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THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 2010 Generals criticized surge, Woodward writes


Trio in civilian posts were most skeptical


of Afghan war strategy BY GREG JAFFE


A new book by BobWoodward


on the Obama administration’s Afghan war deliberations pres- ents three generals in the White House and State Department as themilitary’s toughest,most per- sistent andmost skeptical critics. President Obama, who took


officewith relatively little experi- ence with the military, tapped the generals for key positions that are traditionally filled by civilians. The selections led some critics


to complain that the appoint- ments amounted to the militari- zation of the administration’s foreign policy. The Woodward book, however, consistently shows the three officers — re- tired Lt.Gen.KarlW. Eikenberry, retired Gen. James L. Jones and Lt. Gen. Douglas Lute — em- broiled in heated disputes with the brass. Lute, the National Security


Council’s unofficial “war czar” and the sole active-duty general among the group, is portrayed as among the biggest skeptics of the military’s strategy to send a surge of more than 30,000 addi- tional troops into Afghanistan in an effort to shift the momentum away fromthe Taliban. In late November, as the presi-


dent made the decision to esca- late the U.S. commitment to the war, Lute warned him that the approach was unlikely to suc- ceed. “Mr. President, you don’t have


to do this,” Woodward quotes Lute as saying. The Army general maintained


that the Taliban’s ability to ex- ploit Pakistani safe havens, the persistent corruption within the Afghan government and the poor state of the Afghan security forc- esmade it unlikely that the surge of forces would produce major changes in Afghanistan by July 2011. Lute’s strident questioning of


the military’s preferred strategy drew a stern rebuke from Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military’s top officer. “The secretary and I believe


youweren’t always helpful in the course of the review,” Mullen is quoted as telling Lute. “I hope the president doesn’t


have the same view,” Lute re- sponded. The Pentagon declined to


comment on the revelations in Woodward’s book. “We’re not in the business of offering literary criticism, andwe are not going to start now,” said Geoff Morrell, the Pentagon press secretary. “Our focus is on the mission moving forward in Afghanistan.” Senior White House officials


didn’t dispute Woodward’s de- piction of last fall’s policy review as an emotional and often con- tentious process. They said the president is depicted in the ac- count as decisive,willing to chal- lenge the military brass and


deeply engaged in the war effort. The detailed meeting-by-


meeting account, titled “Obama’s Wars,” describes how the top military and civilian officials in the Pentagon essentially barred serious consideration of any course of action that involved deploying fewer than the 30,000 additional troops that Obama eventually approved. Despite the critiques from Lute, Jones and Eikenberry, the only options that were seriously considered in the White House involved 30,000 to 40,000more troops.


MELINA MARA/THE WASHINGTON POST


Gen. StanleyA.McChrystal led the war effort in Afghanistan until this summer, when he was replaced byGen. David H. Petraeus.


Obama selected Eikenberry


and Jones and retained Lute, who was a holdover from the Bush administration, to compen- sate for his own lack of experi- ence and contacts with the mili- tary. Each of the three registered


their concerns about the strategy in different ways. In early No- vember 2009, Eikenberry, the U.S. ambassador to Kabul, draft- ed a cable that was sharply critical of the military’s counter- insurgency strategy in Afghani- stan, saying it was likely to both


BRENDAN SMIALOWSKI/GETTY IMAGES


Lt.Gen. Douglas Lute held firm to his belief that the troop surge would not produce major changes, earning a rebuke fromMullen.


