as not sufficiently “adverse,” and then move on to the next piece of evidence. But this is precisely what the Supreme Court’s Yanowitz decision condemns. The Court held: We need not and do not decide


whether each alleged retaliatory act constitutes an adverse action in and of itself. Yanowitz has alleged that L’Oreal’s actions formed a pattern of systematic retaliation for her opposition to Wiswall’s discriminato- ry directive. Contrary to L’Oreal’s asser- tion that it is improper to consider collec- tively the alleged retaliatory acts, there is no requirement that an employee’s retaliatory acts constitute one swift blow, rather than a series of subtle, yet damaging, injuries. (36 Cal.4th at 1055, emphasis added).


The defense often asserts that there


was no evidence that the defendant’s con- duct unreasonably interfered with plain- tiff’s salary or benefits. Yet, FEHA specifi- cally notes that “Loss of tangible job bene- fits shall not be necessary in order to establish harassment.” (Gov. Code,§ 12940 (j)(1).) The governing standard is whether or not the conduct “was severe enough or sufficiently pervasive to alter the conditions of [plaintiff’s] employment and cre- ate a hostile or abusive work environment.” (Lyle, supra, 38 Cal.4th at 283, original emphasis.)


Plaintiff cannot prove pretext In reliance on the Court’s decision in


Guz v Bechtel Nat’l Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317 [100 Cal.Rptr.2d 352], defense coun- sel almost always articulate the “legitimate


nondiscriminatory action” defense to FEHA claims. In Guz, the Court stated that an employee may raise a presump- tion of discrimination by presenting a “prima facie case.” The elements of plain- tiff’s showing vary with the nature of the case, but typically require evidence that: “(1) [the plaintiff] was a member of a protected class ..., (2) he was qualified for the position he sought or was performing competently in the position he held, (3) he suffered an adverse employment action, such as termination, demotion, or denial of an available job, and (4) some other circumstance suggests discriminato- ry ... motive. [Citations.]” (Id. at 355.) Once plaintiff has made this show-


ing, the burden shifts to the defense to dispel the presumption of discrimina- tion by articulating some legitimate,


APRIL 2011 The Advocate Magazine — 63


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