penalties or assessing costs,88
or orders
directing the payment of money into the court pending further disposition.89 Section 12-304 of the Courts Article
provides an additional exception to the final judgment rule. It permits any per- son or party to appeal from any order or judgment passed by the circuit court to “preserve the power or vindicate the dig- nity of the court and adjudging him in contempt of court, including an interlocu- tory order, remedial in nature, adjudging any person in contempt, whether or not a party to the action.” The exception does not apply to an adjudication of contempt for violation of an interlocutory order for the payment of alimony.
2. Collateral Order Doctrine In Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan the United States Supreme Court
Corp.,90
enunciated the collateral order exception to the final judgment rule. This doctrine treats as final and appealable a “small class”91
of orders which do not conclude litigation in the trial court92
but which
“finally determine claims of right sepa- rable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action [which are] too im- portant to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case can be adjudicated.”93 To come within this limited class of
orders, four requirements must be met: (1) the order must conclusively determine the disputed question; (2) the order must resolve an important issue; (3) the order must concern a subject completely sepa- rate from the merits of the action; and (4) the order must be effectively unreview-
88
Anthony Plumbing, supra, 298 Md. at 2-22. In Anthony Plumbing, civil penalties were sought under the Maryland Consumer Pro- tection Act for alleged unfair or deceptive trade practices. Id. The Court of Appeals consid- ered the penalties to create a debt recoverable by an action at law and to be analogous to traditional money damages. Id. at 21-22. The court also analogized court costs to incidental damages at law. Id. at 23.
89
Id. at 23. See also Burroughs v. Gaither, 66 Md. 171, 191-93 (1886); Dillon v. Connecti- cut Mutual Life Insurance Co., 44 Md. 386, 394-96 (1876).
90 91
92 93 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978).
Public Service Commission, supra, 300 Md. at 206.
Cohen, supra, 337 U.S. at 546. See also Harris, supra, 310 Md. at 315-16.
Summer 2000 95 96 94
Coopers, supra, 437 U.S. at 468; Cohen, supra, 337 U.S. at 546; Public Service Commission, supra, 300 Md. at 206; Peat, supra, 284 Md. at 92. See also Goodwich v. Nolan, 343 Md. 130 (1996); Montgomery Co. v. Stevens, 337 Md. 471, 477 (1995).
Clark, supra, 286 Md. at 213; Peat, supra, 284 Md. at 93.
Sigma, supra, 297 Md. at 670; Blanton v. Eq- uitable Bank, 61 Md. App. 158, 164 (1985).
able on appeal from a final judgment.94 While the Court of Appeals has stated that the doctrine is “narrow in scope”95 to be applied “only sparingly,”96
dicial immunity;97
and is it has
applied the exception on a number of occasions, in both criminal and civil cases. In the vast majority of situations in which the Court of Appeals has refused to apply the doctrine, the particular order’s effec- tive reviewability after final judgment has been the primary or exclusive reason for non-application. The following are examples of orders
or rulings which have been held to be im- mediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine:
denial of district court
commissioner’s motion for summary judgment on the ground of absolute ju-
denial of governor’s
motion for summary judgment based on a claim of absolute sovereign immunity for common law, non-constitutional
(Continued on page 32) 97
Rice v. Dunn, 81 Md. App. 510, 511-16, cert. denied, 319 Md. 581 (1990)(denial of Dis- trict Court Commissioner’s motion for sum- mary judgment based on absolute judicial immunity was appealable under collateral or- der doctrine since it involved “the right to avoid the trial itself.” See also Town of Brunswick v. Hyatt, 91 Md. App. 555 (1992) (appeal permitted in action in which defen- dant municipal corporation’s right to an im- mediate appeal from denial of its motion for summary judgment, alleging government immunity); Board of Trustees v. Fineran, 75 Md. App. 289, 297-98 n. 1 (1988)(in action in which the defendant college officials’ right to an immediate appeal has not been chal- lenged, Court permitted appeal from denial of motions to dismiss raising both absolute and qualified immunity). The decisions in Town of Brunswick and Fineran, while not ex- plicitly overruled in Artis v. Cyphers, 100 Md. App. 633 (1994), aff ’d, mem., 336 Md. 561 (1994) and Shoemaker v. Smith, 353 Md. 143 (1999), have been severely limited. See discus- sion below.
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