“increase Afghan dependency” on the United States and force the U.S. government to incur “vastly increased costs.” Jones, Obama’s national secu-


rity adviser, similarly was able to use his contacts in the Pentagon and knowledge of how the mili- tary’s vast bureaucracy functions to question the Pentagon’s re- quests for forces. The three generals’ efforts,


however, seemto have had only a modest influence on the final war strategy — in part because top Pentagon officials such as


Mullen, Gen. David H. Petraeus andDefense Secretary RobertM. Gates presented a united front in opposition to deploying any few- er than 30,000 additional troops. Despite continuing high levels


of violence in Afghanistan and ebbing popular support for the war effort, the often heated de- bate surrounding the war strate- gy has moderated in recent weeks. Both administration and Pentagon officials portray a De- cember review of the strategy as unlikely to produce any major changes in approach. “This will


PETE SOUZA/WHITE HOUSE


President Obama conferred with, from left, national security adviser James Jones; Adm.MikeMullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates; and Secretary of StateHillary Rodham Clinton aboardMarine One in December 2009, on his way to unveil the Afghan surge strategy in a speech at theU.S.Military Academy.


be about fine-tuning,” said a senior Pentagon official. “It is not going to be another review like the fall.” The next major question fac-


ing Obama is howquickly hewill begin to pull troops out of Af- ghanistan after July 2011, his stated deadline to begin the withdrawal process. Petraeus, who took over as top commander in Afghanistan this summer, has advocated a gradual removal as responsibility for security is shifted to the Afghans. Gates and Petraeus have said


that the U.S. troop surge and strategy focused on protecting the Afghan people from Taliban insurgents appear to be showing tentative signs of progress. But concerns remain about


the competence of the Afghan security forces and President Hamid Karzai’s government, which is deeply unpopular among Afghans and perceived as corrupt.Mostmilitary officials in Afghanistan cite poor gover- nance and corruption as the major factors driving the insur- gency. Although the United States is engaged in large-scale operations to drive the Taliban from population centers in the south and the east, military offi- cials complain that there is still no coherent strategy to dealwith governance and corruption problems.


jaffeg@washpost.com Covert paramilitary presence in Afghanistan larger than thought afghanistan from A1


ingmissions. The WikiLeaks reports, which


cover the escalationof theAfghan insurgency from 2004 until the end of 2009, include many de- scriptions of the activities of the “OGA” and “Afghan OGA” forces. OGA, which stands for “other government agency,” is generally used as a reference to the CIA. Inclipped and coded language,


the field logs provide glimpses into the kinds of operations un- dertaken by the CIA and its Afghan paramilitary units along the Pakistani border. In addition to accounts of snatch-and-grab operations targeting insurgent leaders, the logs contain casualty reports from battles with the Taliban, summaries of electronic intercepts of enemy communica- tions and hints of the heavy firepower at the CIA’s disposal. The CIA declined to comment


on the Counterterrorism Pursuit Teams. A Pakistani official said the government will not com- ment on Woodward’s book until after it is released. AU.S. official familiarwith the


operations, speaking on the con- dition of anonymity, described the teams as “one of the best Afghan fighting forces,” adding that they have made “major con- tributions to stability and securi- ty.”


The official said that the teams’


primary mission is to improve security in Afghanistan and that they do not engage in “lethal


action” when crossing into Paki- stan. Their cross-bordermissions are “designed exclusively for in- telligence collection,” the official said. In addition to Firebase Lilley,


in Paktika province, the WikiLeaks logs reveal the exis- tence of an “OGA compound” at Forward Operating Base Orgun-E, another U.S. military installation in Paktika. The field reports show that


casualties are common for Af- ghan paramilitary forces training and operating there. On Oct. 6, 2009, for example,


an “OGA-trained” fighter was ambushed near Orgun-E while off duty, according to one log; he was treated on the base for gun- shotwounds to the face, lower leg and hand. The logs also indicate that the


CIA and its Afghan units are at times involved in heavy fighting, in contrast to long-standing per- ceptions that the agency has largely served to direct attacks carried out byU.S. SpecialOpera- tions forces or conventionalmili- tary units. On Aug. 11, 2008, U.S. soldiers


stationed at Firebase Lilley re- ported that insurgents were tar- geting the basewith rocket fire, a common occurrence. The sol- diers responded at first with counterfire but then paused be- cause of the “OGA dropping bombs,” including three 500- pound explosives, according to an Army field report. The coun- terattack apparently worked, as no casualties were reported. According to the logs, CIA


forces also have mortars in their arsenal. On at least one occasion,


The Counterterrorism Pursuit Teams are “one of the best Afghan fighting forces” and have “made major contributions to stability and security.”


