Facilitation & Security Historically, immigration requirements and, more specifically, the provisions of Annex 9 to the ICAO Chicago Convention – Facilitation, have driven much of the collaboration between government and industry in the area of document verification. Some of the most notable amendments to Annex 9 came as a result of recommendations adopted at the Twelfth Session of the ICAO Facilitation Division (FAL/12) (Cairo, Egypt, 22 March to 01 April 2004) regarding the inclusion of “[ … ] Machine Readable Travel Documents (MRTDs), the deployment of biometric technologies in travel documents, aviation security, travel document fraud and illegal immigration, advance passenger information, international health issues and regulations, and assistance to aircraft accident victims and their families.” As a positive outcome from a government
control authority (immigration and customs) perspective, there has indeed been a marked shift in focus. Increasingly the focus has honed in on inspection techniques based on risk management, with the multiple objectives of increasing efficiency, reducing congestion in airports and enhancing security; to controlling abuses such as narcotics trafficking and travel document fraud; and supporting the growth of international trade and tourism. However, this shift in focus is largely concentrated on border, rather than aviation, security.
Back to Basics
Rather than getting lost in the detail as to how such concepts as the IATA Checkpoint of the Future can be implemented, or to slow the pace of change that would ultimately see enhanced documentation controls deployed throughout the passenger journey and across the industry, we would do well to return to some simple, basic principles. It is clearly vital to the security of our industry that we know who is onboard our aircraft and to recognise the potential risks associated with continuing to support procedures
that,
despite our best
intentions, still allow passengers to exploit vulnerabilities in the system and board aircraft with counterfeit or forged travel documents. If we cannot establish the identities of the passengers onboard our aircraft, we cannot reasonably expect to be able to assess the potential risk they may pose to the safety of the flight, its passengers and crew, nor the security of the country to which they are travelling.
If “John
Terrorist” can board an aircraft with a counterfeit document in the name of “John Tourist”, we have failed in our duty of care and many will suffer the consequences.
“…if ‘John Terrorist’ can board an aircraft with a counterfeit document in the name of ‘John Tourist’, we have failed in our duty of care and many will suffer the consequences…”
Known Traveller Programmes – Differentiated / Expedited Security Screening The proliferation of e-Passports and the growing interest in Known Traveller Programmes deserves our attention. Again, one of the foundations of the IATA Checkpoint of the Future concept is the need to establish Known Traveller Programmes, that are interoperable across national borders, and that afford expedited security screening to those passengers whose identity can be established and for whom the risk assessment response delivers a comparatively low score. Using biometric identifiers to establish, beyond any reasonable doubt, that the biometric contained within the travel document is the same as the one
being presented by the passenger, provides us with a good starting point from which to subsequently conduct the risk assessment. However, the integrity of biometric travel documents and the data contained within them are only as reliable as the integrity of the overall document issuance process.
if “John Terrorist” can falsify the application for a new passport, exploit vulnerabilities in the document issuance process, or obtain a genuine travel document by illegal means, we will still find ourselves in the unwanted position of incorrectly identifying him as “John Tourist”.
The Road Ahead As we move forward in our relentless pursuit of securing the aviation industry, the role of enhanced document verification will play a vital part. Wherever travel documents are read and passenger data is captured, we will need to carefully consider the importance of ensuring that these process points also enable us to verify the authenticity of the document being presented.
Again,
Today, most document
readers are to be found at the check-in desk or indeed as an integrated component of self-service kiosks. Tomorrow, we will need to ensure that these devices are also capable of document verification. Moreover, we advocate the deployment of enhanced document verification tools at the airside/landside border and/or at the entrance to the restricted zone, prior to the screening checkpoint. While cost implications are clearly an important factor, we would also advocate the deployment of the same tools at the
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June 2012 Aviationsecurityinternational
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