. In each case, the damages were caused by intentional acts and in each case the Court of Appeals held that the damages at issue were not the re- sult of an “accident” because, from the insured’s perspective, he or she should have foreseen that injury and/or damages were going to occur. Based on these cases, and a more contemporary case, the Court determined that an act constitutes an “ac- cident” under an insurance policy as long as the resulting damage is incurred with- out the insured’s foresight or expectation. After reviewing cases from other jurisdic- tions, the Court found that its holding
was in accord with the majority of juris- dictions that had dealt with similar issues. The Court concluded by noting one additional consideration that was a factor in its holding. Relying on the principle of contract interpretation that permits an ambiguous contract term to be construed against its drafter, the Court stated that it was appropriate in this case to construe the term “accident” against State Farm and in favor of Ms. Cole. In answering State Farm’s argument that the term “accident” was unambiguous, the Court pointed out that State Farm had previously offered many different and conflicting interpre- tations of the term “accident” in appellate courts across the county. The Court stated “we are not convinced by [State Farm’s] assertion that the term ‘accident’ is sus- ceptible to only one meaning, particularly in light of [State farm’s] apparent practice of offering whatever definitional perspec- tive that serves its purpose du jour.”
Cole v. State Farm Mutual Automobile In- surance Company, No. 92, September Term, 1999, filed 14 June 2000. Opinion by Harrell, J.
Real Property
Real Property – Lead Paint Poisoning – Landlord Tenant; Consumer Protection Act; Breach of Warranty; Housing Code Violation; Lead-Based Paint Injury; Jury Instructions – The Baltimore City Hous- ing Code (“Housing Code”) imposes specific duties and obligations on own- ers and landlord in connection with the lease of dwellings for human habitation. Under the consumer protection act, the landlord implies compliance with the housing code at the time the lease is en- tered into. The landlord need not inspect the premises before leasing, but because of the implied representations that accompany the making of the lease, he or she fails inspect at his or her peril.
Facts: The genesis of this case was a com- plaint that alleged that five year-old Brandon Hatcher, the respondent, suf- fered lead poisoning while living in an apartment building in Baltimore City, owned by Joseph Benik, the petitioner. Brandon and his family moved into the apartment in January 1990. At that time Brandon’s sister observed that several ar- eas of the apartment contained flaking, peeling paint. Brandon was subsequently diagnosed with lead poisoning. After the discovery of the lead paint, the family moved to another apartment in the same building. In December 1990, an inspec-
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