Can We Appeal Now? (Continued from page 25)
303(3).70 An outright grant or denial of
an injunction is not necessary to bring the injunctive provisions of Section 12-303(3) into play. An immediate appeal will lie from an order which changes or limits an injunction so as to reduce its operation71 or which attaches impossible or illegal conditions which render the grant of in- junctive relief nugatory.72
Maryland’s
appellate courts have, on occasion, per- mitted immediate appeals from orders in the nature of an injunction, but more fre- quently have rebuffed creative application of the injunctive exception. Thus, for ex- ample, in a divorce action, an order of the court refusing to quash a writ of ne exeat was considered immediately appealable under a statutory predecessor to Section 12-303(3) because it restrained the defen- dant from leaving the state without court permission and therefore had injunctive qualities.73
Similarly, an order staying the
revocation by an administrative agency of a license to practice medicine is, in effect, an order in the nature of an injunction
70
Pappas, supra, 287 Md. at 463 (granting in- junction). See also Funger v. Mayor of Somerset, 244 Md. 141, 149 (1966)(refusing to grant); Montgomery County v. Maryland- Washington Metropolitan District, 200 Md. 525, 528 (1952)(dissolving); Martin v. United Slate, Tile & Composition Roofers, Damp & Waterproof Workers Ass’n, 189 Md. 383, 385 (1947)(refusing to dissolve); Safe Deposit and Trust Co. v. Mayor and City Council of Bal- timore, 121 Md. 522, 533 (1913)(refusing to grant); Office of the State Prosecutor v. Judi- cial Watch, Inc., 356 Md. 118 (1999)(grant of injunction); Hashem v. Taheri, 82 Md. App. 269, 273 (1990)(enjoining).
71
Lessans v. Lessans, 184 Md. 549, 554 (1945); Meyer v. Devries, 64 Md. 532, 534 (1886). 72 Montgomery County, supra, 200 Md. at 528.
73
Jackson v. Jackson, 15 Md. App. 615, 623 n. 3 (1972).
On the other hand, Maryland’s appellate courts have warned that Section 12-303’s injunctive provisions are not to be used “as a transparent artifice for ap- pealing that which is not appealable.” Litigants’ attempts to frame as requests for injunctive relief motions to disqualify counsel75
and appealable under Section 12- 303(3).74
or to stay arbitration76 have
been rebuffed. The stay of an injunction is itself considered an injunction from which an immediate appeal lies under Section12-303(3). Similarly, the stay by the court of an administrative order is an appealable grant of an injunction.77 contrast, neither the grant78
In nor denial by
the trial court of a motion to stay its own proceedings is ordinarily considered an immediately appealable injunction under Section 12-303. Section 12-303(1), permitting imme- diate appeals from interlocutory orders entered with regard to the “possession of property,” has most frequently been ap- plied in divorce proceedings to orders regarding the possession, pendente lite, of the family home.79
The legislative intent
behind the “possession of property” ex- ception was to allow an appeal from an interlocutory order when a controversy exists over the right to possession of prop-
74
Commission on Medical Discipline of Mary- land v. Stillman, 291 Md. 390, 398 (1981). 75Peat, supra, 284 Md. at 98-99.
76 77 78
Town of Chesapeake Beach v. Pessoa, 330 Md. 744, 749 (1993).
Commission on Medical Discipline, supra, 291 Md. at 398.
Waters, supra, 277 Md. at 194-95 (trial court’s order referring matter to standing master and staying further court proceedings was not an appealable interlocutory order under §12- 303). Cf. County Commissioner, supra, 320 Md. at 213.
79
Bledsoe v. Bledsoe, 294 Md. 183, 185 n. 1 (1982); Lewis, supra, 290 Md. at 184; Pitsenberger v. Pitsenberger, 187 Md. 20, 24 n. 3, appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 807 (1980).
80McCormick, supra, 79 Md. App. at 181-82. 81
82
Eubanks v. First Mount Vernon Industrial Loan Assoc., Inc., 125 Md. App. 642 (1999).
Anthony Plumbing, supra, 298 Md. at 20. For a thorough discussion of the legislative his- tory of § 12-303, see Della Ratta, 47 Md. App. at 278-86.
83 84
Della Ratta, supra, 47 Md. App. at 285 (em- phasis in original).
Pappas, supra, 287 Md. at 459-63 (order to pay alimony and fees); Chappell v. Chappell, 86 Md. 532, 536 (1898)(order to pay ali- mony).
85
Genn v. CIT Corp., 40 Md. App. 516, 517 n. 1 (1978).
86Della Ratta, supra, 47 Md. App. at 286. 87
Yamaner v. Orkin, 310 Md. 321, 327-28 (1987)(Rule 1-341); Simmons v. Perkins, 302 Md. 232, 238 (1985)(former Rule 604). And see Legal Aid Bureau, Inc. v. Farmer, 74 Md. App. 707, 711-14 (1988)(when circuit court sitting as an appellate court enters a judgment for sanctions against counsel, that judgment may be appealed to the Court of Special Ap- peals).
30 Trial Reporter Summer 2000
erty or the benefits generated from such property during the pendency of the liti- gation.80
In a forcible detainer action
brought by a mortgagee pursuant to Sec- tions 8-402 and 8-118 of the Real Property Code, an order requiring the mortgagor to make monthly rent and es- crow payments into the registry of the court and to file a bond with the clerk of the court has been held to be appealable under Section 12-303(1).81 While Section 12-303(3)(v) permits immediate appeal from interlocutory or- ders for the “payment of money,” this provision only contemplates appeals from orders which are historically equitable in nature,82
as when “the court orders a per- son to pay a specific sum of money [and] that order proceeds directly to the person and he is directly and personally answer- able to the court in the event of non-compliance.”83
The “payment of
money” exception encompasses the types of orders traditionally rendered in equity: orders for the payment of alimony, child support and counsel fees in divorce pro- ceedings84
and orders to an assignee for
the benefit of creditors to pay certain debts before a final adjudication of all claims.85 The exception does not encompass simple judgments for money damages, whether entered at law or in equity.86
Nor does
the payment of money exception permit appeals from interlocutory orders direct- ing a party or its counsel to pay attorneys’ fees as a sanction for bad faith under Rule 1-341,87
orders for the payment of civil
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