larly, when an action has been stayed as to one party in a multi- party action because a bankruptcy petition has been filed, any judg- ment obtained by the remaining parties cannot be appealed unless it is properly certified under Rule 2-602.42


When separate actions are con- solidated for discovery or trial purposes under Rule 2-503, each of the actions consolidated will be considered separately for purposes of appeal when the court enters separate judgments as permitted under Rule 2-503(a)(2).43


Thus,


when an order disposes entirely of one of several actions consolidated, an appeal from that action will lie, without 2-602 certification, even if there has not been a final disposi- tion of the other actions consolidated for trial.44 The Court of Appeals has held


that an order refusing to certify a suit as a class action and dismissing unnamed plaintiff members of a class claimed to be similarly situ- ated was not a final order and could not be certified for appeal under Rule 2-602’s predecessor on the theory that the order disposed of the claims of some of the parties (the unnamed plaintiffs) in a multi- party action. It so held because the unnamed plaintiffs could not be considered parties until there had been a class action certification and notice.45


c. An Undisputed Amount In An Ac- tion For Money Relief Only: The third situation in which the trial court may certify an order for ap- peal is when the court grants partial


42


Starfish Condominium Association v. Yorkridge Serv. Corp., 292 Md. 557, 568-69 (1982)(dicta).


43


Yarema, supra, 305 Md. at 240. Rule 2- 503(a)(2) provides, in part, that: “In the trial of a consolidated action, the court may direct that joint or separate verdicts or judgments be entered.”


44


Yarema, supra, 305 Md. at 233-39. See also Owens-Corning v. Walatka, 125 Md. App. 313, cert. denied, 354 Md. 573 (1999); Coates v. Southern Maryland Electric Cooperative, Inc., 354 Md. 499, 503-04, n.1 (1999); Custer Environmental, Inc. v. 9305 Old Georgetown Road Partnership, 345 Md. 284, 288, n.1 (1997).


45Snowden, supra, 300 Md. at 559-63. 46Md. Rule 2-602(b)(2).


Summer 2000


summary judgment “for some but less than all of the amount re- quested in a claim seeking money relief only.”46


This is the only time


that the court may certify an order which adjudicates less than an en- tire claim or which does not entirely adjudicate the rights and liabilities of a party.47


rather, it is


This exception does not


contemplate certification of a judg- ment where the amount of the judgment depends on the resolu- tion of open issues;48


intended to cover situations in which there is a genuine dispute of fact only as to a minor portion of the money claimed and entitlement to the bulk of the money relief re- quested is not disputed.


This


exception was held to have been inapplicable to an order of the trial court awarding damages for the principal amount of a debt when the amount of the judgment was contingent upon the resolution of a dispute over interest and the trial court, in making its determination, accepted as true the defendant’s cal- culation.49


d. The Appropriate Circumstances: It is the task of trial judges as “dis- patchers”50


to “balance the


exigencies of the case before them with the policy against piecemeal appeals” under Rule 2-602 and to “allow a separate appeal in the very infrequent and harsh case.”51


Even


when an order which is otherwise final is a candidate for certification under Rule 2-602, the trial judge is expected to exercise “considered discretion”52


in permitting an or-


der disposing of less than all claims against all parties to be certified for appeal under Rule 2-602.53


Among


the considerations to be weighed by the trial court against the strong


47Blucher, supra, 309 Md. at 462 n. 2. 48


Russell v. American Security Bank, 65 Md. App. 199, 206 (1985).


49Russell, supra, 65 Md. App. at 205-06. 50Planning Board, supra, 310 Md. at 647.


51


Diener Enterprises, Inc. v. Miller, 266 Md. 551, 556 (1972)(emphasis added). See also Allstate Insurance Co. v. Angeletti, 71 Md. App. 210, 218-219 (1987); Robert v. Robert, 56 Md. App. 317, 324 (1983); Harford Sands, Inc. v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 27 Md. App. 702, 712, cert. denied, 276 Md. 744 (1975).


52


Diener, supra, 266 Md. at 255 (dicta); Allstate, supra, 71 Md. App. at 217.


53Allstate, supra, 71 Md. App. at 217. Trial Reporter


57 55


policy in favor of judicial economy are: (1) whether the appellate court will be required to consider the same issues in successive appeals; (2) whether determination of the remaining issues might render moot the need for the review being sought; (3) the harsh effects, includ- ing economic effects, which might ensue if the appeal were delayed until the entire case has been con- cluded.54


While few appeals have been dismissed on the basis of the trial court’s abuse of discretion under Rule 2-602,55


Maryland’s appellate


courts have not refused to do so where the record failed to provide any justification for certification under the rule.56


And, while Rule


2-602 does not obligate the trial court to explain the reasons for its certification, the Court of Special Appeals has indicated the “strong desirability” of doing so to ensure “meaningful” appellate review.57


(Continued on page 24) 54


Canterbury, supra, 66 Md. App. at 651-54. Qualifying hardship was found in Matta v. Government Employees Insurance Co., 119 Md. App. 334 (1998)(summary judgment grant court in favor of uninsured motorist carrier was properly certified under Rule 2- 602; absent uninsured motorist coverage, the litigation expense to establish damages in a case involving serious injuries constituted the existence of a hardship or unfairness sufficient to invoke Rule 2-602 (b).” See also Doe v. Doe, 122 Md. App. 295 (1998), cert. granted, 351 Md. 161 (1998); Edwards v. First National Bank of Northeast, 122 Md. App. 96 (1998).


While the appellate courts are no longer re- quired to dismiss an appeal when the trial court fails to certify a judgment it had the discretion to certify under Rule 2-602, dismissal of the appeal is still one of several options the appel- late courts may exercise under Rule 8-602. Rule 8-602 cannot be used to salvage for ap- peal an order which was not properly certifi- able under Rule 2-602 in the first instance.


56


Allstate, supra, 71 Md. App. at 223-24; Can- terbury, supra, 66 Md. App. at 652-654; Carl Messenger Service, supra, 62 Md. App. at 6.


Canterbury, supra, 66 Md. App. at 650-51. See also Tharp v. Disabled Americans Dept. of Maryland, Inc., 121 Md. App. 548, 559-68 (1998)(refusing to apply “procedural lifeboat” of Rule 80602 to save appeal where the trial court had not expressly determined that there was no just reason for delay, no reasons were given for certifying the judgment, and any such certification would have been an abuse of discretion).


7


Page 1  |  Page 2  |  Page 3  |  Page 4  |  Page 5  |  Page 6  |  Page 7  |  Page 8  |  Page 9  |  Page 10  |  Page 11  |  Page 12  |  Page 13  |  Page 14  |  Page 15  |  Page 16  |  Page 17  |  Page 18  |  Page 19  |  Page 20  |  Page 21  |  Page 22  |  Page 23  |  Page 24  |  Page 25  |  Page 26  |  Page 27  |  Page 28  |  Page 29  |  Page 30  |  Page 31  |  Page 32  |  Page 33  |  Page 34  |  Page 35  |  Page 36  |  Page 37  |  Page 38  |  Page 39  |  Page 40  |  Page 41  |  Page 42  |  Page 43  |  Page 44  |  Page 45  |  Page 46  |  Page 47  |  Page 48  |  Page 49  |  Page 50  |  Page 51  |  Page 52