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Decisions — continued from Previous Page


(2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 297 [115 Cal.Rptr.3d 453], decided a few months later. In Nazir the defense had argued that summary judgment was appropriate on the discrimination claims because the supervisor who terminated Nazir’s employment had also participated in his promotion a few years earlier. Nazir rejected this argument, known as the “same actor defense”, clarifying that while an inference of nondiscrimination may be drawn from such circumstances, there is no same actor presumption under California law. (Nazir, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at 272-273.) Nazir further held that such same actor evidence should be looked at in context and not given any “undue importance.” (Id. at 273.)


Sandell extended Nazir’s rejection of


the “same actor” defense, which was based on the fact that the same person both hired and fired the plaintiff within a period of four years. In limiting the “same actor” defense, Sandell noted that, even if a ‘strong inference’ of no discrimination exists, [it] would not be a reason to grant summary judgment in [the defendant’s favor]. A strong inference is just that – an inference. The fact that a juror could reasonably draw a different inference is sufficient to preclude summary judgment. (Id. at 324) As the four cases discussed make


clear, the trend of recent decisions in California appellate courts has overwhelmingly favored employees, providing them with clear authority for


using additional types of circumstantial evidence to prove discrimination, harassment and retaliation. In little more than a year, the courts


have made the following critical rulings: • Ruled that evidence of other discrimination victims working in the same workplace as plaintiff is per se admissible, • Authorized the use of so called “me too” evidence in other workplaces within the same company for purposes of proving the level of reprehensibility to support a claim for punitive damages, • Held that discriminatory personnel actions may be used to prove discriminatory animus motivated other acts of harassment that are not overtly discriminatory on their face, • Rejected the “stray remarks” doctrine


90— The Advocate Magazine APRIL 2011


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