does not exist until the filing of the signed order unless: (1) the court later determines not to require the order and directs the entry of judgment in some other appro- priate manner; or (2) the order is intended to be collateral11


to the judgment.12 For


example, a docket entry indicating “oral opinion [of trial court] to be transcribed by reporter and submitted to court for signature” is not an unqualified order.13 Similarly, an order dismissing an action but which grants the plaintiff leave to amend would be qualified and therefore non-final.14 The following are examples of orders held (once docketed) to be final, appeal-


11


A ruling is sufficiently unqualified for purposes of appeal when it is complete except as to something which may be regarded as collat- eral to the proceeding. Rohrbeck, supra, 318 Md. at 41. For example, in some cases, a claim for attorneys’ fees may be considered collat- eral to an action, and an appeal will be per- mitted on the underlying claim despite non- resolution of the claim for fees. See, e.g., Blake v. Blake, 341 Md. 326, 333-36 (1996)(absence of determination of claim for counsel fees pursuant to Section 11-110 of the Family Law Code did not deprive judgment of divorce of finality for purposes of appeal). On the other hand, a claim for attorneys’ fees will not be considered collateral to the action so as to per- mit an appeal despite non-resolution of a claim for fees where those fees are part of the dam- ages sought pursuant to a contractual right. See Mattvidi Associates Limited Partnership v. Nationsbank of Virginia, 100 Md. App. 71, 78 (1994).


12Rohrbeck, supra, 318 Md. at 42. 13


Arteno v. Arteno, 257 Md. 227, 228-29 (1970) (per curiam). See also Albert W. Sisk & Son, Inc. v. Friendship Packers, Inc., 326 Md. 152, 158 (1992) (direction to prepare written order is qualified, non-final disposition); Estep, supra, 320 Md. at 284 (oral comments insuf- ficient to create final judgment on third party claim); Central Collection Unit v. Columbia Medical Plan, 300 Md. 318, 325 (1984)(ex- pressions of intention by trial judge are not final orders because they are always subject to change); Eberly v. Eberly, 253 Md. 132, 134 (1969)(per curiam)(comments of the bench not binding until docketed as required for the “simple reason that until [its ruling] is filed, the court could alter or destroy it entirely and substitute some other [ruling] in its place.”).


14


See also Sisk, supra, 326 Md. at 158-59 (denial of motion to vacate confessed judgment was not final and unqualified when defendants were permitted to file a counterclaim or other pleading to persuade the trial court a merito- rious defense existed).


Summer 2000 Trial Reporter 5


able judgments within the meaning of Sections 12-101 and 12-301 of the Courts and Judicial Proceeds Code Annotated (“Courts Article”): order denying inter- vention, whether claimed as of right or permissively, under Md. Rule 2-214;15 order granting motion to dismiss plaintiff ’s entire complaint, with or with- out prejudice, which prohibits amendment or which does not expressly grant leave to amend, in an action where there are no other claims pending;16


or-


der dismissing party based on lack of venue;17


order granting summary judg- ment which disposes of all claims against the only defendant over whom court has acquired jurisdiction;18 default judgment19


order entering or denying motion to 15


Maryland Life and Health Insurance Guar- anty Association v. Perrott, 301 Md. 78, 87 (1984). See also County Commissioners of Carroll County v. Gross, 301 Md. 473, 476 (1984); Maryland Radiological Society, Inc. v. Health Services Cost Review Commission, 285 Md. 383, 388 n. 4 (1979); Grand-Pierre v. Montgomery County, 97 Md. App. 170, 172-73 (1993).


16 17


Moore v. Pomory, 329 Md. 428, 431-32 (1993).


Wilde v. Swanson, 314 Md. 80, 83-87 (1988). Wilde concerned the dismissal of a party and not a simple transfer of the action. The court expressly indicated it intimated no opinion on the finality of an order transferring the entire action to another circuit court. But cf. Lennox v. Mull, 89 Md. App. 555 (1991).


18


State Highway Administration v. Kee, 309 Md. 523, 529 (1987). See alsoDoehring, su- pra, 311 Md. at 272 ; Marriott Corp. v. Chesa- peake & Potomac Telephone Co. of Mary- land, 124 Md. App. 463, (1999).


19


Adams v. Mallory, 308 Md. 453, 460 (1987); Berkson v. Berryman, 63 Md. App. 134, 141 n. 3, cert. denied, 304 Md. 296 (1985).


25


strike default judgment;20


order denying


motion to disqualify counsel when dis- position of motion concludes the action;21 order enforcing or quashing an adminis- trative subpoena in an action brought solely for that purpose;22


and order de-


nying a motion to strike or to vacate a judgment.23 The following are examples of orders


which are not considered final, appealable judgments under Sections 12-101 and 12- 301 of the Courts Article because the ruling did not put the parties out of court: order denying motion to dismiss24 summary judgment;25


or for order dismissing


complaint or granting summary judgment (Continued on page 6)


20


Banegura v. Taylor, 312 Md. 609, 618 (1988)(dicta). Denial of a motion to strike an order of default is not, however, a final, ap- pealable order.


21 22


In re Special Investigation No. 231, 295 Md. 366, 370 (1983).


Barnes v. Commissioner of Labor and Indus- try, 45 Md. App. 396, 399-400 (1980), aff ’d, 290 Md. 9 (1981). See also Unnamed Attor- ney, supra, 303 Md. at 481-83 (order denying or enforcing motion to quash administrative subpoena is appealable if court proceedings terminated, even if administrative proceedings have not been con- cluded).


23


J.B. Corp. v. Fowler, 258 Md. 432, 433-36 (1970); Hamilton v. Hamilton, 242 Md. 240, 242-45 (1966); Eshelman Motors Corp. v. Scheftel, 231 Md. 303, 301-02 (1963).


24


Tvardek v. Tvardek, 257 Md. 88, 91-93 (1970); Town of Port Deposit v. Petetit, 113 Md. App. 401,409-10 (1997); Son v. Margolius, Mallios, Davis, Rider & Tomar, 114 Md. App. 190 (1997), rev’d and remanded on other grounds, 349 Md. 441 (1998); Pollekoff, supra, 83 Md. App. at 92.


Nelson v. Kenny, 121 Md. App. 482, 485 (1998).


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