Can We Appeal Now? (Continued from page 7)
Counsel seeking to appeal a judg- ment under Rule 2-602 would be wise to submit a proposed order to the trial court which states that there is no just reason to delay the entry of a final judgment, specifies the reasons therefor and directs the entry of the judgment.
Question 3.
Compliance with Md. Rule 2-601: A ruling final in nature will not be con-
sidered a judgment for purposes of appeal unless it has been entered in accordance with Rule 2-601.58 in pertinent part,59
Rule 2-601 provides, as follows:
(a) Each judgment shall be set forth on a separate document. Upon a gen- eral verdict of a jury or upon a decision by the court allowing recov- ery only of costs or a specified amount of money or denying all re- lief, the clerk shall forthwith prepare, sign and enter the judgment, unless the court orders otherwise. Upon a special verdict of a jury or upon a decision by the court granting other relief, the clerk shall promptly review the form of the judgment presented and, if approved, sign it, and the clerk shall forthwith enter the judgment as approved and signed. A judgment is effective only when so set forth and when entered as provided in Section (b) of this Rule. Unless the Court orders otherwise, entry of the judg- ment shall not be delayed pending the amount of costs.
(b)Method of Entry-Date of Judgment. The clerk shall enter a judgment by making a record of it in writing on the file jacket, or on a docket within the file, or in a docket book, accord- ing to the practice of each court, and shall record the actual date of the en- try. That date shall be the date of the judgment.
After the rendition of a verdict or de- cision of the court, counsel seeking to appeal should verify that a judgment which accurately reflects the substance of the verdict or decision has been entered on the docket or file jacket by the clerk in accordance with Rule 2-601.
In cases
where the clerk is permitted to enter the judgment without direction, care must be taken to see that the court has not un- done the judgment by “order[ing] otherwise.” Counsel should, in the case of rendition of a special verdict or deci- sion by the trial court, determine that the form of judgment has been presented and “approved” by the court. There is no sub- stitution for a written, dated entry of judgment. Entry on the docket or jacket must be made even as to a claim which is admittedly no longer viable because it has been mooted.60
Use of the words “judg-
ment” or “final judgment” is not a prerequisite to the entry of judgment un- der Rule 2-601,61
render appealable an unappealable order.
Question 4. Divestiture of Finality: Post-Judgment Motions: An order which is a final judgment for purposes of appeal under Sections 12-101 and 12-301 of the Courts Article may yet be divested temporarily of its finality by the filing of certain post-judgment mo- tions. When post-judgment motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (Rule 2-532), for a new trial (Rule 2-533), and/or to alter or amend the court’s judg- ment (Rule 2-534) are timely filed within ten days of the entry of judgment, the judgment loses its finality for purposes of appeal and any appeal filed during the pendency of these motions will be pre-
60
Estep v. Georgetown Leather Design, 320 Md. 277, 281-87 (1990)(although the effect of judgment in was to render the defendant’s third-party claim for indemnification ground- less as a practical matter, the court held that, for purposes of the timing of the plaintiff’s appeal, there was no final judgment until the formal entry on the docket disposing of the third-party claim).
61 58
Two discrete acts are required before an ac- tion by the court may be considered the grant- ing of a judgment “rendition of a judgment by the court and entry of the judgment by the clerk..” Davis v. Davis, 335 Md. 699, 710 (1994).
59
Rule 2-601(c) pertains to the recording and indexing of a judgment entered pursuant to subsections (a) and (b).
24
Id. at 283-84. See also Anthony v. Clark, 335 Md. 579, 589 (1994); Houghton v. County Commissioners of Kent County, 305 Md. 407, 413 (1986).
62
Waters v. Whiting, 133 Md. App. 474, 474 (1997)(notice of appeal filed prematurely, prior to the withdrawal or disposition of timely filed motions under Rules 2-532, 2-533 or 2- 534, will be effective; only processing of that appeal is delayed until the withdrawal or dis- position of the motion(s)).
Trial Reporter nor will use of the words
mature.62
A motion to revise judgment63
(Rule 2-535), filed within ten days of the entry of judgment will likewise stay the time for noting an appeal. However, a motion to revise judgment filed more than ten days (but within thirty days) after entry of judgment, does not affect the fi- nality of the judgment and does not stay the time for noting an appeal. In the lat- ter case, if an appeal is noted prior to the disposition of the motion, the circuit court is divested of jurisdiction and there- fore cannot rule on the motion.64
63
An order which is required to be certified under Rule 2-602, but which is not so certified, can be revised at any time until final disposition of all claims against all parties without regard to Rule 2-535. Quartertime Video, supra, 321 Md. at 65-66 (default judgment entered without regard to Rule 2-602 certification was interlocutory and subject to revision without regard to Rule 2-535). See also Bryans Road Building & Supply Co., Inc. v. Grinder, 46 Md. App. 10, 19-20 (1980), vacated on other grounds, 290 Md. 687 (1981). The filing of an appeal from an unappealable in- terlocutory order does not divest the lower court of jurisdiction. Smiley, supra, 12 Md. App. at 549- 51. Even when an appeal is taken from an im- mediately appealable interlocutory order, and the appeal is therefore not premature, the lower court is not divested of jurisdiction to proceed other- wise. Makovi, supra, 311 Md. at 283, n. 6.
64
Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane v. Tornillo, 320 Md. 192, 199-200 (1990); Allstate Insurance Co. v. Atwood, 319 Md. 247, 264 (1990); B & K Rent- als and Sales Co., Inc. v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 319 Md. 127, 132 (1990); Yarema, supra, 305 Md. at 241, n. 19; Unnamed Attorney, supra, 303 Md. at 480-86; Marousek v. Sapra, 87 Md. App. 205, 215, cert. denied, 324 Md. 325 (1991); Pickett v. Noba, Inc., 122 Md. App. 566, 570, cert. denied, 354 Md. 663 (1998); Sieck v. Sieck, 66 Md. App. 37, 40-44 (1986). Popham v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., 333 Md. 136, 142- 44 (1993) (motions for reconsideration filed af- ter court verbally ruled on issue in dispute did not divest judgment subsequently entered and certified pursuant to Rule 2-602(b) of finality in that final judgment rendered motions for recon- sideration moot; motions were not post-judgment motions as lower court’s earlier oral ruling was not intended to be conclusive as evidenced by court’s indication it would sign an order to be submitted by counsel embodying that ruling); See also Waters v. Whiting, 113 Md. App. 464 (1997), in which the Court of Special Appeals held that, when judgment is rendered, in a multi- party action, on all claims against all parties and one or more, but fewer than all, of the parties files a timely motion under Rules 2-532 through 2-534, the time for noting an appeal is stayed not only as to the party filing the post-trial mo- tion but as to all remaining parties. Id. at 470.
Summer 2000
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