Distributor & Supplier Focus
installed. Other bugs could allow criminals to stealmoney, intellectual property, andmilitary intelligence.
After more than 200 pages of analysis, the U.S. Commerce
Department survey provides this simple but effective recommendation: “Buy parts directly from OCMs and authorized distributors, rather than from parts brokers, independent distributors, or the gray market.”
suspected counterfeit parts. There is one that can, but “reporting is low due to the perceived legal implications of reporting prior to a full investigation.”
The GAO report recommends that the Secretary of Defense
Plan ahead for obsolescence, even fromthe design-in stage
increase current anti-counterfeiting initiativeswith a clear definition of counterfeit parts and the establishment of “consistent practices for preventing, detecting, reporting, and disposing of counterfeit parts.” This information, the report says, should be provided to all DOD components and defense contractors. Finally, the knowledge and data collected should be used to develop strategies tomitigate risks caused by counterfeit parts.
Senators weigh in
This advice can be applied in all industries that use semiconductors in their critical applications, because counterfeiters target every segment of the market, not just the military. These days, it is common for the life of products or systems to extend for 20 or 30 years, while the semiconductors they require become unavailable from original manufacturers in only a few years. These situations are prime targets for counterfeiters.When the part is no longer available from the original manufacturer, only an authorized distributor, such as Rochester Electronics, can guarantee the authenticity and excellent quality of the semiconductor components they distribute and manufacture.
GAO report
In Q1 of 2010, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report entitled “Defense Supplier Base: DOD Should Leverage Ongoing Initiatives in Developing Its ProgramtoMitigate Risk of Counterfeit Parts.” This report states that the “DOD draws froma large network of global suppliers andmanages over fourmillion different parts at a cost of over $94 billion.” On the subject of screening for counterfeit parts, the report states, “DOD does not currently have a policy or specific processes for detecting and preventing counterfeit parts. Existing procurement and quality- control practices used to identify deficient parts are limited in their ability to prevent and detect counterfeit parts in DOD’s supply chain.” The report says that some DOD entities have established their own criteria for identifying counterfeit parts, but there is no department-wide definition for the termcounterfeit. Additionally,most government databases have no way of tracking
26 | Annual Edition 2011
In August this year, Senator Tom Carper (D-Del.) and Senator Sherrod Brown (D-Ohio) addressed the issue of counterfeit defense-related parts in a letter to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics, U.S. Department of Defense. Sen. Carper is a veteran and senior member of the Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee. In a press release published on hisWeb site, he says, “Our troops put their lives on the line for us every day and we owe it to them to ensure that the equipment that they depend on to do their job is safe and secure. These reports raise troubling questions about the Department of Defense’s, and quite frankly all federal agencies, ability to safeguard government equipment from infiltration with counterfeit parts. We can, and must, do better. And Brown adds, “Counterfeit parts manufactured offshore not only hurt American manufacturing and competitiveness, but in this case, have the potential to put our military at risk and jeopardize our national security missions. The Department of Defense and the entire Administration must do more to ensure that counterfeit parts are removed from the DOD supply chain and to ensure the integrity of our military operations both here and abroad.”
The senators’ letter cites conditions outlined in both the U.S.
Commerce Department study and the Government Accountability Office study, and urges the Department of Defense to establish “guidance, including consistent practices for preventing, detecting, reporting, and disposing of counterfeit parts.”
George Karalias is Director ofMarketing at Rochester Electronics, an authorized manufacturer/distributor that specializes in Extension-of-Life™ programs for semiconductors
www.rocelec.com www.electronics-sourcing.com
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