Workers’ Compensation (Continued from page 26)


reimbursable. Not surprisingly, no similar exclusionary clause exists in any other sec- tion of the Act, including § 9-660, pertaining to the provision of “medical ser- vices and treatment.” There would be no reason for the Legislature to specifically pro- vide an exclusion for the reimbursement of transportation costs in this section, if the requirement to pay for transportation costs in all other situations did not exist.2 Further evidence showing that transpor- tation costs are reimbursable comes from prior interpretations of § 9-660 of the Act by the appellate courts of this State. The Labor and Employment Article provides as follows:


§ 9-660. Provision of medical services and treatment.


(a) In general. - In addition to the compensation provided under this sub- title, if a covered employee has suffered an accidental personal injury, compens- able hernia, or occupational disease the employer or its insurer shall provide to the covered employee, as the Commis- sion may require: (1)medical, surgical, or other atten- dance or treatment;


(2)hospital and nursing services; (3)medicine; (4)crutches and other apparatus; and (5)artificial arms, feet, hands, and legs and other prosthetic appli- ances.


While there is no specific mention of


transportation costs, this does not mean that they are not reimbursable under this provi- sion. It was not until 1990, in R & T Con- struction Co. v. Judge, 82 Md. App. 700,


2


It is of significance to note that the provi- sion prohibits the payment of transportation costs (except in “unusual cases”) only dur- ing the period of vocational rehabilitation training. “Vocational rehabilitation training” is only one of nine separate vocational ben- efits available to the injured worker and the only one with a two-year limitation on its duration. In other words, transportation costs are reimbursable to the injured worker while reporting for the other eight vocational rehabilitation services including: coordina- tion of medical services, vocational assess- ment, vocational evaluation, vocational counseling, plan development, plan moni- toring, job development and job placement. See § 9-670(e).


28


725-26, 573 A.2d 96 (1990), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 323 Md. 514, 594 A.2d 99 (1991), that a Maryland appellate court addressed what “medical services and treatment” include under the Workers’ Compensation Act. The factual scenario in Judge involved an individual, Thomas C. Judge, who was catastrophically injured in an accident aris- ing out of and in the course of his employment. Rendered a respirator-depen- dent quadriplegic, Judge required around-the-clock nursing care and modifi- cations to his home. Among his physical difficulties, Judge was unable to regulate his body temperature and, therefore, air con- ditioners had to be installed in his home. The Court found, inter alia, that the addi- tional utility costs of the air conditioners was a “medical benefit” as contemplated by the Act and, therefore, Judge was entitled to reimbursement for the additional elec- trical costs he incurred while operating the air conditioners and other life support sys- tems necessitated by his condition. In reaching this finding, the Judge Court turned to Larson’s treatise on Workers’ Compensation law for guidance. It noted with approval the definition provided by Larson, which states as follows:


“Medical benefits ordinarily include not only medical and hospital services and nursing care, which may be compens- able even when supplied at home by a member of claimants’ family but also necessary incidentals such as transpor- tation, apparatus, supplies, and sometimes even special housing facili- ties.”


(emphasis added) 2 Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law (1989), § 61.00. The Court of Special Appeals has clearly ac- knowledged and accepted that transportation costs are contemplated by §9-660 of the Act. In addition, the Judge Court undertook


a thorough review of cases from foreign ju- risdictions that sought to examine how terms such as “medical treatment” are de- fined with reference to workers’ compensation. The Judge Court found “more persuasive those cases in which the terms ‘medical treatment’ and the like are interpreted more broadly.” See Judge, 82 Md. App. at 715-16. The Court felt that this broader view of “medical benefits” was consistent with the statutory mandate that the Workers’ Compensation Act is social legislation to be interpreted liberally in fa- vor of the injured worker. See Judge, 82 Md.App. at 716. Similar to the position of the employer/ insurers in denying reimbursement for


Trial Reporter


transportation costs at this point in time, the employer/insurer in Judge argued that there was no provision in the Act covering costs for “non-medical type treatment.” Recognizing the absurdity of the employer and insurer’s position that the increased utility bills were not recoverable as “medi- cal, surgical, or other attendance or treatment,” the Court of Special Appeals strongly remarked that


[i]t makes absolutely no sense for a stat- ute to require an employer to furnish an injured worker with equipment, and yet not require that same employer to supply that same injured worker the means with which to operate it.


Judge, 82 Md.App. at 716. Similarly, “it makes absolutely no sense” for the stat- ute to require an employer to furnish medical services and treatment without re- quiring the employer to furnish the injured worker with the ability to attend the medi- cal services and treatment. The insurance carriers realize that, gen-


erally, the amount in dispute is normally not significant enough to justify its own hearing. In addition, as the policy at present is to appeal each of these cases, carriers are aware that practitioners will not likely bring the mileage issue to a hearing, knowing that an appeal, and the eventual divestment of the jurisdiction of the Commission that comes with the appeal, is certain to follow. In such a case, the ability to address more pressing matters for the injured worker may be significantly hindered. In addition, the Workers’ Compensation Commissioners, the first line of interpreters of the Act, have continued to require carriers to provide mileage reimbursement to the injured worker.3 If one looks at the Act with more than a


cursory glance, it becomes readily appar- ent that transportation costs to and from health care providers are reimbursable. In the meantime, however, the insurance car- riers will continue to deny these claims in the unrealistic hope that the appellate courts of this State will fail to follow firmly estab- lished principles of Workers’ Compensation law in addressing this issue.


3


Each year, the “CompGram,” an informa- tional bulletin for the Compensation Com- munity distributed by the Workers’ Com- pensation Commission, includes the effec- tive rates for mileage reimbursement for the upcoming year. It is difficult to imagine that this information is included each year for no other purpose than for those “unusual cases” involving allowance of transportation costs for vocational rehabilitation training.


Fall 2000


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