—A U.S. official familiar with the operations


in March 2008, the CIA used 81-millimeter rockets to repel an attack on Forward Operating Base Chapman, the same com- pound that a Jordanian suicide bomber later targeted in Dec. 30, 2009, killing seven CIA opera- tives. Chapman is in Khost prov- ince, also near the Pakistani bor- der. The agency’s paramilitary


wing, known as the Special Activ- ities Division, has been active in Afghanistan since


the


U.S.-backed effort to oust the Taliban government began in 2001.But current and formerU.S. intelligence officials said that the CIA almost immediately began assembling an elite Afghan com- mando force that has expanded in scale andmission over the past nine years. A former senior CIA official


involved in the formation of the Counterterrorism Pursuit Teams said the first unit was created in Kabul shortly after the U.S.- backed invasion in 2001. The teambased inthe capital remains the largest and most sophisticat- ed, and it is routinely used to carry out operations elsewhere in the country, the former official said. Over the past eight years, how-


ever, newunits have been created inother locations, includingKan- dahar. Their missions vary from sensitive intelligence-gathering operations to carefully orches- trated takedowns of Taliban tar- gets. When intelligence indicates a


Taliban or al-Qaeda presence in a nearby village, the teams often make the first move. “You might knock on the door. Youmight ask a neighbor.Or youmight raid the place,” the former official said. Most of the teams are trained


in Afghanistan by CIA and U.S. Special Operations forces. “Un- like the Afghan army, these guys are fairly well paid, very well motivated,” the former official said. The Army field reports suggest


that the Afghan paramilitary forces can also be ruthless. On Oct. 23, 2007, military personnel at Orgun-E reported treating a 30-year-old Afghan man for the “traumatic amputation of fin- gers” onhis left hand.The patient had been “injured by Afghan OGA during a home breach,” according to the report. The CIA has been running


operations for several years from its eastern Afghan bases, which generally are shared with U.S. Special Operations forces and othermilitary units. U.S. officials said that the CIAand themilitary frequently use different names for the same base and that the agency code names do not neces- sarily correspondwiththoseused in theWikiLeaks records. In October 2003, two Ameri-


cans working on contract for the CIA were killed near a U.S. mili- tary outpost inthe ShkinValley in Paktika province. The outpost, then known as Firebase Shkin, was renamed in 2007 to honor Master Sgt.Arthur L. Lilley, aU.S.


Special Forces soldier who was killed in a firefight there. The CIA has also used the


borderbases tobuildandmanage networks of ethnic Pashtun infor- mants who cross into Pakistan’s tribal belt. In combination with near-constant surveillance from U.S. drone aircraft in the skies, the informants have enabled the CIA to identify the whereabouts of al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders. That has led to an exponential


increase inmissile attacks by the drones. The CIA has carried out 71 drone strikes inPakistani terri- tory this year, more than double the number for all of 2008, ac- cording to statistics compiled by the New America Foundation. At the same time, the border-


hugging bases have reduced the CIA’s dependence on Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence direc- torate, a mercurial spy service that has helped track down doz- ens of al-Qaeda and other insur- gent leaders but is also consid- ered a secret supporter of the Afghan Taliban. For years, the ISI restricted


CIA operatives to Pakistani bases in the tribal belt and strictly controlled access to its sources in the region.As a result, theAmeri- canswere kept largely in the dark about the presence of al-Qaeda and Taliban forces on that side of the border.


whitlockc@washpost.com millergreg@washpost.com


Staff researcher Julie Tate contributed to this report.


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